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Introduction
The ontological problem is characterized by Quine as the question on what
there is. This question can be split into smaller issues according to the way
we describe the world: common sense, chemistry, computer science, physics,
and so on. Mathematics plays a crucial role in our web of beliefs, because
it seems indispensable to the scientific picture of the world. Because this
is so, part of the ontological problem takes the form of what mathematics
is about: that is, whether mathematical objects exist or not. If there are
such objects, like numbers, it seems we ought to regard them as abstracta:
causally inert objects that are outside of space-time and mind-language in-
dependent. This is because no one can build a telescope to detect where
mathematical objects are, no one can break a Turing machine, and no one
can causally interact with numbers. The view that mathematical abstracta
exist is called Platonism, whereas the view according to which there is no
commitment to such objects is called anti-Platonism.
Anti-Platonism is a broad name for a large number of different positions
that are divided into two classes: anti-Platonist realism and anti-Platonist
anti-realism. According to the former, mathematical objects exist but are
not abstracta, whereas, according to the latter, mathematical objects do
not exist at all. Both views are generally driven by the weak epistemology
of abstract objects, that is, by the fact that it is hard to account for how
the correlation between belief states and abstract objects occurs. Episte-
mological arguments against Platonism are based on manifold theories of
knowledge (e.g. the causal theory of knowledge, reliabilism, etc.) but they
5
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all point to the same problem: no epistemic story can bridge the gap be-
tween belief states and abstract objects. And if we lack such an epistemic
story, it might be questionable whether or not to include abstracta in our
ontology.
The Platonist has a straightforward reply to such epistemological wor-
ries: the indispensability arguments. According to one of the most impor-
tant versions of the indispensability argument, if mathematical objects are
indispensable to our best scientific theories, we ought to have ontological
commitment to such objects independently of any epistemological concern.
Because the indispensability argument aims to overcome any epistemologi-
cal objection, it is perhaps the best argument for Platonism. In this regard,
there have been many attempts at disarming the indispensability argument
without committing to any sort of revisionism of actual scientific practice.
I should like to present the best examples of such attempts by advocating
the distinction between the ‘hard road’ and the ‘easy road’ to anti-Platonism:
hard-road strategies paraphrase physical, or mathematical, statements in
order to dispense with mathematical objects; easy-road strategies also re-
ject abstract objects but do not require that physics and mathematics be
paraphrase-bound.
I will examine three ‘hard roads’: Field’s nominalization of classical me-
chanics and Newtonian gravitational theory, Chihara’s constructibility the-
ory, and Hellman’s modal reconstruction of arithmetic. I intend to consider
the best-developed of all nominalist reconstructions: the best anti-realist
hard roads available to us.
According to Field, it is possible to show that the mathematical objects
we refer to in classical mechanics and Newtonian gravitational theory are
dispensable. Roughly speaking, Field’s argument proceeds as follows: if the
physical consequences we can derive by using mathematics are the same as
those we can derive from a body of pure physical assertions, then mathemat-
ical objects are dispensable. As a result, the statements that existentially
quantify over mathematical objects, such as ‘there are infinitely many prime
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numbers’, turn out to be false. Under the assumption that mathematical
objects do not exist, a large number of mathematical assertions turn out to
be false. But according to Field, mathematics does not need to be true to
be useful: it merely needs to be a device for making calculations easier. And
if it is possible to extend Field’s approach to all our best scientific theories,
the indispensability argument will be disarmed.
Chihara provides an extensive reconstruction of mathematics without
ontological commitment to mathematical abstracta. In this regard, Chi-
hara settles on a nominalistic interpretation of mathematics through the
constructibility theory, namely a first-order language equipped with con-
structibility quantifiers. Constructibility quantifiers are concrete tokens
(marks on paper, or on screen, etc.) that explain the rules for building se-
quences of concrete tokens. Such sequences are in turn employed to replace
mathematical objects, formal relations, mathematical properties and so on.
To put it another way, Chihara’s goal is to find a surrogate of mathematical
objects that is nominalistically acceptable. Moreover, Chihara makes use of
the modal operator ‘it is possible to construct X’, where X is conceived as
a token located in space and time.
Hellman develops a modal strategy that offers some analogies to Chi-
hara’s. According to Hellman, mathematics is about possible structures.
For instance, Peano Arithmetic is the study of the possible structures (i.e.
progressions or ω-sequences) that satisfy Peano axioms. Hellman’s modal
structuralism assumes that mathematical structures are possible, but does
not force any commitment to actual structures. In addition, there is no
ontological commitment to the objects that occur in structures. Hellman
also presents a truth-translation scheme according to which all ordinary
mathematical statements can be translated into statements about possible
structures. The translation scheme allows Hellman to recover arithmetic,
real analysis, and set theory partially, given the hypothetical existence of
suitable mathematical structures.
For a long time, ‘hard-road’ strategies attracted the attention of anti-
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Platonists. However, there have been many objections to such approaches.
For example, some philosophers point out how Field’s nominalization in-
volves mathematical abstracta (i.e. models) surreptitiously; others stress
technical difficulties in extending Field’s approach to other branches of con-
temporary physics. Turning to Chihara, it is open to question whether or not
constructibility quantifiers require possible worlds semantics, and Hellman,
for his part, needs to clarify how we can get knowledge of possible math-
ematical structures. These and other problems have led anti-Platonists to
develop new strategies that do not require any paraphrasing of mathemat-
ical, or physical statements. In this regard, I will consider the following
‘easy roads’ to anti-Platonism: Azzouni’s neutralism, Yablo’s presupposi-
tionalism, and Maddy-Sober’s objection to confirmation holism.
Azzouni seeks to reject Quine’s criterion for ontological commitment,
where commitment is tracked down in formulas of the form ∃xP (x). In
Quine’s view, if existential quantifiers range over a domain of discourse, and
the truth of an existential formula such as ∃xP (x) is given by the satisfac-
tion of an object x, existential quantifiers are always ontologically marked.
By applying Quine’s criterion to a domain of discourse, we get a straightfor-
ward way of identifying what that discourse is about. However, according to
Azzouni, existential quantifiers are neutral in the sense that quantification is
not sufficient to carry any ontological commitment: we also need a story that
shows how the objects in question are independent of psychological processes
and language. Azzouni notices how a sentence such as ‘there are numbers’
leads to a commitment to numbers so long as ‘there is’ carries ontological
weight; but Azzouni distinguishes the ontological commitment of a sentence
from what a sentence is about: there are sentences about something even if
they do not force ontological commitment to what they refer to. In the end,
Azzouni’s strategy does not need any paraphrasing of mathematical state-
ments insofar as quantification is released from ontological commitment and
if, in addition, mathematical objects are mind– and language– dependent.
According to Yablo, the physical content of a theory can be represented
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as what is left after subtracting the proposition that mathematical objects
exist from that theory. In this regard, Yablo develops a general approach
called ‘logical subtraction’ in order to strip away unwanted propositions
that presuppose the existence of mathematical objects. Here the challenge
is to show that even though a proposition such as ‘there are no numbers’ is
false, its failure makes no difference to how matters stand in relation to the
physical world. Although complex, the entire procedure does not require
any sort of paraphrasing of mathematical, or physical, sentences. To make
logical subtraction work, Yablo invokes powerful philosophical mechanisms:
propositions, possible worlds and subject matters.
Consider this argument for Platonism: it could be argued that the em-
pirical success of a theory confirms both the existence of physical objects
and the mathematical entities involved. If mathematics is true because it
is empirically confirmed, we ought to commit ourselves to the existence of
mathematical entities as well as we do to the existence of physical objects. In
this regard, confirmation holism states that scientific theories are confirmed
as a whole. I intend to present two objections to confirmation holism: on the
one hand, Maddy argues that confirmation holism does not corroborate the
existence of mathematical objects that are employed in physical theories;
on the other hand, Sober argues that mathematics does not need empirical
confirmation to be true, nor is it affected by the falsification of empirical the-
ories. In point of fact, both Maddy and Sober dismiss the indispensability
argument that is based on confirmation holism.
The ‘easy roads’ to anti-Platonism I mentioned earlier lead to either
realism or anti-realism. But other ‘easy roads’ can be considered: Balaguer’s
anti-metaphysical view and Bueno’s agnostic nominalism. These positions
neither endorse nor reject the existence of abstract objects, but lead to the
conclusion that we should suspend our judgment on whether mathematical
abstracta exist or not. The issue is not that the metaphysical debate is
meaningless or faulty: instead, according to Balaguer, there is no fact of
the matter as to whether or not abstract objects exist whereas, according
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to Bueno, we cannot ever know whether or not such objects exist: perhaps
they exist, perhaps they do not.
For Balaguer, we do not have any good arguments for and against the
existence of abstract objects. Philosophers have not come up with any good
arguments because there is no fact of the matter as to whether abstract
objects exist. If this is so, Balaguer argues that we do not have any reasons
for choosing between Platonism and anti-Platonism. Under the assumption
that full-blooded Platonism and fictionalism are respectively the best forms
of Platonism and anti-Platonism, Balaguer argues that the metaphysical
debate is factually empty. This is a valid argument inasmuch as the sentence
‘there are abstract objects’ does not have any (possible-worlds-style) truth-
conditions. Balaguer aims to show that if our usage does not determine
truth-conditions for ‘there are abstract objects’, we can imply that there is
no fact of the matter.
Bueno presents a view where the commitment to mathematical abstracta
is avoided without denying their existence. If abstracta are truly mind–
language independent, we cannot rule out their existence. Bueno argues that
agnosticism can account for the application of mathematics to the physical
world and, in addition, agnosticism can take mathematical statements at
face value as the Platonist does. With regard to the former point, Bueno
claims that mathematicians deal with mathematical artifacts whereas, with
regard to the latter, the agnostic can maintain that mathematical objects
would be abstracta if they happened to exist.
By way of a conclusion, I intend to advance my own agnostic view.
I would argue that even if there is no epistemic role for mathematical
abstracta, that claim, on its own, does not say anything about the non-
existence of mathematical abstracta. In other words, that claim is compati-
ble with the existence, or non-existence, of mathematical abstracta. I would
also argue that abstract objects have good reasons for lacking any epistemic
role. The fact that abstract objects have no epistemic role just implies that
nothing epistemically relevant to mathematical practice follows from the ex-
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istence, or non existence, of mathematical abstracta. If this is so, it does
not matter for mathematical practice whether or not abstracta exist. My
own agnostic position leads to the distinction between agnosticism about
abstract objects and global agnosticism; that is to say, my own agnostic
view is not an old-fashioned agnosticism. Finally, I will show how my own
agnostic view could open an easy-road to anti-Platonism that is compatible
with the indispensability argument. Additionally, I will demonstrate how
it overcomes Field’s challenge, and how it partially recovers confirmation
holism.
Chapter 1
Arguments for and against
Platonism
People take for granted the existence of the external world before they start
philosophizing. Some of them will reconsider their position later on, whereas
others will find compelling arguments for supporting their pre-philosophical
belief. It is not clear when exactly philosophy comes into the picture, but
philosophy is certainly involved once we ask ourselves what the external
world is. Imagine being a novice at philosophizing but, nonetheless, you
want to figure out what the external world is. The first thing you may no-
tice is that we are surrounded by medium-sized objects perceived through
the senses, and that the existence of such objects is somehow independent of
us. Later on, you will find that philosophers qualify these objects as mind–
and language– independent. Perhaps you are on the right track, but many
important items have been left out: objects that we do not perceive directly,
such as elementary particles, molecules, exoplanets. And such objects merit
an important role in the ontological picture no less than medium-sized ob-
jects. This is because perceived objects are not sufficient to account for
most empirical phenomena. For this reason, scientists postulate the exis-
tence of objects that can be detected only by extending the senses through
more and more sophisticated instruments. Ultimately, determining what ex-
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ists involves not just perception but also a considerable number of scientific
concepts.
Here lies the first question: what kind of scientific concepts should we
take into account? It seems as if we should look to our current best scientific
theories, because there is no reason to believe in the existence of something
that scientists dismissed a long time ago, e.g. the phlogiston. Here lies
another issue: if scientific theories are indispensable to addressing the onto-
logical problem, what is the nature of the entities involved? These entities,
say, are generally physical ones. However, scientific theories do quantify over
objects that do not seem to be physical at all: numbers, for instance. And
because our best scientific theories allow the quantification over abstract
objects, we ought to commit ourselves to the existence of mathematical ab-
stracta.1 That is, we ought to commit ourselves to the existence of objects
that are not physical on the basis of the way we describe the physical world.
Abstract objects seem to play an indispensable role not just in physical
theories but also in our common talk: propositions, concepts, and meanings
do not seem to refer to concrete objects, or to the mereological sum of con-
crete objects.2 Although people may have a sort of fundamental intuition3
that the world is made up of physical objects, abstract entities abound in
the scientific enterprise as well as in ordinary speech. This is because many
sentences, taken literally, seem to refer to abstracta. Hence, some philoso-
phers have come to the conclusion that abstract objects do exist, and unless
1We should at least commit ourselves to the existence of mathematical objects that
are indispensable to our best scientific theories. I will examine this statement in sec. n.
1.3 when I consider the indispensability argument.
2Mereology studies the relationships between an entity and its constituted parts. Unlike
sets, mereological sums can be conceived as concrete entities. At least in the light of
Leonard and Goodman’s analysis (1940), mereology is a formal theory that can be used
to develop a nominalistic program, i.e. calculus of individuals.
3Goodman and Quine (1947) claimed that whatever exists is concrete, and they regard
such a claim as a fundamental intuition. Goodman and Quine aim to build a nominalistic
syntax in order to avoid referring to abstract objects. Moreover, Goodman and Quine
reject every predicate, definition, and sentence that is supposed to refer to abstract objects.
It is well known how Quine distanced himself from his early position.
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we can dispense with that concept, the fundamental intuition is seriously
under attack.
Addressing the ontological problem is not straightforward. The answer
to the question ‘what is there?’ cannot simply be “Everything”, because
‘everything’ does not take into account the fact that people have different
ontological positions on the same matter.4 And even if the disagreement
in question was faulty, that is, people think they disagree whereas they do
not, philosophers should explain in what sense there seem to be different
ontological positions. In any case, ‘everything’ does not specify what we
are ontologically committed to, and thus it does not address the ontological
problem.
Quine recognizes the existence of plural ontologies and, in addition, ad-
vances a way to settle the ontological disagreement: Quine’s criterion of
ontological commitment. The idea is to look to our best scientific theories,
regiment them into an interpreted first-order language, and track down the
ontological commitment in any formula of the form ∃xP (x).5 I will examine
Quine’s criterion in detail later on, but notice this:6 if existential quantifiers
range over a domain of discourse, and the truth of the formula ∃xP (x) is
given by an object that satisfies x, existential quantifiers force ontological
commitment to that object independently of its nature. The criterion applies
irrespective of whether x is a physical or an abstract object. If after regi-
menting our best scientific theories we find a statement such as ‘there are
numbers’, and numbers are considered abstract objects, Quine’s criterion
forces ontological commitment to mathematical abstracta.
But do abstract objects really exist? Philosophers disagree widely on
this matter. Concrete objects can be defined as things that have causal
powers in space and time: from things we perceive through the senses, like
a tennis ball, to objects we discover by using sophisticated instruments,
4See Quine (1948).
5Where x occurs free in P . See Quine (1948), (1951) and (1951b).
6When I consider Azzouni’s position on Quine’s criterion, I will explain that matter.
See sec. n. 3.1.2.
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like MRI.7 By contrast, abstract objects are not in space-time, nor have
causal powers: no one can build a telescope to detect the portion of space-
time where numbers are, no one can break Turing machines, no one can
causally interact with numbers, and so on.8 Because abstract objects have
such odd properties, philosophers have, for a long time, questioned their
existence. I shall call ‘anti-Platonists’ those philosophers who reject the
existence of abstract objects, and ‘Platonists’ those who believe that mind–
and language– independent abstract objects exist.9
Anti-Platonism is a term that encompasses many different positions:
nominalists, fictionalists, idealists, non-Platonist realists, and so on. It is
extremely difficult to take account of all these perspectives, so I need a philo-
sophical excuse to focus on some of them. I believe that many anti-Platonists
criticize Platonism mainly on the basis of epistemological arguments. Be-
cause anti-Platonists are generally skeptical about finding a good epistemol-
ogy for abstract objects, I will start with the epistemological objections to
abstract objects. More specifically, I will first examine the objections based
on the causal theory of knowledge.
1.1 Between a rock and a hard place: Benacerraf’s
argument
The causal theory of knowledge was not initially used as an argument against
Platonism. Goldman indeed employed the causal theory of knowledge only
to strengthen the classical concept of knowledge.10 According to this con-
cept, an epistemic agent knows that P iff P is both a true and justified
belief that is held by an epistemic agent. The definition highlights three
notions (truth, justification, belief) that play an important role in what we
7Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI). To avoid terminological ambiguities, I should
point out that ‘concrete’ is synonymous with ‘physical’.
8We causally interact with concreta: inscriptions, numerals, diagrams, and so on.
9I borrow the term ‘anti-Platonist’ from Balaguer’s Platonism and Anti-Platonism in
Mathematics (1998).
10See Goldman (1967).
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regard intuitively as knowledge. But there are at least two problems in such
a definition: first, how epistemic agents form their belief is missing and,
secondly, the definition is open to Gettier’s counter-examples.11 Goldman
aims at overcoming both problems by supplying the concept of knowledge
with causality. On this view, an agent knows that P iff P is both a true and
justified belief, and P is caused by its truthmaker.12 In other words, Gold-
man’s causal theory of knowledge requires the causal connection between
belief and its truthmaker in addition to the notions of truth, justification,
and belief.13
It is important to ask which kind of knowledge Goldman is referring to.
In Goldman’s view, the causal theory of knowledge concerns only empirical
knowledge:
My concern will be with knowledge of empirical propositions
only, since I think that the traditional analysis is adequate for
knowledge of non-empirical truths.14
Whereas Goldman applies the causal theory of knowledge only to em-
pirical contexts, Benacerraf runs his argument by using the causal theory of
knowledge against non-empirical truths.15 Of course, this is an important
11Suppose Tyler believes that ‘Lance owns a Chrysler’. Tyler can infer from that sen-
tence that 1) either Lance owns a Chrysler or Lance is in Boston; 2) either Lance owns a
Chrysler or Lance is in Miami; 3) either Lance owns a Chrysler or Lance is in Rome; and
so on. Now, suppose that Lance is really in Rome, but he has not kept Tyler posted. Does
Tyler know that Lance is in Rome? Intuitively, the answer is “no”. However, according
to Gettier, if the classical concept of knowledge was true, Tyler would know that Lance
is in Rome. This is because Tyler’s belief is true (Lance is in Rome) and justified (Tyler
had used logic to make that inference). Gettier’s counter-example suggests that there is
something wrong with the classical concept of knowledge. See Gettier (1963).
12P ’s truthmaker is the fact that makes P true.
13There are several problems with Goldman’s suggestion that I will not elaborate on,
because I would like to develop a discussion on Benacerraf’s use of the causal theory
of knowledge. A good, concise reconstruction of those problems can be found in Dancy
(1986), Ch. 2.
14Goldman (1967, p. 357).
15Benacerraf does not seem to assume that mathematical truths are empirical. See
1.1 Between a rock and a hard place: Benacerraf’s argument 17
shift for those who believe that mathematical knowledge is not empirical.
Benacerraf’s argument aims to challenge mathematical Platonism, but
it can be applied to any object that is supposed to be causally inert. Let
us call ‘broad Platonism’ the claim that abstract objects exist, and see how
the argument goes:
(P1) If broad Platonism is true, we should have knowledge of abstract ob-
jects.
(P2) If P1 is true, we should be causally related to abstract objects.
(P3) But we are not causally related to abstract objects.
(C) Broad Platonism is false.
Since mathematical Platonism is an instance of broad Platonism, the
argument can be applied to mathematical entities as well. Benacerraf’s
epistemological argument against mathematical Platonism is as follows: to
have mathematical knowledge, we should be causally related to mathemat-
ical entities. But because we cannot causally interact with mathematical
entities, i.e. they are abstracta, mathematical knowledge turns out to be
impossible. As a result, mathematical Platonism must be rejected if we
want to account for mathematical knowledge.16
Along the same lines as Benacerraf’s epistemological argument, the causal
theory of reference can be used against Platonism.17 If mathematical objects
are not stipulated, as the Platonist claims, we should refer to them through
Benacerraf (1973).
16When I talk about ‘mathematical Platonism’ from now on, I will refer to it as ‘Pla-
tonism’.
17See Kripke (1980). Roughly speaking, according to the causal theory of reference,
there are two ways to fix reference: by dubbing or by description. In the former case,
reference is fixed by perceiving objects, e.g. this dog is called ‘Fido’, whereas in the latter,
reference is fixed via stipulation, e.g. ‘Italy’ is the area that borders France, Switzerland,
Austria and Slovenia. In the case of proper names, reference occurs by a causal chain that
stretches back to the dubbing of the object with that name.
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sense organs. But given the inertness of mathematical objects, it is impos-
sible to explain how we can refer to them successfully. As a consequence,
Platonism makes the way we refer to mathematical objects inexplicable.
Both versions of Benacerraf’s argument are considered problematic nowa-
days. However, Benacerraf’s argument has the benefit of highlighting the
epistemological weakness of abstract objects, although within a restricted
linguistic and epistemological background. I will elaborate on the causal
theory of knowledge, but let me first note that Benacerraf’s argument is not
necessarily a step toward anti-realism. In fact, it is an argument for anti-
Platonism. Roughly speaking, a realist might accept that mathematical
entities exist in space and time; in this case, the interaction with math-
ematical entities would not be mysterious.18 I am not, of course, saying
that Benacerraf’s argument is useless for anti-realists. I merely think that
in order to serve as an argument for anti-realism, Benacerraf’s argument
should be supported by additional assumptions, for example by the claim
that mathematical entities do not exist in space and time, nor in our mind.
Let us examine Benacerraf’s argument starting with the least controver-
sial premise: the fact that we do not causally interact with abstract objects.
Some philosophers, such as Go¨del, argue that abstract objects are causally
related to us.19 According to Go¨del, epistemic agents interact with mathe-
matical abstracta via mathematical intuition, which makes possible mathe-
matical knowledge by connecting the epistemic agents to abstract objects,
such as perception connects epistemic agents to physical objects.
Go¨del’s analogy is rather obscure. We can explain how perception works
through chemical stimulation of the sense organs, whereas we do not have an
account of intuition of abstracta that is compatible with cognitive sciences.
In fact, it is not clear how to provide such an account since abstract objects
are outside of space and time.
To overcome Go¨del’s problem, Penelope Maddy attempted to explain
how we can get knowledge of mathematical objects via perception. Maddy’s
18The most famous advocate of this view is John Stuart Mill.
19Go¨del (1947).
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position is called ‘set-theoretical monism’, where mathematical intuition is
nothing but perception:
for the monist, all sets have physical grounding and spatio-temporal
location, and all physical objects are sets. These manoeuvres
produce a radical ‘one-worldism’ – a reality at once mathemat-
ical and physical – that should appeal to philosophers of this
stripe.20
Notice that Maddy is not supporting Platonism. If mathematical objects
are outside of space and time, there is no way they can be perceived. As
Balaguer highlights: “Maddy hasn’t naturalized platonism at all — she’s
abandoned it.21
I have already mentioned how the causal theory of knowledge requires a
causal connection between beliefs and their truthmakers. This requirement
is captured by the principle of causal knowledge: if an epistemic agent knows
that P , then he or she stands in a causal relation to P .22 It may sound trivial,
but standing in a causal relation to P is not a sufficient condition to know
that P . If there is a causal connection between an undiscovered particle and
us, this connection does not imply that we know the properties of the particle
in question. Nevertheless, according to the causal theory of knowledge, the
principle is a necessary condition to know that P . Hence rejecting such a
principle is the easiest way to defend Platonism from Benacerraf’s attack.
There are many strategies for dismissing the principle of causal knowl-
edge; but let me focus on the most prominent. I have previously mentioned
how Goldman applies the causal theory of knowledge only to empirical con-
texts. If one adheres to Goldman’s original idea, one needs to argue that
mathematical knowledge is empirical before turning the principle of causal
20Maddy (1990, p. 180).
21Balaguer (1998, p. 29). Since Maddy does not support Platonism but monism, I do
not need to discuss her approach.
22Philosophers refer to the principle of causal knowledge using different terms. Colyvan,
for example, calls it ‘the eleatic principle’. See Colyvan (2001), Ch. 3.
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knowledge against Platonism. Of course, such a response is not sufficient to
dismiss every objection to Platonism, because it is addressed to those who
believe that mathematical knowledge is empirical. Certainly, mathematics
includes some empirical elements, such as the fact that mathematicians make
use of pens, paper and computer software in order to do their job. More
importantly, empirical factors can influence mathematicians during their re-
search. However, what is at issue here is not that mathematical research
involves some empirical elements, but whether mathematical knowledge is
empirical or not. Here I will not address this problem, because the Platonist
does not need to argue that mathematical knowledge is empirical in order
to undermine Benacerraf’s argument, and the solution does not involve any
epistemological terms.
Platonists can avoid the problem concerning the nature of mathematical
knowledge by advocating the indispensability argument: we ought to commit
ourselves to all and only those objects that are indispensable to the best
scientific theories that we use.23 If mathematical objects must exist because
they are indispensable to our best theories that we use to describe the world,
the Platonist does not even need to reject the principle of causal knowledge
altogether. He, or she, can allow that the principle works in the empirical
sciences, but deny that mathematical knowledge needs causality. And if
the principle of causal knowledge cannot be applied to mathematics, then
Benacerraf’s argument is flawed.
Colyvan supports the indispensability argument and offers some natu-
ralistic reasons for invalidating the principle of causal knowledge.24 I call
them ‘naturalistic’ because they aim at undermining the principle of causal
knowledge through the interpretation of scientific practice, instead of advo-
cating a pure philosophical argument. In a nutshell, Colyvan argues that
scientific practice constantly violates the principle of causal knowledge, and
23I present the indispensability argument in sec. n. 1.3. I am going to argue that the
indispensability argument rises the most serious problem for those who want to distinguish
between concrete and abstract objects.
24Colyvan (2001).
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mentions some case studies where that happened. In this regard, Colyvan
presupposes that anti-Platonists would endorse a weak form of naturalism:
if a philosophical doctrine is inconsistent with science, we must drop our
philosophical misconception and adopt a new one that is consistent with
it. If the principle of causal knowledge turns out to be inconsistent with
scientific practice, Colyvan argues, the principle must be rejected.
Colyvan quotes several examples from the history of science to show how
the principle of causal knowledge does not seem likely to be true. Among
them, a nice example comes from the discovery of germanium.25 Although
there had been no causal contact with germanium before 1886, Mendeleeff
had noted that there was a gap in the Periodic Table of the Elements,
corresponding to the position of germanium. So Mendeleeff had good reasons
for believing in the existence of germanium before 1886, because his belief
had been founded on a solid background theory, i.e. the Periodic Table of
the Elements. If Mendeleeff had endorsed the principle of causal knowledge,
the discovery of germanium would have had a temporary setback. As a
consequence, the principle of causal knowledge turns out to be inconsistent
with scientific practice and must be rejected.
I think Colyvan is right to emphasize the fact that scientists do not al-
ways need a causal confirmation before committing themselves to the truth
of an empirical hypothesis. Nevertheless, causal interactions play an im-
portant role for scientists in confirming, or falsifying, empirical hypotheses.
Here are a few examples: the existence of germanium was only confirmed
in 1886 by Winkler, when he was able to isolate germanium in a sulfide
mineral called argyrodite; the existence of the planet Neptune was proved
only after Galle detected the planet at the Berlin Observatory; physicists
and engineers build accelerators that produce collisions between particles to
track down the existence of smaller and smaller objects; and so on. Even
if the causal theory of knowledge is wrong, causal interactions remain an
essential test-bed for empirical hypothesis.
25Colyvan (2001, pp. 44-45).
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1.2 Benacerraf revisited: the reliability claim
Benacerraf’s epistemological argument against the existence of abstract ob-
jects is based on the causal theory of knowledge. I will now consider how
to recast Benacerraf’s argument without referring to the causal theory of
knowledge. In this regard, I will examine Field’s version of Benacerraf’s
argument within the reliabilist theory of justification.
Reliabilism is a doctrine aimed at making precise our common under-
standing of the term ‘justification’.26 More precisely, reliabilism aims to
provide an account of ‘justified belief’ that is close enough to what people
ordinarily mean by that. The goal is to highlight the process of beliefs-
formation without using epistemic terms. The idea behind reliabilism is
that people are intuitively capable of distinguishing reliable processes of
beliefs-formation from unreliable ones even without a theory of knowledge
in the background.
According to reliabilism, an epistemic agent is reliable on a certain mat-
ter M if he, or she, has mostly true beliefs about M . In this regard, re-
liabilism highlights the tendency for an expert epistemic agent to produce
true beliefs. Even an expert epistemic agent can be wrong about his field,
of course, but what matters for him, or her, to be considered reliable is the
tendency of having mostly true beliefs about M . Expert mathematicians,
for example, can be wrong about the truth-value of a mathematical propo-
sition; nonetheless, we consider a mathematician reliable if he, or she, has
mostly true beliefs about mathematics.
Reliabilism is a theory of justification. If a belief arises out of a reliable
process, then it is justified. This does not require that the belief in question
be true — under the assumption that justification and truth are two different
matters. As I said, reliabilism grasps the fact that we regard someone as
an expert on a particular matter if he, or she, has mostly true beliefs about
that matter. Nonetheless, reliabilism may raise some worries for those who
26There are many versions of reliabilism but I will refer mainly to Goldman’s (1979)
view.
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look for a stronger theory of justification, since it is not clear how many
times an agent must have true beliefs in order to be considered reliable.27
Let us examine how Field’s argument against Platonism based on re-
liabilism goes. Field argues that the Platonist cannot explain why expert
mathematicians have mostly reliable beliefs about mathematics. For math-
ematicians to be reliable, a correlation between belief states and mathemat-
ical facts must hold.28 As previously observed, expert mathematicians can
be wrong about mathematical facts, but this is not what is at issue. The
point is that if there is some kind of correlation between mathematicians’
beliefs and mathematical facts, philosophers must explain why this correla-
tion does not occur by accident. To accept Field’s challenge, Platonists do
not even need to commit themselves to the existence of mathematical facts,
because the correlation between beliefs and facts can be stated in terms of
sentences: expert mathematicians tend to accept true mathematical sen-
tences. The process that leads mathematicians to true beliefs is captured
by this principle: most of the time,
The reliability claim: If expert mathematicians accept a mathematical
sentence S, then S is true.
Field argues that the Platonist should accept the reliability claim, since
it just expresses a non-accidental correlation between mathematical facts, or
mathematical sentences, and expert mathematicians’ beliefs. If an ordinary
person, by some fluke of luck, guesses the truth-value of a mathematical
sentence, we do not need to account for how he, or she, got it right — the
correlation simply occurred by accident. But expert mathematicians do not
guess the truth-values of mathematical sentences. This is why we need to
explain how they generally get them right.
27I will address the problem when I come to consider in what sense Field’s argument is
a challenge for the Platonist.
28Field’s argument is presented in several papers. See for example Field (1989, pp.
230–239).
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I would like to examine what the minimal requirements for the relia-
bility claim are. To do this, I am going to semi-formalize the reliability
claim. Prima facie, notice how the reliability claim includes an ‘if-then’
conditional which, I think, should be interpreted as a material implication
in order to avoid some unwanted consequences that I will present in the next
paragraph.29 If this is so, the reliability claim can be rephrased as follows:
most of the time,
RC1: ∀S[(expert mathematician accepts S)→ S is true]
where S is any mathematical sentence. Now, consider this case: it might
occur that expert mathematicians reject a mathematical sentence that turns
out to be true afterwards. An interesting example is perhaps the case of the
well-ordering theorem. At the time when Zermelo proved the well-ordering
theorem, there were a few mathematicians (e.g. Lebesgue) who rejected the
well-ordering theorem on the basis of the fact that Zermelo had used the
axiom of choice in his proof.30 Does this case falsify the reliability claim? It
does not, if the conditional is material — i.e. if the antecedent of RC1 is false,
then RC1 is trivially true. A way of rejecting the reliability claim is to argue
that expert mathematicians have mostly false beliefs about mathematics,
but this move is rather implausible. Another possible strategy is to argue
that ‘mostly’ is vague but, as showed previously, even this condition can
be dropped: the only requirement is that there must be a non-accidental
correspondence between expert mathematicians’ beliefs and mathematical
facts.
The reliability claim involves the truth predicate. What does ‘truth’
mean in this context? According to Field, the reliability claim only requires
the deflationistic conception of truth.31 There is a large amount of literature
29Linnebo (2006) also argued that the material conditional is the minimal requirement
to run Field’s argument.
30According to the well-ordering theorem, every set can be well-ordered; and a set x is
well-ordered iff every non-empty subset of x has a least element.
31“I argue that in doing this we need not rely on any notion of fact, nor even on any
notion of truth beyond a thoroughly disquotational one.” See Field (1989, p. 26).
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on what ‘deflationism’ is supposed to mean, but, generally speaking, every
deflationist regards ‘true’ as a predicate that occurs in any instance of the
biconditional schema: “S” is true if and only if S, where S is a sentence.
Roughly speaking, deflationists argue that the concept of truth is fully cap-
tured by every instance of the biconditional schema, and thus the concept
of truth cannot be defined by appealing to another property. So the concept
of truth is primitive.32
In Field’s view, deflationism should take into account the truth pred-
icate purely disquotationally: that is, deflationism should not depend on
(1) any non-disquotational concept of truth; (2) it should not involve any
verificationist account;33 (3) it should not need truth-conditions.34 In short,
the concept of truth is just a useful simplification device to express infinitely
many conjunctions and disjunctions that could not be formulated otherwise.
If there were only a finite number of sentences, Field argues, we could build
a theory of meaning without referring to truth at all.35
According to Field, the concept of truth does not require truth-conditions.
For this reason the reliability claim need not the correspondence theory of
truth to be formulated. Moreover, because mental states are supposed to
be finite, the reliability claim does not require the concept of truth either:
I have denied that a ‘mathematical realist’ need be committed
to a correspondence theory of truth for mathematical sentences.
Nonetheless, I believe that even on this weak construal of realism,
we should not be realists about mathematics. [. . . ] The problem
32Deflationism raises several important issues about the role of truth, if any, in language:
if ‘S’ is true means S, is truth simply redundant? Is true a property of sentences as man
and red are properties of certain objects? And so on.
33Verificationism is defined by Field broadly: ‘the verification conditions of a type of
utterance might be given by the class of sensory stimulations that would or should lead
to the acceptance of an utterance in that class’. See Field (1994b, p. 249).
34Field regards truth-conditions as correlations between belief states, or mental states,
and sentences. See Field (1994a, p. 408).
35See Field (1994a, p. 406). Field’s deflationism aims at capturing any legitimate
concept of truth.
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can be put without use of the term of art ‘know’, and also without
talk of truth (though talk of disquotational truth enables us to
give a more snappy formulation of it).36
If Field is right, the reliability claim can be finally reformulated as fol-
lows: most of the time
RC2: ∀S[(expert mathematician accepts S)→ S]
1.2.1 Field’s argument against Platonism
Let us see Field’s argument against Platonism. If Platonists believe that
some kind of correlation between expert mathematicians’ beliefs and math-
ematical facts must occur, then:
(P1) Platonists should explain how expert mathematicians are reliable.
(P2) Any explanation of reliability can be either casual or non-casual.
(P3) Platonists are not able to provide such explanations.
(C) Platonism is not justified.
Field does not seek to advance a conclusive argument against Platonism.
In point of fact, Field does not argue that Platonism is false but, more
likely, that it is not justified unless Platonists are able to provide a plausible
account of reliability. In this regard, Field draws an analogy between the
challenge faced by Platonists and an hypothetical situation in a remote
Nepalese village:
It is rather as if someone claimed that his or her belief states
about the daily happenings in a remote village in Nepal were
nearly all disquotationally true, despite the absence of any mech-
anism to explain the correlation between those belief states and
the happenings in the village.37
36Field (1989, p. 60).
37Field (1989, pp. 26-27).
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Suppose that, for instance, I believe that the sun sets because there is an
entity that moves it every day. Even in the absence of a better explanation,
you should be suspicious about my explanation unless I can account for how
the correlation between that mysterious entity and the sun is supposed to
occur. If I am not able to provide such an explanation, my belief is simply
not justified.38 This is not to say that my belief is false, since justification
and truth are different from one another. Perhaps what I believe is true,
perhaps it is not.
In contrast to Benacerraf’s argument, Field does not appeal to the causal
theory of knowledge but employs the concept of explanation. The prob-
lem, of course, is to figure out what kind of explanation Field refers to.
When Field mentions ‘explanation’, it seems that he actually means ‘corre-
lation’. If this is so, mathematical abstracta cannot correlate belief states to
mathematical facts, since abstract objects are a-causal.39 But what about
non-causal explanations? Are they possible? Here is Field’s answer:
Perhaps then some sort of non-causal explanation of the corre-
lation is possible? Perhaps, but it is very hard to see what this
supposed non-causal explanation could be.40
As far as I know, Field does not spell out what he means by ‘non-causal
explanation’; that is, what sort of non-explanation the Platonist should pro-
vide. So what is a non-causal correlation between belief states and mathe-
matical facts supposed to be? In other words, the problem we are facing is
as follows:
Field’s challenge: how can Platonists account for the fact that the relia-
bility claim usually holds?
38Even if I can provide an explanation, you may be still unconvinced. Explaining the
correlation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for a belief to be justified.
39Platonists may refuse to explain the correlation in terms of causality for the same
reasons as they reject Benacerraf’s argument. Kasa (2010), for example, argues that
Field’s argument is similar to Benacerraf’s argument.
40Field (1989, p. 231).
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Here is a trivial solution: mathematicians become reliable by working
hard, that is, by learning over time how to manipulate mathematical state-
ments correctly. For example, mathematicians become expert on set theory
after many trials and errors by learning basic algebraic operations, trans-
finite induction, forcing, and so on. After years of studying, they finally
become expert, and when they accept a statement of set theory P , then P
usually follows from the axioms of set theory.
The trivial solution to Field’s challenge seems plausible. In addition,
notice how the trivial solution has the advantage of distinguishing between
expert mathematicians and someone who simply guesses the truth-value of
mathematical statements. Expert mathematicians know which statements
follow from which mathematical theories, whereas the lucky ordinary person
does not. But imagine a supercomputer that proves a sentence S only if S
follows from the axioms of a mathematical theory that has been accepted
by expert mathematicians.41 Because the supercomputer can prove that S
follows from a mathematical theory, it is absolutely reliable. But here lies
a problem that the trivial solution does not address: why do expert mathe-
maticians accept certain mathematical theories over others? The reliability
claim can be presented in that new form, and the trivial solution does not
address it.
To sum up, the matter of providing for a non-causal explanation of the
reliability claim is not a clear-cut one. But this is how I intend to interpret
Field’s challenge: the Platonist should tell us some kind of story that must
bridge the gap between belief states and abstract objects. Otherwise, the
existence of abstract objects is not justified. The story does not need to be
based on the causal theory of knowledge but needs to correlate belief states
with abstracta. So long as the Platonists is unable to provide such a story,
the existence of abstract objects is not justified.
41This example is quoted from Linnebo (2006).
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1.3 The indispensability argument(s)
If mathematical objects exist and are outside of space and time, it is clearly
hard to provide a good epistemology for them. Does this mean that the
existence of abstract objects cannot be justified at all? The indispensabil-
ity argument aims at overcoming the problem as follows: if mathematical
abstracta are indispensable to our best scientific theories, then the existence
of such abstracta is justified independently of any epistemological concern.
And because the main problem for Platonism is the lack of a good episte-
mology, the indispensability argument is the first and foremost argument
for Platonism.
The indispensability argument is mainly due to Quine and Putnam, but
it would be more accurate to refer to it as a class of (fairly) homogeneous
arguments. Indeed, the indispensability argument is often used to force on-
tological commitment to mathematical abstract objects, but it can be also
used to sustain semantic realism.42 In addition, some philosophers argue
that nominalism is compatible with some versions of the indispensability
argument.43 However, in this section I will regard the indispensability ar-
gument only as an argument to endorse Platonism.
The indispensability argument forces us to commit ourselves to the ex-
istence of mathematical entities. Here is how the indispensability argument
for Platonism goes:44
(P1) We ought to have ontological commitment to all and only those objects
that are indispensable to our best scientific theories.
(P2) Mathematical objects are indispensable in that regard.
(C) We ought to have ontological commitment to mathematical objects.
Therefore, Platonism is true.
42According to semantic realism, the truth-value of mathematical statements transcend
knowability. Mathematics can be objective even without ontological commitment to math-
ematical objects. Putnam (1967, pp. 69-70), for example, endorses semantic realism.
43See for example Azzouni (2009).
44Colyvan (2001) presents a thorough analysis of the indispensability argument.
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Contemporary scientific theories, like physics, provide the best descrip-
tion of the world. According to Quine, our best scientific theories are the
reference point to settle the ontological dispute. In other words, in order
to figure out what exists, we ought to look to what our best scientific the-
ories quantify over. For example, if in contemporary physics we quantify
over elementary particles, then such objects exist — until otherwise proven.
Yet our best scientific theories do not quantify just over physical objects,
but also over mathematical abstracta such as numbers, groups, topological
spaces, and so on. Unless abstract objects are dispensable, so it is claimed,
we ought to commit ourselves to abstracta as we do for physical objects that
are indispensable to our best scientific theories.
The indispensability argument is very powerful, because it forces on-
tological commitment to objects that are outside of space and time on the
basis of empirical considerations. Although mathematical abstracta are epis-
temically , we ought to include them in our ontology to formulate our best
scientific theories of the physical world: pragmatic reasons overcome episte-
mological demands altogether.
The force of the indispensability argument depends on the fact that em-
pirical theories are confirmed by experience. If mathematics were employed
within theories that are not confirmed by experience, the indispensability
argument would be seriously undermined. Nonetheless, it is important to
realize that, strictly speaking, empirical confirmation is unnecessary in or-
der to run an indispensability argument. In this regard, Resnik developed
a variant of the indispensability argument without referring to empirical
confirmation.45 That is, even if empirical theories are not confirmed by ex-
perience, or even false, the indispensability argument can still be used to
argue for the existence of mathematical entities. Here is Resnik’s argument:
(P1) Scientists assume the existence of mathematical objects and the truth
of much mathematics.
45See Resnik (1995, pp. 169-170).
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(P2) These assumptions are indispensable for scientists, because scientific
laws could not be derived without taking mathematical sentences to
be true.
(C) We are justified in drawing scientific conclusions only if we take the
mathematics used in science to be true.
Resnik’s argument does not refer to empirical confirmation, and per-
haps it is less persuasive than the one I presented previously. However,
it highlights the basic premise of the indispensability argument: scientists
presume that the mathematics employed in their deductions is true. This is
why Azzouni argues that the kernel of the indispensability argument is as
follows:46
(P1) Certain statements that quantify over mathematical entities are indis-
pensable to science.
(C) Those statements are true.
On this view, truth is an unavoidable premise of the indispensability
argument, and it is even more important than empirical confirmation. This
is why I am going to argue later on that the strategies based on the rejection
of confirmation holism cannot disarm the indispensability argument but,
at best, can only make it less effective. Roughly speaking, according to
confirmation holism, the empirical success of that theory confirms not only
the existence of physical entities involved, but also mathematics, because
mathematics is part of the corporate body.47
Here is an important issue that I would like to introduce. Every ver-
sion of the indispensability argument that I mentioned refers to the truth
of mathematical statements, or to the existence of mathematical entities.
However, none of these arguments is explicit on what the nature of mathe-
matical entities is supposed to be. At best, the indispensability arguments
46Azzouni (2009, p. 139). Azzouni calls it an enthymemic blueprint version of the
indispensability argument.
47I examine confirmation holism in sec. n. 3.3.
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tell us that we ought to assume the existence of some kind of mathematical
entities in order to formulate our best scientific theories. And to be fair, Az-
zouni does not even refer to the existence of mathematical entities because,
according to Azzouni, only quantification and truth are necessary to run the
indispensability argument.48
It is notable that the indispensability arguments do not tell us about
the nature of mathematical entities. In other words, they are not explicit
on whether mathematical entities are abstracta, concreta, fictions, artifacts,
or what. In addition, the indispensability arguments are also indeterminate
on what kind of mathematical objects we ought to be committed to: do
we need to have ontological commitment to numbers? Sets? Or maybe,
categories? At this stage, it is only necessary to observe that we need more
assumptions to settle these matters.
1.3.1 Three forms of naturalism
I would now like to examine the first premise (P1) of the former indis-
pensability argument that I presented earlier: we ought to have ontological
commitment to all and only those objects that are indispensable to our best
scientific theories. P1 contains a couple of adjectives that highlight two im-
portant assumptions: ‘all’ refers to confirmation holism, and ‘only’ involves
naturalism. I will discuss both confirmation holism and naturalism during
the remainder of this section, but let me first introduce what I mean by
‘naturalism’.49
Naturalism rejects first philosophy. Roughly speaking, first philosophy
is the idea that philosophy comes before, and is prior to, science. According
to naturalism, philosophy cannot challenge the methods of scientific inquiry
and, more specifically, it cannot address the ontological problem by itself.
There are several types of naturalism, but many can be sorted according
48This is because Azzouni distinguishes between quantification and ontological commit-
ment. See sec. n. 3.1.2.
49As previously stated, I will examine confirmation holism in sec. n. 3.3.
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what role ontology plays in our picture of the world. I will refer to three
different forms of naturalism exemplified by Carnap, Maddy, and Quine.
Carnap is skeptical about the possibility of addressing the ontological
problem according to both internal and external standards of justification.50
Given a linguistic framework, i.e. a collection of inference rules and assump-
tions, an existential question such as ‘are there x?’ is internally justified if
it is possible to answer that question according to the inference rules within
the framework. For instance, ‘are there prime numbers?’ is justified within
the framework of arithmetic because, given certain inference rules, we can
determine whether any natural number is prime or not. On the other hand,
Carnap argues that the ontological problems that take the form of ‘does x
exist?’ are supposed to be addressed independently of any given framework,
and thus they cannot be justified according to any internal standards of
justification. In addition, Carnap argues that internal existential questions
do not force any ontological commitment: ‘there are prime numbers’ is just
a fruitful convention that we adopt in order to achieve practical goals. In
point of fact, whether or not a framework is useful for practical reasons is
the only external question that Carnap is willing to admit. Thus, ontological
problems are generally regarded by Carnap as pseudo-scientific questions.
In other words, Carnap’s naturalism implies the abandonment of the onto-
logical problem.
Maddy’s naturalism is more moderate than Carnap’s. According to
Maddy, ontology is continuous to science, although mathematics and empir-
ical sciences have their own standard of justification. From this viewpoint,
naturalism is
‘the conviction that a successful enterprise, be it science or math-
ematics, should be understood and evaluated on its own terms,
that such an enterprise should not be subject to criticism from,
and does not stand in need of support from, some external, sup-
50See Carnap (1956).
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posedly higher point of view’.51
In contrast to Carnap, Maddy argues that the ontological problems can
be addressed by internal standards of justification. Mathematicians, for ex-
ample, have their own internal standards of justification, and according to
them the question of whether or not mathematical objects exist is straight-
forward: look at the axioms of whatever mathematical theory and ask your-
selves what kind of objects the theory assumes. Because ZFC assumes the
existence of certain sets, then it follows that we are ontologically committed
to mathematical objects, i.e. sets. In Maddy’s view, internal standards of
justification are sufficient to settle the ontological disagreement. As a conse-
quence, mathematicians do not need any external justification: neither from
philosophy, nor from empirical sciences. This is because the fact that math-
ematics is indispensable to our best scientific theories is not necessary in
order to have ontological commitment to mathematical objects. Therefore,
Maddy’s naturalism implies the rejection of the indispensability argument,
but the ontological problem is not considered pseudo-scientific.52
According to Quine, the ontological problem cannot be solved by em-
ploying internal standards of justification, in contrast to Maddy. Quine
argues that if a theoretical hypothesis is adopted on the basis of practical
grounds, we have strong evidence for its truth and, as a consequence, for the
existence of the entities employed to formulate that hypothesis. I should like
to point out that Quine does not endorse certain naive forms of scientism:
the fact that an hypothesis is confirmed by experience is the best we can
ever hope for in determining what exists. In contrast to what Maddy claims,
internal standards of justification are not sufficient for Quine: the existence
of mathematical objects can be justified by looking at our best empirical
scientific theories.
51Maddy (1997, p. 161).
52I will examine Maddy’s objection to the indispensability argument in sec. n. 3.3.1.
In addition, I reconsider Maddy’s rejection of first philosophy in sec. n. 3.1.4.
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1.3.2 Dodging the indispensability argument: an outline
We saw that the indispensability argument forces us in committing ourselves
to the existence of mathematical objects, and that it is the most powerful
argument to which the Platonist can resort. In the chapters that follow I will
examine the most important strategies opposing Platonism that are based
on the rejection of the indispensability argument. I will split such strategies
into two classes: hard roads and easy roads. This distinction is made by
Colyvan, although I distance myself in part from his view.53 Whereas Coly-
van refers to hard roads and easy roads to nominalism, I will talk about
hard roads and easy roads to anti-Platonism. This is because I think that
Colyvan’s distinction faces two problems: first, it regards Field’s program as
the only hard-road, and secondly some easy-roaders do not consider them-
selves nominalists. Despite this, I think that Colyvan has an interesting
point, because there are basically two strategies of denying the existence of
abstract objects: the first approach requires the paraphrase of mathematical
or scientific sentences, whereas the second approach does not demand any
paraphrases. Hence I will recast Colyvan’s original distinction by calling
the first approach ‘the hard road to anti-Platonism’, and the second one
‘the easy road to anti-Platonism’.
Before I examine hard and easy roads, let me sum up the strategies I
am going to consider. In the next chapter I will analyse the following hard
roads to anti-Platonism:
• Showing how we can dispense with mathematical objects from physics
(Field).
• Reformulating mathematics within a constructivist account of quanti-
fiers (Chihara).
• Reconstructing mathematics without referring to mathematical ob-
jects but possible structures (Hellman).
53See Colyvan (2010).
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Secondly, I will consider the following easy roads to anti-Platonism:
• Rejecting Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment (Azzouni).
• Showing that it makes no difference to how matters stand in relation
to the physical world if mathematical propositions are false (Yablo).
• Rejecting confirmation holism (Maddy/Sober).
Lastly, I will examine a less debated option in contemporary metaphysi-
cal literature: agnosticism. Indeed, my final goal is to support a specific
agnostic view on the metaphysical debate between Platonism and anti-
Platonism. As will become clear later on, my own position is an easy road
because it does not require any paraphrasing of mathematical statements,
nor does it demand to endorse nominalism. My own agnosticism is a gen-
uine anti-Platonist position in the sense that I do not commit myself to the
existence of abstract objects.
1.4 Burgess and Rosen’s challenge to nominalism
Before concluding my discussion of Field’s nominalization program, I would
like to present some general objections to nominalism. Nominalists in the
philosophy of mathematics argue that mathematical abstracta do not exist.
In this regard, Burgess and Rosen present a few arguments called ‘scientific’,
because they arise from scientific practice, in order to undermine nominal-
ism.54 Burgess and Rosen argue that the literal meaning of mathematical
existential statements such as ‘there are infinitely many natural numbers’
is expressed by Platonism, and this is commonly accepted by the scientific
community. The reason is as follows: ‘there are infinitely many natural num-
bers’ is true only if natural numbers exist, and because scientists know that
such objects are not concreta, then natural numbers must be abstracta. In
Burgess and Rosen’s view, either nominalists are able to show how scientists
54See Burgess and Rosen (2005) and Burgess (2004).
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could dispense with mathematical objects from science, or they can change
the literal meaning of mathematical sentences commonly accepted by the
scientific community. But either way, nominalists interfere with the scien-
tific community and, as a result, nominalism turns out to be inconsistent
with scientific practice.
According to Burgess and Rosen there are two varieties of nominal-
ism: revolutionary and hermeneutic. This distinction is further split into
two more types: revolutionaries can be either ‘naturalized’ or ‘alienated’;
hermeneuticists are either on ‘content’ or on ‘attitude’.
Let us first examine revolutionary nominalism. Revolutionary nominal-
ists claim that mathematicians are wrong when they refer to mathematical
objects, because mathematical objects simply do not exist. On the one
hand, naturalized nominalists aim at showing how mathematics is dispens-
able from our best scientific theories. Field’s reconstruction of Newtonian
physics is the typical example of naturalized nominalism.55 However, be-
cause contemporary scientists employ mathematical objects to make predic-
tion about the physical world, Burgess and Rosen argue that naturalized
nominalism is incompatible with the scientific practice. On the other hand,
“alienated” nominalists appeal to philosophical arguments in order to refute
the existence of mathematical objects. These philosophers are “alienated”
because they favor philosophy over science. But scientists can simply regard
Field’s argument based on the reliability claim or Benacerraf’s argument as
skeptical challenges. It is as if someone demanded an argument for per-
ception to be reliable before they would accept that physical objects exist.
Thus, when nominalists argue that mathematical objects do not exist be-
cause we lack epistemic access to them, Burgess and Rosen reject such a
demand by tagging it as skeptical.56
55I examine Field’s program in sec. n. 2.1.
56In addition, Burgess and Rosen endorse Lewis’ position (1991, p. 53), according to
which epistemologists cannot argue against mathematicians, because what mathematics
has accomplished over time is definitely more impressive than what philosophers have
achieved. This long quote from Lewis (1991, p. 59) is self-explanatory: “How would you
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In Burgess and Rosen’s view, revolutionary nominalism is overall in-
consistent with scientific practice. Are they right? In point of fact, Chi-
hara replies to Burgess and Rosen by pointing out that nominalism aims at
building the big picture of the world, in which all aspects of knowledge are
coherent with one another:
In this search for the big picture, coherence is an essential in-
gredient [. . . ] Take the philosophy of language, for example.
Here, we seek an understanding of the nature of language and
our mastery of language that is consistent with our general sci-
entific, epistemological, and metaphysics views [. . . ] In general
one would not expect a contemporary philosopher’s account of
language to contradict any of our prevailing views of science and
scientific knowledge without very compelling reasons.57
Abstract objects are out of the picture because they lack good epistemol-
ogy. However, Burgess and Rosen may reply that, despite the big picture
of the world, nominalistic reconstructions are more complicated than the
theories where quantification over mathematical abstracta is allowed. In
other words, nominalistic reconstructions are fruitless in the eyes of the sci-
entific community. But why should nominalistic reconstructions be useful
in that regard? It is clear, I think, that nominalists do not wish to compete
against mathematicians or physicists. A nominalist like Field, for example,
recognizes that mathematics is useful to our best scientific theories even
though there are no abstract objects. Generally speaking, nominalists do
not claim that empirical sciences plus mathematics provide a wrong picture
of the world, but that Platonism, as philosophical doctrine, is false. Burgess
and Rosen’s argument arises from two questionable premises: existential
like the job of telling the mathematicians that they must change their ways, and abjure
countless errors, now that philosophy has discovered that there are no classes? Can you
tell them, with a straight face, to follow philosophical argument wherever it may lead? If
they challenge your credentials, will you boast of philosophy?”.
57Chihara (2005, p. 490).
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mathematical statements can be true only if there are abstract objects and,
moreover, that such a conception is part of our scientific world-view.
According to Burgess and Rosen, there are two types of hermeneutic
nominalists: those who focus on the content of mathematical statements,
and those who focus on mathematicians’ attitudes towards mathematical
statements. According to the former, nominalism is compatible with empir-
ical sciences and mathematics, because it is possible to interpret the content
of mathematical statements without postulating abstract objects. Burgess
and Rosen argue that because the existence of abstract objects is implied
by the literal interpretation of existential mathematical statements, content
hermeneuticists change the literal meaning of such statements. As a result,
content hermeneuticists are in opposition to the mathematical community,
which endorses the literal interpretation of existential mathematical state-
ments. On the other hand, those hermeneuticists who focus on attitude,
claim that mathematicians can pretend that mathematical objects exist —
whereas they do not. However, Burgess and Rosen argue that no expert
mathematicians warn people not to believe in what existence mathematical
sentences literally say, i.e. certain abstract objects exist. Expert mathe-
maticians do recognize the literal meaning of mathematical sentences, and
do take it for granted.
I will argue that mathematical statements, taken literally, do not force
any commitment to abstract objects. The mathematical community does
not believe that the literal meaning of mathematical existential statements
is what the Platonist adheres to. Moreover, I intend to achieve my goal
without endorsing nominalism: either revolutionary or hermeneutic.
Chapter 2
Removing Plato’s Beard:
Hard Roads to
anti-Platonism
2.1 Physics without numbers
Nominalism can be defined in two different ways, according to what commit-
ment they take on what exists: on the one hand, nominalism is the negative
view that there are no abstract objects; on the other hand, it is the positive
view that only concrete, or physical, objects exist. The early nominalistic
strategies in the philosophy of mathematics were based on the conviction
that mathematics ultimately refers to physical objects, such as linguistic
tokens or mental states.1 In contrast to those strategies, Field’s approach
aims at undermining the indispensability argument by showing that the
mathematics we use in our best scientific theories is actually dispensable.
Field’s claim may be rather controversial at first glance. Is it really possi-
ble to dispense with mathematics whilst contemporary scientists employ it in
order to make empirical deductions? Regarding this, I would like to empha-
size that Field does not dispense with mathematics, but with mathematical
1For example, Leonard and Goodman (1940) or Goodman and Quine (1947).
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abstracta. In fact, it is a common misconception about Field’s program to
regard his nominalism as a sort of revisionism of scientific practice because
mathematicians would assume that quantifiers range over abstract objects.2
Field does intend to revise mathematical, or scientific, practice: he wants
to prove that each statement of classical mechanics that quantifies over
mathematical objects can in principle be nominalized. Field’s goal is merely
philosophical in the sense that he wants to explain the success of mathemat-
ics without presuming the existence of mathematical objects. That is, how
mathematics can be applied to the physical world if nominalism is true.
It is important to understand what Field means by ‘nominalism’. Ac-
cording to Field, a theory is nominalistically statable if it does not overlap
in non-logical vocabulary with a mathematical theory.3 This definition is
rather technical, so let me spell it out as follows: a nominalistic sentence
is an assertion that does not refer to mathematical objects but only to the
physical world. In other words, a nominalistic sentence is a sentence that
talks about only the physical world. However, because our best scientific
theories involve mathematical abstracta, such theories are not nominalistic
in Field’s sense. This is because physical theories contain mixed assertions
that involve both mathematical and physical objects. Consider for example
Newton’s law of universal gravitation F = G0
M1M2
r2
. Even though the for-
mula describes physical events, numbers are employed in order to represent
both mass and force. And since that mixed formula involves numbers, it
seems that we ought to commit ourselves to the existence of numbers for
that formula to be true.
Perhaps a nominalist could argue that physical theories do not need to
contain true mixed assertions in order to describe the physical world. What
physical theories do need is consistency: given an empirical phenomenon
O, a physical theory cannot predict both O and ¬O. However, as Field
himself notes, consistency cannot be used instead of truth in the context
2As showed in the previous chapter, Burgess and Rosen misconceive Field’s program,
i.e. they regard it as revolutionary nominalism.
3See Field (1980, p. 108), note n. 8.
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of the empirical theories because, if this was so, false predictions about
the physical world would be possible.4 For example, it would be easy to
imagine a consistent physical theory that entails the existence of twelve
planets in the Solar System. In other words, the consistency of a successful
physical theory is not sufficient by itself to account for its predictive power.
Our best scientific theories, such as contemporary physics, must be true in
order to describe the world. But according to Field, scientific theories can
be true despite the fact that existential mathematical statements are false.
Mathematics turns out to be just a useful tool to simplify calculations.
2.1.1 Truth and conservativeness
Here lies a problem that I should like to consider. If existential mathemati-
cal statements are false, how can mathematics be useful and make reliable
predictions about the physical world? After all, mathematics cannot be suc-
cessful by accident. Even if Field is right to claim that mathematics does
not need to be true to be useful, we should nonetheless explain why scien-
tists are willing to adopt a false theory and still able to account for physical
phenomena. Field’s answer to this problem is called ‘fictionalism’: although
there are no abstract objects, if we regard ‘truth’ as ‘truth in the of story
mathematics’, existential mathematical statements are still considered true.
For example, a mathematical sentence such as ‘there are natural numbers’
is true iff it is true in the story of mathematics.
Since mathematics is just a story for the fictionalist, some philosophers
could raise a faulty analogy between mathematics and stories like novels.
Consider the sentence ‘Robin Hood steals money from the rich’. This sen-
tence is literally false, since Robin Hood does not exist, but it is nonetheless
true in Robin Hood’s legends. Here is the analogy with mathematics: ‘there
are natural numbers’ is literally false, because there are no numbers; but it
is still true in the story of mathematics.5 But even if mathematics is just a
4See Field (1982).
5It seems to me that an analogy between fictionalism and formalism can be drawn. The
formalist argues that mathematics is a game. So what is the difference between games
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story, mathematics is still different from novels and legends. Novels do not
have predictive power: mathematics does.
I would like to highlight that Field does not need to stress the difference
between mathematics and novels (or legends). In fact, Field should explain
how mathematics can be applied to the physical world if mathematical ex-
istential statements are false.6 Roughly speaking, this is Field’s answer: if
a physical theory, i.e. mathematics plus physical assertions, is nothing but
a conservative extension over a nominalistic body of assertions about the
physical world, it is possible to get a purely nominalistic physics that does
not refer to mathematical objects. In this regard, Field states the following
conservativeness principle:
The conservativeness principle: A mathematical theory M is conserva-
tive if and only if for any assertion A about the physical world and
any body N of such assertions, A doesn’t follow from N + M unless
it follows from N alone.7
Roughly speaking, the conservativeness principle states that we can dis-
pense with mathematical objects if the physical consequences that we derive
by using mathematics are the same as those we can derive from a body of
physical assertions without mathematics. Of course, it is one thing to state
the conservativeness principle, another is to prove that the principle is true.
But Field provides an ingenious nominalization of Newtonian mechanics and
theory of gravitation where mathematics is just a useful device for simplify-
ing calculation and, as a result, mathematics need not carry any ontological
weight in classical physics. If Field’s approach really works, it provides an
hard road to nominalism for classical mechanics.
I would now like to emphasize that conservativeness is stronger than
both consistency and truth. According to Field:
and stories? The fictionalist can argue that mathematics is false whereas, according to
formalism, mathematical statements lack truth-values.
6Platonists, for their part, must explain how mathematics can be applied to the physical
world if mathematical objects are outside of space and time.
7Field (1989, p. 58).
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Unlike consistency, conservativeness does not follow from truth;
our anti-realist, then, is not really substituting a weaker goal in
place of the realist’s goal of truth, he or she is substituting a
different goal. [. . . ] Conservativeness might loosely be thought
of as ‘necessary truth without the truth’.8
Despite the fact that truth does not entail conservativeness, consistency
is similar to conservativeness.9 Consider an analogy between the role of con-
servativeness in Field’s nominalism and the one of consistency in Hilbert’s
program. According to Hilbert, the finitary fragment of elementary number
theory is certain, whereas the ideal fragment might be considered prob-
lematic. After formalizing a mathematical theory into an axiomatic system,
Hilbert intends to provide a finitary (metamathematical) proof of the axiom-
atized mathematics. Similarly, the ‘certain’ part of Field’s nominalization is
the nominalistic body of assertions, whereas the ‘ideal’ part is represented
by mathematics.10 Nevertheless, it is important to stress a difference be-
tween Hilbert’s program and Field’s: whereas Hilbert justifies the ideal part
of mathematics by finitary methods, Field shows that mathematical objects
are dispensable by proving that mathematics is conservative. Again, mathe-
matics is not useless for Field: it is still indispensable to making calculations
easier to handle. More precisely, Field’s aim is to show that mathematics
does not need to be true to be employed in physics: it needs to be conser-
vative.
Field argues that good (i.e. applied) mathematics is always conserva-
tive.11 But what about physics? Does physics need to be conservative to be
8Field (1989, p. 59).
9Indeed a theory is consistent iff it has a model, i.e. there exists an interpretation
under which all theorems are true. For this reason, consistency follows from truth.
10Urquhart (1990) points out how such a comparison is rather inaccurate, because that it
is not clear what the metaphysical and epistemic status of the finitary fragment of Hilbert’s
program is. For example, according to Hilbert, the objects of the finitary fragment of
number theory are numerals, but they are neither physical nor mental constructions. See
Hilbert (1926). In contrast to Hilbert’s view, Field distances himself from finitism.
11“Good mathematics is conservative; a discovery that accepted mathematics isn’t con-
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good? A conservativeness principle for physics may be as follows:
The conservativeness principle (in physics): if M is a physical theory,
and N a collection of assertions about observables, one does not get
any more conclusions from N+M then one does from N alone.
Physical theories do not need to be conservative in that sense. In point
of fact, conservativeness is generally a bad requirement for physics. Sup-
pose that one believes that unobservables exist, like Field does. Because
unobservables do have causal power, they are nominalistically acceptable.
In other words, Field does not need to dispense with unobservable.12
2.1.2 Dispensing with mathematical objects in physics
In Science without Numbers, Field proves that mathematics is conserva-
tive.13 The conservativeness principle requires a nominalistic body of as-
sertions to operate on, whilst the representation theorem provides the link
between mathematical objects and their nominalistic counterparts.14 Ac-
cording to the representation theorem, there is a function (isomorphism)
that preserves the structure from the points of space-time to the set of
quadruples of real numbers. In other words, the representation theorem
states that we can translate every nominalistic statement into a statement
about abstract objects, such that every statement about space-time turns
out to be equivalent to its abstract counterpart. Roughly speaking, we can
continue talking about space-time without referring to real numbers. In
servative would be a discovery that it isn’t good.” Field (1980, p. 13).
12There are non-mathematical abstract entities that are postulated by physics. A perfect
gas is an example in that regard. However, the nominalist does not need to dispense with
perfect gases, because they are explicitly postulated to make calculations easier to handle.
In other words, scientists are aware that perfect gases do not exist.
13Field has two separate procedures for showing that mathematics is conservative: he
employs set theory plus inaccessible cardinals or, alternatively, Field proves that if stan-
dard set theory is consistent, then standard set theory is conservative. See Field (1980, pp.
16-19).
14See Field (1980, p. 27).
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addition, because Hilbert’s representation theorem requires an isomorphism
between physical space and R4, physical space must have the same structure
of R4. In other words, Field ought to commit himself to the existence of
many uncountable physical objects.15 This would be problematic for nomi-
nalists who endorse finitism, such as Goodman and Quine, but not for those
who reject finitism, like Field does.
Let us examine how Field intends to nominalize Newtonian classical me-
chanics. Field’s approach requires the nominalization of Euclidean geome-
try; that is, it requires dispensing with real numbers in Euclidean geometry.
This is because the scientific treatment of physical space is represented by
the set of real numbers. In this regard, Field appeals to Hilbert’s axiomati-
zation of geometry in order to dispense with real numbers by replacing the
statements that refer to real numbers with synthetic geometrical relations,
such as ‘congruence’ and ‘collinearity’. For example, if x, y, z are space-time
points, we say that ‘y is collinear to x and z’ if y is a point on the line-
segment whose endpoints are x and z; ‘xy is congruent with zw’ when the
distance from point x to point y is the same as the distance from z to point
w. Similarly, it is possible to nominalize every predicate that is necessary
to recover plane and solid geometry. Synthetic predicates are employed in
the treatment of the four-dimensional hyperspace of kinematics and dynam-
ics. Ultimately, classical mechanics and Newtonian gravitation theory are
fully reconstructed by including other predicates such as simultaneity, mass
density and gravitational potential.16
Hilbert’s axiomatization of Euclidean geometry might be problematic
for the nominalist, because it requires that first-order variables range over
points, lines, and spaces, whereas second-order variables range over sets of
points, sets of lines, and sets of spaces.17 If quantification over sets is allowed,
as Hilbert does, it seems that the nominalist should assume the existence
of sets. So here lies a question for Field: how can the nominalist eventually
15Field addresses this problem in (1980), Ch. 4.
16See Field (1980), Ch. 8.
17See Field (1980, p. 37).
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dispense with sets? Field’s solution is to replace standard second-order logic
with a suitable nominalistic surrogate: Goodman’s second-order logic. By
this way Field can replace sets with mereological sums, which are supposed
to have causal power — whereas sets do not. As a result, Field can operate
on (concrete) mereological sums of regions of space-time, instead of referring
to sets of regions of space-time. In the end, Field’s reconstruction does not
give up second-order logic but
it involves what might be called the complete logic of the part-
whole relation, or the complete logic of Goodmanian sums, and
this is not a recursively axiomatizable logic. To clarify this, note
that the theory as I’ve suggested it be written is still a second-
order theory, that is, it still involves second-order logic [. . . ] and
because also we haven’t invoked variables for functions or for
predicates of more than one place, no nominalistically dubious
entities need be invoked to serve in the range of the second-order
quantifiers.18
I would now like to present substantivalism, which is the concept of
space-time endorsed by Field.19 According to substantivalism, the universe
is made up of space-time and its parts whereas, according to relationalism,
the universe consists of physical objects that are related with one another.
More precisely, according to the former, a physical object is nothing but a
part of space-time whereas, according to the latter, the existence of space-
time is unnecessary. Field argues that substantivalism is more appropriate
than relationalism because the latter is ultimately reducible to the former.
In fact, suppose that the best candidate for replacing space-time is the notion
of field, which assigns causal properties to space-time regions. For example,
an electromagnetic field assigns to n-ple of space-time’s points a relation
of electromagnetic intensity. Relationalists could argue that space-time is
dispensable if, for every sentence about space-time regions, it is possible
18Field (1980, p. 38).
19See Field (1984).
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to build a corresponding sentence about field’s properties. However, Field
replies, substantialists can dismiss this objection by claiming that fields are
ultimately properties of space-time. As a result, the minimal requirement is
merely the existence of space-time.
2.1.3 Shapiro’s objections
Suppose that Field’s nominalization works. Is it legitimate to employ so
much mathematics in order to show that mathematical objects are dispens-
able? As Shapiro points out
There is an interesting irony in Field’s development of fictional-
ism [. . . ] By assuming the mathematics, Field shows that, in a
sense, mathematics is not necessary for science.20
In point of fact, there have been many objections to Field’s approach,
and I intend to split them into two classes: those who reject the conserva-
tiveness of mathematics, and those who criticize the possibility of extending
Field’s nominalization towards other branches of physics. Because there are
a considerable number of objections, I will elaborate on the most important
critiques for each class of objections.21
Consider Field’s claim that good mathematics is conservative. It is not
clear what kind of conservativeness Field invokes:22 on the one hand, syn-
tactic conservativeness states that a nominalistic statement can be derived
from N + M if it can be derived from N alone; on the other hand, seman-
tic conservativeness states that if a nominalistic statement is true in every
model of M + N , then it is true in every model of N alone. We know
that Go¨del’s completeness theorem establishes a correspondence between
semantic truth and syntactic provability in first-order logic, but since Field
chooses second-order logic for Euclidean geometry, the two distinct notions
of conservativeness remain into play.
20Shapiro (1997, p. 227).
21Most objections are collected in Chihara (1990).
22See Shapiro (1983).
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Let us suppose that mathematics is just semantically conservative: if
M + N entails a nominalistic statement n, then n is true in every model
N , but it does imply that n is derived from N alone. As a consequence, if
it is possible to build a n that is true in every model N , but n cannot be
derived from N alone, then mathematics cannot useful in Field’s sense: that
is, mathematics does not merely simplify deductions.23 One might reply to
this objection by adopting first-order logic. However, Field himself notes
that since the representation theorem maps space-time onto the set of real
numbers, the theorem implies that any model of N is uncountable.24 If N
was formulated within first-order logic, Lo¨wenheim-Skolem’s theorem would
hold, and thus N would have a countable model.25 For this reason, Field
adopts Goodman’s second-order logic instead of first-order logic.26
Consider a further objection. If nominalists dispense with mathematical
objects, they should still make use of the notion of model. This is because
the notion of logical consequence is required in order to formulate semantic
conservativeness, which is stated in terms of models. However, models are
abstract objects that are not available to the nominalist. In other words,
even if mathematics was conservative, the nominalist could make no use of
that result. If mathematics were dispensable in classical mechanics, Field
would still need the notion of logical consequence in order to prove the con-
servativeness theorem. In the next section I will present how Field intends
to show that conservativeness is nominalistically acceptable.
2.1.4 Field’s modal deflationism
Nominalists have two strategies for stating conservativeness: either (1) they
could dispense with the notion of logical consequence, or (2) they could
23In point of fact, Shapiro builds a Go¨del-style sentence G that belongs to the nominal-
istic body of assertion N such that ZFC + N ` G but N 0 G. See Shapiro (1983). In
this regard, Field (1985, p. 255) replies that G is not an assertion about space-time.
24See Field (1985).
25The theorem states that consistent first-order theories have a model with a countable
domain.
26Field does not seem to be satisfied with his choice, though. See Field (1980, p. 115).
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employ modal logic. Because the first option is too hard, Field chooses
the second one reinforcing classical logic through modality without possible
worlds semantics. The idea is to express the notions of logical consequence
and consistency in modal terms by avoiding ontological commitment to pos-
sible worlds.
Let us see how Field’s strategy works. In the first instance, Field intro-
duces a primitive notion of logical consistency, where a mathematical theory
T is consistent if ♦T (i.e. T is possible). Let AT be the (finite) conjunction
of the axioms of T , B a mathematical assertion of T , and B∗ the result of
restricting B to non-mathematical entities. According to Field, T ’s conser-
vativeness can be modally expressed in this way: if ♦B, then ♦(B∗ ∧AT ).27
Moreover, Field reinterprets the notion of logical consequence in terms of
modal operators without referring to models and truth. Instead of ‘P ’ in
AT is true iff ‘P ’ is true in a model of AT , we say (AT → P ). This is
a nominalistic surrogate of the notion of truth in a model, which aims to
overcome the objection according to which both conservativeness and logical
consequence involve abstract objects, i.e. models.
A problem with Field’s formulation is that standard set theory, such as
ZFC, is not finitely axiomatized (i.e. there are infinitely many axioms). And
standard set theory is essential to prove that mathematics is conservative.
So how can we express the conjunction of all the axioms of set theory?
Field’s idea is to appeal to a finitely axiomatizable theory: von Neumann-
Bernays-Go¨del set theory (NBG).
To sum up, Field recasts consistency, conservativeness, and logical con-
sequence in modal terms. But here lies another problem: since both con-
servativeness and logical consequence involve modality, one might tend to
interpret such operators in terms possible worlds semantics. Why should
a commitment to possible worlds be better than mathematical abstracta?
Field’s answer is that modal operators must be taken as primitive. This
response might be considered rather hasty, but the point is that Field does
27See Field (1989, p. 120).
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not actually regard modality as a surrogate of ontology.28 What Field does
is to offer an epistemology for his modal concepts: that is to say, a defla-
tionistic view of mathematical knowledge. On this view, an epistemic agent
has mathematical knowledge if he, or she, knows that (1) certain mathemat-
ical assertions follow from certain mathematical assumptions, and that (2)
those assumptions are consistent. In other words, an epistemic agent has
mathematical knowledge of AT if he, or she, knows that (1’) (AT → B),
and that (2’) ♦AT .29
2.1.5 Extending Field’s program
One of the main problems of Field’s approach concerns its extension. It
is questionable whether or not Field’s program can be extended towards
other branches of physics aside from classical mechanics. Suppose that
classical mechanics is nominalizable in a way that one can dispense with
mathematical abstracta and nominalize the basic elements of vector cal-
culus. Nonetheless, Malament argues, quantum mechanics cannot be still
nominalized because we lack a sort of the representation theorem for it.30
In classical mechanics the nominalistic surrogates of abstract objects are
the physical regions of space-time. But in quantum mechanics we deal with
Hilbert’s spaces in order to represent quantum events, or propositions, that
are not dispensable in the absence of a representation theorem. This is be-
cause quantum mechanics is a probabilistic theory in which quantum states
are functions from quantum events to probabilities. Malament’s point is
that probabilities in quantum mechanics are represented by real numbers
that are not dispensable:
28See Field (1989, p. 256).
29Here is a problem: how can we know that ♦AT ? For example, we cannot prove the
consistency of NBG within NBG itself: we should know that the existence of a weakly
inaccessible cardinal is possible. Alternatively, we might appeal to an inductive argument:
no one has found yet a contradiction in NBG, hence we can reasonably suppose that NBG
is consistent. However, this inductive argument is rather controversial, as Resnik points
out (1984).
30See Malament (1982).
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I do not see how Field can get started at all. I suppose one
can think of the theory as determining a set of models — each
a Hilbert space. But what form would the recovery (i.e. rep-
resentation) theorem take? The only possibility that comes to
my mind is a theorem of the sort sought by Jauch, Piron, et al.
They start with “propositions” (or “eventualities”) and lattice-
theoretic relations as primitive, and then seek to prove that the
lattice of propositions is necessarily isomorphic to the lattice of
subspaces of some Hilbert space. But of course no theorem of
the sort would be of any use to Field. What could be worse than
propositions (or eventualities)?31
Even a generous nominalist like Field cannot feel entitled to
quantify over possible dynamical states.32
In contrast to Malament’s view, Balaguer argues that Field’s program
can be extended to quantum mechanics.33 According to Balaguer, all we
need is to find the nominalistic counterparts of the statements that assign
probabilities to quantum events. To do this, Balaguer argues that we could
regard probabilities as physical properties of physical systems, i.e. propensi-
ties. In a second step, Balaguer outlines a representation theorem for quan-
tum mechanics in this way: for each Hilbert space we employ in quantum
mechanics, the set of closed subspaces of an Hilbert space can be repre-
sented by using propensities. Nonetheless, Balaguer’s solution remains a
highly controversial topic.34
31Malament (1982, p. 534).
32Malament (1982, p. 533).
33See Balaguer (1996).
34According to Bueno, Balaguer’s solution is incompatible with many interpretations of
quantum mechanics and, moreover, it is unclear whether or not propensities are available
to the nominalist. See Bueno (2003).
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2.2 Mathematics and constructibility quantifiers
In the previous section, I presented the way Field employs modal terms in or-
der to dispense with models. But nominalists have other reasons to advocate
modality. If the universe does not contain as many concreta as those that
are necessary to represent mathematical objects, nominalists could make
use of modal concepts. In this regard, it is first important to consider this
objection: if modal operators are employed in nominalistic reconstructions
in order to dispense with mathematical entities, nominalists might be onto-
logically committed to possibilia. And ontological commitment to possibilia,
or possible worlds, is as much problematic as the commitment to abstract
objects. So here lies a first worry for modal nominalism: philosophers who
employ modal operators should clarify what they mean by ‘possible’ and
‘necessary’ without committing themselves to possibilia or possible worlds.
Modal nominalists should handle a further problem: ontology is reduced
only by increasing ideology. As will see, the modal nominalist must increase
the complexity of the theory in order to dispense with abstracta. Chihara,
for example, extends classical logic to the system of modal logic S5 in order
to dispense with mathematical abstracta. However, the semantics of sen-
tences in S5 is presented in terms of possible worlds: ‘it is possible that
P ’ means that there is a possible world w such that P is true in w ; ‘it is
necessary that P ’ means that P is true in any possible world w. Again,
ontological commitment to possible worlds is as much questionable as the
one to mathematical abstracta.
2.2.1 The constructibility theory
Chihara’s constructibility theory aims at reinterpreting mathematics with-
out ontological commitment to possible worlds. Before I examine Chihara’s
theory, I would like to mention that Chihara neither believes that good
mathematics is conservative, as Field does, nor he endorses fictionalism.
According to Chihara, mathematical sentences do not literally refer to ab-
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stract objects. The semantics of a mathematical statement such as ‘there
are numbers’ is not captured by a Platonist interpretation, i.e. ‘there are
numbers’ is true if numbers exist and are abstracta. Because Platonism does
not express the literal interpretation of mathematical statements, Chihara
does not argues that mathematics is false, as Field does. However, Chihara
does not seem to endorse any position about the literal meaning of such
statements. He merely claims that mathematics does not need to be true to
be useful:
My general position has been that theorems of mathematics,
whatever their literal meaning may be (assuming that they have
a “literal meaning”), do not have to be true to be justifiably used
by scientists to draw the inferences they do in their scientific
work.35
It can be seen that, no matter how one may analyse the literal
meaning of mathematical sentences, one can make good sense of
mathematical practice and the applications of mathematics in
science without requiring mathematical theorems, literally con-
strued, to be true. It is enough that sentences expressing the
structural content of the theorems be true.36
For Chihara, it does not matter what the literal interpretation of mathe-
matical statements is. In other words, Chihara seems to endorse an agnostic
viewpoint on the literal meaning of mathematical statements. Nominalists
should just provide a nominalistic account of mathematical structuralism
without committing themselves to the existence of abstract objects. This is
sufficient for the modal nominalist. In Chihara’s view, what it matters is
that mathematics can recovered in the constructible setting.
It is important to understand what Chihara means by ‘constructible’.
Bur let me first elaborate on how Chihara distances himself from the Pla-
35Chihara (2004, p. 252).
36Chihara (2004, p. 295).
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tonistic view on mathematical structures, or ante rem structuralism. Ac-
cording to ante rem structuralism, mathematical structures exist and are
abstracta.37 On this view, mathematics also involves objects that are posi-
tions in the domain of a structure. In contrast to ante rem structuralism,
Chihara’s approach aims at holding together nominalism and structuralism.
The idea is to provide a nominalistic interpretation of mathematics based on
the constructibility theory, which makes use of special quantifiers, i.e. con-
structibility quantifiers, in order to avoid quantification over mathematical
objects:
Thus, the point of showing these philosophers how mathematics
can be done in terms of constructibility quantifiers was not to
convert scientists to using a new system of mathematics, but
rather to show that the undeniable usefulness of mathematics in
science did not require that one believe in the [things apparently]
talked about in mathematics.38
As will show soon, the constructibility theory aims at dispensing with
mathematical objects by using modality.39 The constructibility theory is ba-
sically a first-order theory plus constructibility quantifiers that do not carry
any ontological commitment.40 Constructibility quantifiers tell us which
concrete tokens we can construct. For instance, consider a sentence such
as ‘it is possible to construct houses made entirely of ice’. By uttering this
sentence, I am not committing myself to the actual existence of houses made
entirely of ice; I am just saying that houses made entirely of ice are possible.
Constructibility quantifiers occur in ordinary language, although they are
not pre-theoretic terms of ordinary language, because they occur in a formal
37See Shapiro (1997).
38Chihara (1990, p. 188).
39I will take into account the latest versions of the constructibility theory developed in
Chihara (1990) and (2004).
40For those who accept Quine’s criterion of ontological commitment, existential quanti-
fiers carry ontological commitment whereas, according to Chihara, constructible quantifies
do not.
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system, i.e. the constructibility theory.
Constructibility quantifiers are sequences of concrete tokens. Chihara
represents the assertion ‘it is possible to construct an open-sentence −’ by
the quantifier (C−), and the assertion ‘every open-sentence −’ by the quan-
tifier (A−). Sentences are all open in the constructibility theory. Open-
sentences are concrete marks on paper, on screen, and so on: that is to say,
they are spatially and temporally located sentences.
The constructibility theory is a formal system that tells us how to build
open-sentences without assuming the existence of any open-sentence. In
point of fact, the constructibility theory does not aim at providing informa-
tion about how to detect open-sentences, or which objects satisfy a given
open-sentence. Still, it may be helpful to give an example of what an open-
sentence could be. I am typing right now the sentences ‘x is an American
actor’ and ‘x is my favorite fiction novel’. These are open-sentences that you
are reading on screen, or on printed paper, that can be satisfied by John
Wayne and The Lord of the Rings respectively. In other words, typing ‘The
Lord of the Rings is my favorite fiction novel’, I wrote a concrete sentence
token that can be expressed by saying that ‘The Lord of the Rings’ satisfies
the open-sentence ‘x is my favorite fiction novel’.41
Satisfaction is the basic relation between objects and open-sentences
where standard quantifiers are involved, whereas it is the relation among
open-sentences if constructibility quantifiers occur. In the language of con-
structibility theory, a sequence of symbols ‘(C)xy’ could be read in English
such as ‘it is possible to construct an open-sentence y, such that y satisfies
x’; on the other hand, ‘(A)xy’ could be read in English such as ‘every open-
sentence y that it is possible to construct is such that y satisfies x’. Again,
it is important to emphasize that if an open-sentence is constructible, we
do not commit ourselves to an actual open-sentence token, or to a possible
world where that open-sentence exists. The constructibility theory does not
41In intuitionistic mathematics, proofs are mental constructions that are in princi-
ple constructible whereas, on Chihara’s account, mathematics involves concrete open-
sentences: tokens that are said to be constructible.
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tell us which objects satisfy a given open-sentence, such as Euclid’s geometry
does not tell us how to recognize straight lines, points and circles:
Euclid’s geometry does not tell us how to recognize straight lines,
how to tell if a line is really straight, or if a line really intersects a
point. It does not tell us how to construct points, straight lines,
or arcs. The important point is this: it doesn’t matter that
Euclid’s geometry does not tell us these things. The usefulness
of that kind of modal theory does not depend on its giving us that
kind of information. That’s not the way we use that geometry.
Similarly, my Constructibility Theory is not designed to give us
information about how to tell what is an open-sentence or what
things satisfy any given open-sentence.42
Open-sentences are all monadic, that is, sentences such as ‘x is human’.
But in order to recover mathematics we also need to express relations, func-
tions, and many other mathematical concepts. How could we express for
instance that a set has the same cardinality of another one without func-
tions? Or that every natural number has a unique successor? Because binary
relations can be defined as sets of ordered pairs < x, y >, and because or-
dered pairs < x, y > can be represented by the set {{x}, {x, y}}, Chihara
needs to reformulate set-theoretic ordered pairs in terms of open-sentences.
In Chihara’s view, an ordered pair is an open-sentence that it is satisfied
by other open-sentences; that is, it is satisfied by all and only couples {x, x}
and {x, y} that could be constructed.43 Starting with ordered pairs, Chihara
aims at constructing relations, equinumerosity,44 and natural numbers.45 In
42Chihara (2004, p. 172).
43For example, an ordered pair {Field, Y ablo} is a couple {Field, F ield} or a cou-
ple {Field, Y ablo}. A Couple {x, y} is an open-sentence that is satisfied by only open-
sentences x and y.
44In point of fact, Chihara proves a constructibility version of Hume’s principle. The
definition is complex, and it requires to spell out several technical concepts. For a summary
see Chihara (2004, pp. 178-179).
45To prove the theorems Peano’s Arithmetic, Chihara makes use of the hypothesis of
infinity. It is called ‘hypothesis’ instead of ‘axiom’ because, as Chihara (1990, p. 71)
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the end, Chihara carries out an extensive reconstruction of the relations that
are indispensable to recovering a large amount of mathematical results into
the language of the constructibility theory.46
I do not need to examine the constructibility theory in detail. But let
me highlight how Chihara’s theory is nothing but a theory of types for
open-sentences. Indeed, open-sentences are stratified into different levels
as follows: we start with concrete objects at level 0; at the next level we
quantify over objects of level 0; at the next level we quantify over open-
sentences of level 1; and so on.
Consider an open-sentence such as ‘x is an Afro-American President’.
This concrete token is an open-sentence of level 1, and Barack Obama is the
object that satisfies the open-sentence. I am now writing an open-sentence
of level 2 ‘there is at least an object that satisfies F ’, which is satisfied by
the open-sentence ‘x is an Afro-American President’ that I wrote earlier. In
principle, I could iterate the process building a hierarchy of open-sentences
that includes different variables for each level: objects (level 0), properties,
(level 1), attributes (level 2), qualities (level 3), and so on.
Let us see how stratification works in mathematics. At level zero, we
have objects such as x, y, z. At level one, we find the property (couple)
{x, y} that is satisfied by the objects x and y.47 At level two, we have the
attribute (ordered pair) < x, y > that is satisfied by all and only properties
{x, x} and {x, y} that could be constructed at the first level. By going on
points out, ‘I cannot suppose, as did Russell, that the question of whether the domain of
objects is finite or not is simply a matter of fact, to be settled, if at all, by the appropriate
scientific investigation. Nor is there any reason to maintain that the hypothesis will hold
no matter what domain of objects we may select, since I want to allow interpretations in
which the domain of objects is finite [. . . ] we can regard the number theorist as implicitly
adopting the Hypothesis of Infinity as an axiom. But in the present system, the hypothesis
will function as merely a hypothesis: certain theorems will presuppose the hypothesis and
others will not‘’. For further details see Chihara (1990, pp. 68-73).
46For a detailed analysis see Chihara (1990), Ch. 3-5.
47There are obviously several ways to satisfy such a property, for example
{Field, Y ablo}, {Field, F ield}, and so on.
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to the next levels we can construct relations, numbers, and so on.48
The constructibility theory supports nominalism about structures or, in
other words, in re structuralism. The idea behind in re structuralism is that
mathematics is a science of structures, but structures are not considered
abstract entities. However, the problem is that it is standard to regard
structures as models of a first-order theory, i.e. set-theoretical entities. As
Chihara points out,
The goal is to find such ”things” which are also nominalistically
acceptable, so that they can be used as the ”realizations” of
mathematical theories without requiring the background theory
to carry a commitment to the sorts of metaphysical entities that
led to so much trouble for the [ante rem] structuralists.49
Thus, we need a nominalistically acceptable open-sentence that describes
structures and, moreover, we need an appropriate open-sentences that rep-
resent the relations between objects. According to Chihara, the notion of re-
alization aims at substituting the standard (Platonistic) notion of truth in a
model. More precisely, a realization is an ordered pair consisting of an open-
sentence that is satisfied by the elements of the domain (i.e. constructible
open-sentences), and of an open-sentence that represents the relations be-
tween such elements. Since open-sentences, ordered pairs and relations, can
be built in the constructibility theory, such notions turn out to be nominal-
istically acceptable. As a result, Chihara can dispense with the Platonistic
notion of model.
48Suppose that there are less than 1010
10
particles in the universe. It should not be
possible to satisfy the open-sentence ‘x is an open-sentence that contains 1010
10
concrete
tokens’. However, as I said previously, the constructibility theory does not aim at telling
us what opens-sentences are possible.
49Chihara (2004, p. 220).
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2.2.2 Modality without possible worlds
Modal concepts are nominalistically acceptable insofar as the constructibil-
ity theory does not imply that the entities that satisfy open-sentences exist,
nor constructibility quantifiers are ontologically committing. But here lies
a question for Chihara: what about constructibility quantifiers semantics?
Does it require possible worlds semantics? In point of fact, Chihara presents
constructibility quantifiers semantics in terms of possible worlds,50 but fur-
ther adds that
It should be emphasized again that the above appeal to possi-
ble worlds was made to relate the constructibility quantifiers to
familiar and heavily studied areas of semantical research. I, per-
sonally, do not take possible world semantics to be much more
than a useful device to facilitate modal reasoning.51
For purposes of formal development, however, I have found it
simpler to regard the modal universal quantifier as a primitive
of the system.52
What does Chihara means by ‘primitive’? Prima facie, two ways of
defining ‘primitive’ are available: on the one hand, a term is primitive if it
is not defined by other terms; on the other, if the term is a pre-theoretical
notion.53
According to Chihara, possibility is taken as primitive in the sense that
it is not defined in the system where that notion occurs, as the membership
relation is a primitive of set theory.54 Possibility can occur as a defined
notion in another system but, Chihara argues, model theory is not required.
50Chihara develops an extension of the semantic of first-order language that includes
constructibility quantifiers. See Chihara (1990, pp. 27-37).
51Chihara (1990, p. 38).
52Chihara (1990, p. 39).
53Shapiro argues that ‘primitive’ means pre-theoretical according to Chihara. See
Shapiro (1997, p. 232).
54Chihara (2004, p. 204).
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Basically, Chihara regards the existence of open-sentences in a possible world
as a fac¸on de parler. What matters is just our world:
To say that someone has constructed an open-sentence is not
to say that an entity of a certain sort has been constructed but
only that the person has done something — he has performed
the appropriate series of actions. This is one reason why, when
the objects we are discussing are open-sentence tokens, I prefer
the ‘It is possible to construct’ reading to the ‘It is possible for
there to be’ reading. Still, it is useful to treat open-sentence
tokens as ordinary objects55
In short, possible worlds are merely a useful myth.56 In Chihara’s view,
when I say something like ‘it is possible to construct two different open-
sentences’, I am not saying that there are two distinct open-sentences in two
distinct possible worlds: I am merely stipulating that such open-sentences
could exist. In other words, possible worlds seem to me nothing but fictions
in this context.
But how can fictions provide genuine explanations? In this regard, Chi-
hara distinguishes two kinds of explanations:57 we can either have scientific
explanations of natural phenomena, or explanations of the meaning and use
of expressions. According to Chihara, myths are not involved in scientific
explanations but can be used for clarifying the meaning of modal notions.
Thus, possible worlds are myths that make constructibility quantifiers eas-
ier to understand, as well as Flatland world can be used as a metaphor to
explain complex geometric concepts.
2.2.3 Towards modal fictionalism
Since possible worlds are considered myths by Chihara, I think I can label his
account of possible worlds as modal fictionalism. As previously stated, Chi-
55Chihara (1990, p. 40).
56See Chihara (1990, p. 60).
57See Chihara (2004, p. 196).
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hara does not endorse fictionalism just because he distances himself from
Field’s program, and because he does not take existential mathematical
statements as false. Thus, I do not think I am forcing Chihara’s position
by presenting Rosen’s account of modal fictionalism and applying it to Chi-
hara’s.58
Modal fictionalism aims at providing an analysis of modality in terms
of fictions. Basically, the idea is to express possible worlds semantics in
fictions. Consider the following realist interpretation of modal operators:
1. ♦P if and only if at some world w, P holds.
2. P if and only if at all worlds w, P holds.
The modal realist can turn a modal statement P into a non-modal one
P ∗ about possible worlds as follows: P if and only if P ∗. For instance, a
statement such as ‘it is possible to construct the number two’ becomes ‘there
is a possible world in which the number two exists’.
Modal realists have two ways of conceiving modality: possible worlds can
be either abstracta or concreta.59 By contrast, modal fictionalists opt for
a deflationistic view in which possible worlds’ semantics works in fictional
contexts. In addition, modal fictionalists typically introduce the fictional
operator ‘according to the fiction F ’ that operates on sentences. This is
how modal operators are interpreted:
1. ♦P iff, according to the many-worlds fiction, at some world w, P holds.
58See Rosen (1990) and (1995).
59David Lewis is perhaps the most famous philosopher who conceived possible worlds as
concrete objects. Lewis (1986, p. 2) advocates “ a thesis of plurality of worlds, or modal
realism, which holds that our world is but one world among many. [. . . ] The other worlds
are of a kind with this world of ours. To be sure, there are differences of kind between
things that are parts of different worlds - one world has electrons and another has none,
one has spirits and another has none - but these differences of kind are no more than
sometimes arise between things that are parts of one single world, for instance in a world
where electrons coexist with spirits. The difference between this and the other worlds is
not a categorical difference. Nor does this world differ from the others in its manner of
existing.”
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2. P iff, according to the many-worlds fiction, at all worlds w, P holds.
The fictional operator singles out a collection of sentences that are true
in a domain but false in another. It explains how, for instance, the sentence
‘Siegfried killed the dragon’ is true in Norse mythology but false in the real
world (since there are no dragons). Ontological commitment to possible
worlds is avoided by invoking the fictional operator. If one has an anti-
realist attitude towards fictions, it is also trivial to account for how we
have epistemic access to them, in contrast to realism about possible worlds.
Modal fictionalism is thus compatible with nominalism.
If the modal fictionalist is right, it is possible to provide an anti-realist
semantics of modality without ontological commitment to possible worlds.
Whereas the modal realist accepts the schema P if and only if P ∗, the
modal fictionalist appeals to the schema P if and only if, according to the
many-worlds fictions, P ∗. I suggest to apply the latter schema to Chihara’s
account of possible worlds as follows: for instance, ‘it is possible to construct
the number 2’ if and only if, according to the the many-worlds fiction, there
is a possible world in which there is the number 2.
It is important to emphasize a difference between modal realism and
fictionalism: according to the former, every modal statement, or proposition,
has a determinate truth-value even if we do not know which it is; on the
other hand, according to the latter, it is pointless to speculate on a sentence’s
truth-value if the story does not say anything about it. For example, because
The Lord of the Rings does not say anything about hobbits’ blood type, it
makes no sense to mull over Bilbo’s blood type. As a consequence, the
sentence ‘Bilbo’s blood type is A+’ lacks either truth-value, or it is false.60
I would like to present a problem that arises out of modal fictional-
ism. Hale notices how the statement (PWF) ‘there exist possible fictional
60In point of fact, even if a story leaves many questions open, it might be important
to speculate on the truth-value of certain sentences to appreciate the story in question.
Consider Kafka’s incomplete novel Amerika. It would be rather dismissive to say: ‘Kafka
does not tell us anything about what Karl does after he got to Oklahoma City. The
problem is meaningless; stop wondering about it!’
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worlds’ should be false according to modal fictionalism.61 Here is a dilemma:
is PWF false necessarily or contingently? If PWF is false necessarily, the
sentence ‘according to fictions, P ’ is trivially true independently of the con-
tent of P , as there are no fictional worlds. Suppose that PWF is false
contingently. If this is so, there may exist fictional worlds, and thus modal
fictionalism turns out to be self-refusing. Either way, Hale argues that modal
fictionalism is hard to sustain.
2.2.4 Burgess’ objection
Chihara rejects Burgess and Rosen’s distinction between hermeneutic nom-
inalism and revolutionary nominalism.62 Chihara does not consider his pro-
gram revolutionary, because it does not dictate that scientists have to adopt
the constructibility theory, nor hermeneutic, because it does not provide
an alternative semantics of mathematical sentences. For Chihara, it does
not matter what literal meaning is. But consider the following Burgess’
objection.63 Suppose one utters the sentences:
1. There are numbers.
2. There are numbers greater than 1010 that are prime.
To paraphrase those statements, nominalists have two main strategies
according to Burgess. The nominalist could argue that either (2) does not
imply (1), or (2) implies (1) but (2) is false. The former is the hermeneutic
strategy, whereas the latter is revolutionary. Instead, Chihara argues that
(1) is false, but he does not say anything about whether or not (2) implies
(1), or whether (2) is true or false. In other words, Chihara does not want to
endorse hermeneutic or revolutionary nominalism. He is reluctant to adopt
any hypothesis on what people mean when they utter sentences like (2).
But how could Chihara distinguish between a mathematician and someone
61See Hale (1995).
62See sec. n. 1.4.
63See Burgess (2005).
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like Humpty Dumpty who gives any truth-value whatsoever to sentences?
Mathematicians, Burgess argues, know what the truth-value of (2) is: (2)
is true. Chihara’s reply emphasizes how the constructibility theory does
not depend on mathematicians’ linguistic practices, nor it states the actual
meaning of mathematical assertions.64 Nonetheless, I believe that Burgess
and Rosen’s distinction between hermeneutic nominalism and revolution-
ary nominalism points at something important. Taking for granted that
Burgess and Rosen’s distinction is too narrow in order to encompass every
nominalistic program, it is nevertheless helpful to set what the nominalistic
goals should be.65 It would be hard evaluating the success of a nominalistic
reconstruction without considering any goals.
64See Chihara (2006, pp. 331-336).
65See Baker (2006).
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2.3 Mathematics without numbers
Hellman’s aim is to interpret mathematical statements modally without
quantification over abstract objects. According to Hellman, there are four
requirements for every philosophical interpretation of mathematics:66 1)
mathematical statements must be either true or false; 2) philosophers must
account for how we can get mathematical knowledge; 3) mathematics must
be a priori ; 4) philosophers must explain how mathematics can be applied
to the physical world. Platonists do not have any problems of accounting for
the first and the third requirement, but they have troubles with the second
one. For Hellman, it is possible to meet all the four desiderata by endorsing
his modal structuralism. According to Hellman’s modal structuralism,
mathematics is the free exploration of structural possibilities,
pursued by (more or less) rigorous deductive means.67
On this view, the basic requirement is that mathematical structures are
possible, which is called the ‘hypothetical component’ of modal structural-
ism.68 Hellman’s modal structuralism does not lead to ontological commit-
ment to mathematical objects, nor to the existence of actual mathematical
structures. Modal logic is required in order to avoid representing struc-
tures as models or sets, and modal logic is presented in terms of a second-
order language that allows quantification over possible structures. Hellman’s
structuralism is a form of modal nominalism or, in other words, of elimina-
tivism that avoids commitment to both structures and objects. Hellman’s
nominalism is often called ‘structuralism without structures’.
Consider the case of arithmetic in light of structuralism. It does not
matter what the identity of each single natural number is: what matter are
the relations in arbitrary ω-sequences. More generally, Hellman intends to
recover arithmetic, real analysis, and even part of set theory in a structural-
istic setting without commitment to abstracta. Hellman’s strategy must be
66See Hellman (1989, pp. 2-6).
67Hellman (1989, p. 6).
68See Hellman (1989, p. 16).
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distinguished from Chihara’s, since the latter makes use of constructibility
quantifiers, whereas the former does not.
2.3.1 Hellman’s program
Imagine an arithmetical sentence (A) such as 2+2 = 4. Hellman interprets A
as the conditional ‘if there were any ω-sequence, A would hold in it’. The first
part of that conditional is expressed by ♦X, where X is an ω-sequence, and
arithmetical sentences are sentences that would hold in possible ω-sequences.
The modal structuralist is thus committed to possible ω-sequences, which
is the so-called ‘categorical component’ of modal structuralism: ♦X, where
X is an ω-sequence satisfying Peano axioms. In point of fact, Hellman’s
structuralism requires second-order arithmetic to be formulated, and it is
important to point out that second-order Peano Arithmetic is categorical,
i.e. there is one intended model.69
Hellman’s nominalization starts with standard second-order logic plus
the comprehension principle ∃R∀x1 . . . xn[R(x1 . . . xn)↔ A].70 Arithmeti-
cal truths are proved within second-order Peano Arithmetic by modal oper-
ators in this way: (PA2 → A), where PA2 is the conjunction of the second-
order Peano axioms, and A is an arithmetical sentence. More precisely, an
arithmetical sentence goes over to a conditional of the form ∀S(PA2 → A),
where S is the relation variable that replaces the successor constant. If A
is logically implied by PA2, then A is true; otherwise ¬A in virtue of the
categoricity of second-order arithmetic. Any pair of models of PA2 is isomor-
phic, and every arithmetical sentence is either true or false in every model
of PA2.
To express that an arithmetical sentence holds in any ω-sequence, Hell-
man says ∀X∀f(PA2 → A), where X is an ω-sequence and A is an arith-
69By contrast, there are non-standard models in first-order arithmetic. Quantification
over both predicates and first-order variables is allowed in second-order logic. Many
interpretations of predicates are admitted once quantification over predicates is allowed.
This is why there are many possible interpretations of second-order logic.
70Where R occurs free in A. Note that universal quantifiers are not boxed.
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metical sentence. Hellman also proves that there could be an infinite total-
ity, which indicates how the modal structuralist postulates the existence of
potential infinity.71
Arithmetic can be fully recovered in such a modal setting. And if ω-
sequences are possible, then natural numbers are dispensable. But suppose
that ω-sequences were not possible. If this was so, the conjunction of Peano
axioms PA2 would be false, and the conditional PA2 → A would be true
for every A. Therefore, arithmetic would be trivialized. This is why Hell-
man must assume the above-mentioned ‘categorical component’ of modal
structuralism as fundamental law of arithmetic.
Since Hellman does not postulate actual ω-sequences, he does not com-
mit himself to the existence of abstract ω-sequences. The modal structuralist
assumes that ω-sequences could exist, but such sequences are just a dummy
names that do not refer to anything. This is because whereas Platonists
regard a true mathematical sentence as ‘true in a model’, the modal struc-
turalist regards that sentence as ‘true in a possible model’. In Hellman’s
view, true mathematical sentences in a model are false. Modal structural-
ism is thus distinct from formalism, i.e. it is distinct from the view that
mathematical sentences have no truth-values. The price is to take modal
operators as primitive notions: that is, modal operators are not given in
terms of set-theoretical semantics.
According to Hellman, mathematics explores a priori truths, in the sense
that it studies truths about possible structures. But why should we endorse
Hellman’s interpretation of standard mathematics? After all, non-modal
mathematical sentences are false according to the modal structuralist. To
address this problem, Hellman provides a translation scheme that proves the
equivalence between the modal interpretation of arithmetic and the standard
(Platonistic) one.72 The equivalence theorem aims at showing that:
71However, because the axiom of comprehension allows impredicative sentences, its
constructive nature is not guaranteed. See Hellman (1989, p. 33).
72See Hellman (1989, pp. 41-44).
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1. A is Platonistically true iff PA2 logically implies A
2. PA2 logically implies A iff A is a modal structuralist truth.
3. A is Platonistically true iff A is a modal structuralist truth.
2.3.2 Beyond the modal interpretation of arithmetic
Let us now examine how to extend Hellman’s program to real analysis and
set theory. Real analysis can be developed in second-order logic by em-
ploying first-order variables for real numbers plus a continuity principle.73
With regard to set theory, Hellman recovers a large amount of set-theoretical
notions by the elementary theory of finite sets and classes, where the cate-
goricity of second-order arithmetic is fully available.74 However, that theory
is not nominalistic on its own, and thus it requires both plural quantification
and mereology.75
Hellman employs a further strategy for paraphrasing sets. Suppose that
the cumulative hierarchy is the standard model of set theory. Hellman shows
that if A is a set-theoretical sentence that is either true or false in the cumu-
lative hierarchy, then A is either true or false in all the possible models of set
theory. In this regard, Hellman employs ZF2’s quasi-categoricity theorem:
if M1 and M2 are two models of ZF2 (second-order Zermelo-Fraenkel set
theory) that have the same cardinality and ordinal height, then M1 and M2
are isomorphic. However, the models of ZF2 are different than standard ZF,
because the ordinal height of any model of ZF2 is a strongly inaccessible car-
dinal.76 This point may be problematic from a nominalistic point of view,
since it is no obvious matter to establish the possibility of the existence of
structures with inaccessibly many objects.
Last but not least, Hellman also presents the general form of applied
mathematics for modal structuralism: if there were structures satisfying
73See Hellman (1996).
74See Feferman and Hellman (1995) and Hellman (1996, pp. 107-110).
75See sec. n. 2.3.4
76κ is a strongly inaccessible cardinal iff κ is regular and is a strong limit, i.e. κ has a
strong limit if 2λ < κ, for every λ < κ.
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the conjunction of the axioms of second-order Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory
that also includes Urelemente (that is, non-mathematical objects), modal
set-theoretical statements would hold in such structures. Roughly speaking,
mathematics can be applied in a modal setting if we assume an hypothetical
statement about structures satisfying the conjunction of the axioms of ZF2
plus Urelemente are possible.
2.3.3 The wolf and the lamb
Before I examine Hellman’s use of mereology and plural quantification, I
would like to consider Quine’s critique of second-order logic. According to
Quine, second-order logic is nothing but set theory in disguise,77 because
if we quantify over predicates, we ought to commit ourselves to sets. Here
is how the objection goes: there is a difference between the position of
predicates and the position of names in a sentence. In first-order logic,
quantifiers range over variables that stand for names of entities of some sort,
such as ∃x(x is a glass) where x stands for a name of a glass. In second-
order logic, on the other hand, we quantify over predicates treating them as
they are names. But if predicates are names, then
The quantifier ‘∃F ’ or ‘∀F ’ says not that some or all predicates
are thus and so, but that some or all entities of the sort named
by predicates are thus and so.78
And if predicates name sets, then second-order logic is nothing but set
theory in disguise. Boolos’ reply to Quine is based on the distinction be-
tween names and ranges of predicates. Predicates have ranges but they
do not necessary name sets. Even though quantifiers range over a domain
of discourse, there is no unique interpretation of second-order logic. Logic
has no a specific subject matter, because it is neutral about the choice of
the domain. If a second-order sentence says something about sets, the do-
main contains sets; otherwise there is no ontological commitment to sets.
77See Quine (1970, pp. 66-67).
78Quine (1970, p. 67).
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Moreover, second-order logic is weaker than set theory, because the notion
of validity can be defined in set theory, but it cannot purely be defined in
second-order language.79 According to Boolos, this point shows that second-
order logic is not set theory in disguise.
2.3.4 Ontological innocence
Hellman postulates possible (non-actual) infinitely many Urelemente (indi-
viduals). These individuals follow the axioms of mereology and the term
‘finite set’ is interpreted as ‘finite sum of individuals’.80 Infinite sums of
individuals are expressed using plural quantification by the following postu-
late:
There are (possibly) some individuals one of which is an atom
and each one of which fused with a unique atom not overlapping
that individual is also one of them.81
where an atom is an individual without proper parts.82 Adding that pos-
tulate plus Goodman’s axioms of mereology, we get a nominalistic model for
the elementary theory of finite sets and classes. First-order variables range
over individuals; finite set variables range over finite sum of individuals; and
class variables range over arbitrary individuals. If a countable infinity of
atoms is possible, then we can show the modal existence of ω-sequences.
It is important to understand that sums of individuals are as much con-
crete as the individuals themselves. A mereological sum of individuals is a
thing that has all such individuals as its parts, and every part overlaps some
of those individuals. If a particle is an individual, then a mereological sum
of particles is a concrete item that is made up of all particles and nothing
else.
79See Boolos (1975, pp. 518-519).
80See Goodman (1977).
81Hellman (1996, p. 108). Things that overlap are things that have a part in common.
82x is a proper part of y iff x is a part of y and x 6= y. In other words, a proper part of
something is a part of it that is distinct from the whole.
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I have not explained yet how Hellman employs plural quantification. Plu-
ral quantification was originally motivated by the fact that some sentences in
natural language cannot be naturally formulated by using first-order logic.
There are sentences such as ‘some critics admire only one another’ or ‘there
are some pens on the desk’ that contain plural quantifiers. Boolos and others
suggest that such statements should be literally taken as containing plural
quantifiers. In this regard, there two possible options: one could include
plural quantifiers, i.e. ∃xx and ∀xx, in a first-order language, or one could
allow plural quantification over predicates in second-order logic.
It is interesting to examine how plural quantification can be used to
eliminate ontological commitment to mathematical abstracta. Remember
that instead of claiming that there are abstract objects satisfying Peano
axioms, Hellman argues that ω-sequences satisfying Peano axioms could ex-
ist. Without plural quantification, quantifiers are interpreted as ranging over
(monadic) predicates and (polyadic) relations in second-order logic. By con-
trast, plural quantification combined with mereology enables a reduction of
polyadic relations to monadic predicates. Roughly speaking, relations and
functions are both dispensable within plural quantification.83 As a conse-
quence, plural quantification does not depend on mastering mathematical
concepts such as functions and relations.
I would now like to emphasize a few aspects of Hellman’s approach that
might be controversial. In the first place, Hellman neither clarifies what
an individual is, nor he spells out which entities are mereologically accept-
able. In addition, modal structuralists need to assume modal operators as
primitive, in the sense that such operators are not required to be given a
set-theoretic semantics. Hellman’s structuralism relies on the general as-
sumption that modal existence and structures are both possible, but modal
structuralists should account for how we can have epistemic access to modal
existence. Hellman himself understands the problem:
What sort of evidence can we have for the various modal-existence
83Hellman (2005, p. 559).
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postulates arising in mathematics, as illustrated above? [. . . ] It
seems that we must fall back on indirect evidence pertaining to
our successful practice internally and in applications and, per-
haps, the intuitive pictures and ideas we have of various struc-
tures as supporting the coherence of our concepts of them84
This last remark does not undermine the epistemic objection to modal
structuralism, because even if Hellman can dispense with mathematical ob-
jects, he should address the problem of epistemic access to possible struc-
tures.
84Hellman (2005, p. 557).
Chapter 3
Trimming Plato’s Beard:
Easy Roads to
anti-Platonism
3.1 Deflating existential consequences
Platonists and anti-Platonists disagree on what there is. It is unclear, how-
ever, if the dispute arises from the fact that the opponents do not actually
share the same criterion of existence. In that case, the disagreement would
be faulty in the following sense: Platonists and anti-Platonists seem to dis-
agree on what there is, whereas the debate is about the right criterion for
what exists. Just to mention some well-known examples, one could opt for
observability, causally efficacy, being in space and time, and so on. Az-
zouni suggests the following criterion that, perhaps, both Platonists and
anti-Platonists could adopt: anything exists if it is mind- and language- in-
dependent. It is not straightforward to make precise what objects fall under
that criterion, but some cases can be presented. The monster I dreamed last
night while I was sleeping does not exist, since dreams are mind-dependent;
a fictional character such as Sherlock Holmes does not exist, since it is made
up by Conan Doyle and his readers. More generally, existence does not take
74
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place merely because one is thinking about it, or when people depict it.
Dreams, fictional characters, and hallucinations, are all in the same boat:
they do not exist and do not have properties either.1
I would like to make a remark about properties. When I open a book
and read that ‘Sherlock Holmes has grey eyes’, I am not discovering a prop-
erty of a fictional character. Properties, according to Azzouni, are strictly
connected with things that exist: thus, fictional characters have no prop-
erties. Nevertheless, we constantly express true or false sentences about
fictional characters and other non-existing objects. For example, it is true
that ‘Sherlock Holmes has green eyes’ within Conan Doyle’s novels, whereas
‘Sherlock Holmes has yellow eyes’ is false.2 But statements about fictional
objects are not true or false because of a truth-maker, i.e. because of an
existing (fictional) object. In fact, we pretend that such statements are true
or false during the fiction (myths, novels, films, etc.),3 but we do not com-
mit ourselves to the fact that Sherlock Holmes has properties by uttering
a statement such as ‘Sherlock Holmes has grey eyes’. Things that do not
exist cannot have properties or, in other words, there is nothing to discover
about non-existing objects. Everyone who is acquainted with the fact that
Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character also knows that he does not really
have an eye colour.
Here what seems to emerge is a pluralistic concept of truth, in which
true in a fiction is different from true in the real world. But looking at
our linguistic practices, we do not distinguish a fictional conception of truth
from a realist one: truth does not draw any line between real and unreal.
1See Azzouni (2004, pp. 83–87).
2Although, I think, Conan Doyle never says that ‘Sherlock Holmes does not have yellow
eyes’, we can easily infer it from the fact that he has grey eyes.
3See Azzouni (2010a, p. 112). More precisely, Azzouni distinguishes internal state-
ments from external ones during a fiction. External statements are those that we pretend
to be true or false, whereas internal statements are those that are true or false simpliciter.
For example, we pretend that ‘Hamlet is a prince’ is true, whereas ‘Hamlet is portrayed
as a prince in Shakespeare’s play Hamlet ’ is true simpliciter. See Azzouni (2010a, p. 114-
123).
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If we know that Sherlock Holmes is a fictional character, it is because we
read Conan Doyle’s novels, or because we watched movies where Sherlock
Holmes is depicted as a fictional detective, and so on. In other words,
there are usually facts in the world that induce the identification of fictional
characters, and such facts play an indispensable role in identifying both
fictional characters and real objects. When a term in a sentence does not
refer to, the term does not have truth-makers, although there may be some
external factors that induce a truth value of a sentence.4
Azzouni’s picture of truth is a form of deflationism, but an anomalous
one, because it is compatible with the correspondence view of truth. De-
flationists usually aim at a concept of truth that does not fit with the cor-
respondence view of truth. However, according to Azzouni, the correspon-
dence theory of truth has to be recovered even within a deflationist picture,
because correspondence grasps an important intuition that arises from our
linguistic practice. The sentence ‘snow is white’ is true in virtue of how
the world is made: the fact that snow is white. But a statement such as
‘Sherlock Holmes lives in Baker street’ is true even in the absence of truth-
makers. More specifically, ‘Sherlock Holmes lives in Baker street’ is true in
virtue of Conan Doyle’s novels, despite the fact that there are no fictional
characters.
A satisfactory concept of truth should neither be entirely developed from
truth-makers, nor imply the existence of the objects under the quotation
marks. Azzouni’s idea makes sense if we distinguish the ontological com-
mitment of a sentence from what a sentence is about. As a consequence,
there are sentences about something even if we do not commit ourselves
to the existence of what the sentences are about. If we can express true
mathematical sentences without committing to mathematical objects, then
it will be possible to provide an easy-road to nominalism.
4See Azzouni (2012a).
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3.1.1 A criterion for what exists
I will say more on the relation between ontological commitment and exis-
tence in the next section.5 I would now like to point out that Azzouni’s
mind– and language– independent criterion is not just a necessary condi-
tion for what exists: it is also sufficient. This point does not rule out other
criteria insofar as some of them may be co-extensive with Azzouni’s crite-
rion. Let us pick out the criterion of being in space-time. It may be that,
for every object x, if x is mind– and language– independent, then x is in
space-time, and vice versa. Thus Azzouni’s criterion may coincide with be-
ing in space-time. But even in that case, Azzouni’s criterion will remain the
most adequate criterion, because it can be applied to abstracta: to objects
that are mind– and language– independent, although neither observable,
nor located in space-time, nor causally efficacious, and so forth. This point,
I think, is decisive for the debate between Platonists and anti-Platonists.
In fact, if they share the same criterion for what exists, the metaphysical
disagreement in question will not be a faulty one. Given the same criterion,
the debate is really about what exists.
Azzouni’s criterion has an epistemic value, because it emerges from our
epistemic practices.6 How do epistemic agents discover the properties and
the relations of existing objects? To settle this issue, we need a non-trivial
explanation of the method by which we discover the properties and relations
of mind– and language– independent objects.7 Consider a concrete object
such as an apple: apples are mind– and language– independent we perceive
through causal connections. In this case, we can provide an epistemic ac-
count of such connections that involves neuro-physiological concepts that
tell us how the sense organs work. However, causality is not the only way of
meeting such an epistemic requirement. This is because there could be other
contexts where causality is not operative – although epistemic requirements
5See sec. n. 3.1.2.
6Azzouni (2012b, p. 956).
7In Azzouni (2004) this method is explicitly presented in terms of reliability.
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are empirical.8
The epistemic requirement is a test for determining whether or not an
object is stipulated. But it neither depends on the metaphysical criterion,
nor it can be deduced from that criterion. Whereas Azzouni’s criterion tells
us what it is the necessary and sufficient condition for what exists, the epis-
temic requirement is an empirical test to distinguish what exist from what
is merely stipulated. Azzouni’s criterion does not apply to objects whose
existence is stipulated. Hence if numbers do not exist, they must depend on
our linguistic practices in the same way as fictional characters do. Here the
metaphysical criterion joins the epistemic requirement: mathematical ob-
jects are mind– and language– dependent because the methods of satisfying
the epistemic requirement cannot be applied: no epistemic story about how
we can get knowledge of abstract objects is possible.9 Platonists can reply
by invoking the indispensability argument that forces ontological commit-
ment to mathematical objects independently of any epistemological concern.
Azzouni’s counter-reply is that a sentence such as ‘there are numbers’ seems
to commit to the existence of numbers so long as one believes that ‘there is’
always carries ontological weight. This is why it is important to stress the
difference between quantification and ontological commitment.
3.1.2 Existence and ontological commitment
A metaphysical criterion for what exists can be tied to a criterion for what
a discourse is committed to. In On “on what there is”, Azzouni claims that:
We start with a distinction between a ‘criterion for what exists’
(CWE) and a ‘criterion for recognizing what a discourse com-
mits us to’ (CRD). A nominalist, for example, claims that only
concrete objects (of one sort or another) exist; platonists, no-
toriously, think otherwise [. . . ] These are all variant of CWEs.
8See Azzouni (2004, p. 101).
9See Azzouni (2004, pp. 103–107).
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Quine (1948), however, is quite clearly not offering a CWE, but
only a CRD.10
But even accepting the connection between commitment and existence,
many questions about the nature of such a commitment still remain open.
One could recognize that a discourse commits us to entities and, nonetheless,
leave their properties unspecified. It is possible to fix such properties by
combining ontological commitment with a criterion for what exists.11
One of the common criteria for ontological commitment is Quine’s: reg-
iment a discourse into an interpreted first-order language in order to track
ontological commitment in every formula of the form ∃xP (x).12 By apply-
ing Quine’s criterion to a domain of discourse, one gets a straightforward
way of identifying what that discourse is about.13 Quine’s criterion is nor-
mative because it says what we have to commit ourselves to; the criterion is
also ontologically parsimonious, because it is supported by Russell’s theory
of descriptions to cut off those names that do not carry ontological com-
mitment;14 finally, it avoids quantification over predicates as well as the
corresponding ontological commitment to properties.
In Quine’s hands, the criterion is used to grasp the commitment within
our best scientific theories. But the criterion is not sufficient for the Pla-
tonist, because other assumptions are required in order to show that math-
ematical objects are outside of space-time and causally inert. Neither the
criterion for which anything exists if it is mind- and language- independent
can fill the gap, because abstracta and concreta are both considered by the
10Azzouni (1998, p. 2).
11We may, for example, assume that what exists is concrete.
12Where x occurs free in P . Quine’s criterion seems plausible within the context of our
best scientific theories at least. See Quine (1948).
13Quine’s criterion should be applied to our best scientific theories, although, in princi-
ple, it could also be used in other contexts.
14How can we say that an entity does not exist without presupposing its existence?
Quine’s (1948) makes use of Russell’s theory of definite descriptions to avoid the suggestion
that the use of the word ‘Pegasus’ in ‘Pegasus does not exist’ presupposes that there is a
Pegasus.
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Platonist mind- and language- independent.
According to Azzouni, Quine’s criterion for ontological commitment and
the metaphysical criterion are disjointed; that is, Quine’s way of recognizing
ontological commitment via regimentation does not follow from the meta-
physical criterion and vice versa. More generally, it is not the case that
metaphysical criteria indicate the way by which we should regiment scien-
tific theories, nor regimented existential formulas cast light on what exists.
The truth of an interpreted existential formula must be defined as the satis-
faction by something in a domain. Retrieving the distinction between object
language and metalanguage, existential quantifiers in the object language
have an ontological connotation if the quantifiers in the metalanguage also
have an ontological connotation. An argument for ontological commitment
in Quine’s style may proceed as follows: if existential quantifiers range over
a domain of discourse, and the truth of an existential formula like ∃xP (x) is
given by an object that satisfies x, existential quantifiers are always ontolog-
ically marked. Ontological commitment eventually follows from objectual
quantifiers and from the notion of satisfaction defined by a Tarskian theory
of denotation. However, Azzouni argues, Tarski’s theory of truth can be ap-
plied to terms that refer to nothing at all, insofar as it is possible to extend
the notion of reference even to those statements where vacuous terms occur.
Talking about ‘extension’, perhaps, is not the best way of characterizing
Azzouni’s strategy, since it lies in our current linguistic practices (vernac-
ular). In the vernacular we constantly refer to objects that do not exist –
a straightforward example is our talking of fictional characters. Endorsing
Azzouni’s view, we get a notion of reference according to which it is possible
to make sense of both vacuous and denoting terms: a notion of reference
that is labeled as reference*.
Reference is narrower than reference*. In Azzouni’s view, if objectual
quantifiers are taken as ontologically neutral — they do not always commit
to existing objects— there is no need to change Tarski’s semantics. Of
course, speakers need to be able to distinguish committing uses of ‘there is’
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from non-committing ones.
In Talking about Nothing, Azzouni refines the idea from Deflating Exis-
tential Consequence: reference* presented a singular conception of reference
in which both vacuous and denoting terms occurred, whereas the new dis-
tinction between referencer from referencee introduces a plural conception
of reference. More precisely, referencer is the relation that connects terms
(names, demonstatives, quantifiers) and objects, whereas referencee does
not require the existence of an object to which we refere to. For example,
‘Barack Obama’ refersr to Barack Obama, whereas ‘2’ referse to 2. The
ordinary way of speaking does not differentiate r from e but, mixing both,
leads to the disagreement between Platonism and anti-Platonism in the phi-
losophy of mathematics. In other words, the Platonist mistakes referr for
refere.
Referencer and referencee may sound rather artificial since ordinary
speakers do not use them in the vernacular. After all, here is a bit of
wordplay to make the point, what reference does it not refer to? However,
words such as ‘there is’, ‘exist’, or ‘refer to’, do not always carry ontolog-
ical commitment even in the vernacular. Consider an ordinary sentence
such as ‘there are fictional hobbits’ (H), and let us examine some ways of
interpreting it:15
1. One may provide a paraphrase of (H) in order to avoid ontological com-
mitment. ‘There are depictions of hobbits’, or ‘there are no hobbits’,
are standard ways of paraphrasing (H) without ontological commit-
ment to fictional entities. It is clear we need to distinguish proper
interpretations of (H) from incorrect ones stressing what kind of goal
a paraphrase must achieve. What it is required of a satisfactory para-
phrase is what it keeps the meaning of the original statement. ‘There
are no hobbits’ works insofar as the meaning of (H) is a denial of the
existence of hobbits. But the paraphrase is still inadequate because
the reference to fictional discourse is missed. Consider the paraphrase
15There are other ways of reading (H). See Azzouni (2004, pp. 63-78).
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‘there are depictions of hobbits’, which alludes to a fictional context.
This new paraphrase can yield a sentence with an unwanted truth
value. Suppose that I appreciate some virtues of hobbits, as courage
and heartiness, but dislike Tolkien’s way of depicting them. If I substi-
tute ‘fictional hobbits’ with ‘depictions of hobbits’, I could not appreci-
ate hobbits’ virtues unless I liked the way hobbits are depicted. These
counter-examples show how the most common paraphrasing options
fail to preserve the meaning that (H) sustains.
2. Another possibility is to consider (H) as a sentence about hobbits, and
when I assert (H) I commit myself to the existence of fictional entities.
All the uses of ‘there is’ are ontologically committing under this inter-
pretation. It is appropriate to attribute the adjective ‘meinongian’ to
such fictional entities, since they are ‘real’ non-existing objects. How-
ever, ordinary speakers clearly do not intend to commit themselves to
the existence of fictional objects when utter a sentence such as (H).
Thus, the meinongian route does not have a grip on our common lin-
guistic practices.
3. I would now like to consider a reading of (H) based on the distinction
between literal meaning and metaphorical meaning. According to this
interpretation, (H) can be read on two different levels: it is false taken
literally, since there are no hobbits, but it is true metaphorically. When
(H) is understood metaphorically, the words do not carry ontological
commitment any more. This strategy has two main advantages over
the others: first, it does not seem to deny our common linguistic intu-
itions as the Meinongian option does; secondly, it does not require any
paraphrases. The couple literal/metaphorical works insofar as the dis-
tinction between the two levels is plain, that is, when nobody has trou-
bles to make out whether or not a word operates metaphorically. The
notion of pretense, or make-believe, plays an essential role: properties
can be attributed to non-existing objects by pretending that certain
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statements are true during the fiction. For example, I can say that
‘Frodo Baggins is the ring-bearer’ is true, despite the fact that Frodo
does not exist. However, there are statements about fictional charac-
ters that are true simpliciter in the vernacular, i.e. independently of
any pretense.16 Some examples are statements such as ‘Pegasus does
not exist’, or ‘Bilbo Baggins is a fictional character’. In such contexts
no pretense comes into play, but those statements are still true, not
just truth-apt, in contrast with a statement such as ‘Frodo Baggins is
the ring-bearer’.
4. The temptation to consider (H) true, and not merely truth-apt, is quite
strong. When (H) is considered literally true, the problem is how to
avoid ontological commitment to fictional entities. An interesting sug-
gestion comes up from the word ‘fictional’ when it is used to draw a line
between committing uses of ‘there is’ and non-committing. But ordi-
nary speakers do not always have such a word in order to distinguish
between fiction and non-fiction. Context and background information
play a crucial and indispensable role to tell whether or not a term is
committing ontologically without invoking fictional operators.
I would like to point out that none of those options constitute a con-
clusive argument for the right interpretation of (H). Azzouni’s neutralism
is an alternative reading in which quantifiers, nouns, and demonstratives
are taken as ontologically neutral. Such a viewpoint is different and even
stronger than claiming that ‘there is’ sometimes is ontologically committing.
Azzouni does not argue that the uses of ‘there is’ are vague or that shows a
pluralistic conception of existence. Ordinary speakers are able to recognize
whether or not a term carries ontological commitment. If they are not, they
have no access to salient data. Background information is essential in that
regard: for example, if I did not know that Sherlock Holmes is a fictional
detective, I could believe he was a real detective who lived in London a long
16Azzouni (2010a, pp. 114-115).
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time ago. This does imply that ‘there is’ is essentially vague: I was wrong
because I lacked relevant information.
Azzouni aims at rejecting Quine’s criterion by claiming that existential
quantifiers are ontologically neutral. Quantification, on its own, is not suffi-
cient to carry ontological commitment, which is justified only for those ob-
jects that are independent of our psychological processes and language. And
If quantification is released from ontological commitment, nominalists do not
need to reject the indispensability argument. Mathematical statements are
indispensable because make it possible to represent empirical phenomena
and manipulate scientific theories. Following Azzouni’s terminology, we use
assertively mathematical statements in empirical science.17
Despite the indispensable use of quantifiers, mathematical objects are
stipulated: they are made up and depend on our psychological processes.18
Of course, an argument is needed to show that mathematical objects are
fictional. We require a test for discovering the properties of a mind- and
language- independent object, and Azzouni aims to show that standard
methods for showing the existence of abstract objects fail in that attempt.
The Platonist could argue that mathematical objects are known a pri-
ori, where ‘a priori’ means independently of experience. But even if we
take a priori knowledge for granted, we should still account for our a pri-
ori intuition of mathematical objects. The best candidate would lie in some
cognitive mechanism, though it is unclear what kind of cognitive mechanism
could justify the intuition of objects that are supposed to be outside of space
and time. Another difficulty for Platonism is how to explain the applications
of mathematics. According to the indispensability argument, we do not need
to explain the correlation between mathematical abstracta and the physi-
cal world, because such abstracta are indispensable to formulating our best
empirical theories.19 But look how tricky the argument is: it does not tell
us whether or not mathematical objects are mind– and language– indepen-
17Azzouni (2010a, p. 298)
18Azzouni (2004, p. 103).
19Colyvan (2001, p. 11).
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dent. In the absence of an epistemic story that would explain the connection
between the world and mathematical abstracta, we have no reasons to be-
lieve that mathematical abstracta are mind– and language– independent.
The point is not a conclusive argument against Platonism, but it provides a
good reason to believe that mathematical objects are mind– and language–
dependent.
Consider the following counter-argument: if nothing satisfies ∃xP (x)
then, according to standard semantics, the formula turns out to be false.
Thus, Azzouni must either show that scientists regard existential statements
as false, or he must provide an alternative semantics for those formulas. Az-
zouni avoids the dilemma by claiming that a sentence can be either true
or false without truthmakers: that is to say, without any object that de-
termines the truth-value of a sentence.20 There are other factors in the
world that can force the truth-value of that sentence: truth-value inducings.
These factors are not objects, and thus quantifiers do not range over truth-
value inducings. Azzouni prefers to talk about ‘truth-value inducings’ over
‘truth-value inducers’ because ‘truth-value inducers’ seems to refer to exist-
ing objects. However, according to Azzouni, quantifiers range over fictions
in mathematics. Instead, truth-value inducings are conventions, sociological
facts, fruitfulness of applications, and so on.
It is important to notice that Azzouni is not a formalist, where by ‘for-
malism’ I mean the fact that mathematical statements do not lack content.21
On the contrary, mathematicians prove truths and their consequences that
may turn out to be indispensable to our best scientific theories. This is
why Azzouni is not a standard fictionalist, if we mean by ‘fictionalism’ the
position that mathematical statements are false. Of course, the standard
fictionalist could change the truth-value of a mathematical statement from
false to true via the fictional operator ‘according to’. For example, they may
20For instance, a sentence such as 2 + 2 = 4 is true without truthmakers. See Azzouni
(2004, p. 57).
21See Azzouni (2004, p. 48): ‘The use of the truth idiom in science prevents instrumen-
talist construals of applied mathematical doctrine’.
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say that ‘Hercules is a demigod’ is literally false, since there are no demigods,
but it is true according to Greek myths; according to Peano Arithmetic,
it is true that there exists a number which is 2 + 2. More generally, false
mathematical statements become true via fictional operator in metaphorical
contexts. Mathematics is fiction alike not in the sense that mathematicians
are story-tellers, but because mathematical statements semantics is treated
as fictional statements semantics.
In contrast to standard fictionalism, Azzouni does not need to stress
the distinction between literal meaning and metaphorical meaning — i.e.
because quantifiers are ontologically neutral. In addition, Azzouni’s strategy
avoids all the technical difficulties of hard-road programs providing an easy
road to nominalism. The strategy is ‘easy’ because does not paraphrase
mathematical statements, but the price is to get rid of Quine’s criterion
of ontological commitment. In the next section, I will examine Azzouni’s
counter-proposal to Quine’s criterion.
3.1.3 Grades of ontological commitment
Neutral quantifiers range over both fictions and existing objects. To put it
another way, neutral quantifiers range over posits. Posits are tracked in a
first-order regimented discourse by formulas of the form ∃xP (x), where P (x)
is any formula with x free. If quantifiers range over mind– and language–
independent posits, the commitment is called ‘ontological’, whereas if they
range over fictions, the commitment does not have existential weight. Az-
zouni calls the latter ‘quantifier commitment’ in order to emphasize the
lack of ontological commitment.22 Note that it is possible to disagree with
Azzouni about whether or not mathematical objects are fictional, but still
accept the distinction between quantifier and ontological commitment.
Many posits are indispensable to building up the scientific image of
the world. Azzouni rearranges the posits that are indispensable to scien-
tific theories according to their epistemic burdens. In this regard, Azzouni
22Azzouni (2004, p. 127).
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subdivides posits into three categories: ultra–thin, thin, and thick posits.
Ultra–thin posits have no epistemic burdens at all, because they are merely
postulated by writing down definitions or axioms. Both mathematical ob-
jects and fictional characters are the most common examples of ultra-thin
posits. Mathematical posits cannot change their epistemic status because
play no epistemic role in mathematical proofs: that is to say, mathematical
objects are always mind– and language– dependent. In Deflating existen-
tial consequences, Azzouni called ‘thin’ those posits that pay the ‘Quinean
rent’ by contributing to our web of beliefs. Thin posits were exemplified
by Quinean virtues such as conservativism, modesty, simplicity, testing, and
refutability.23 More recently, Azzouni has revised his position claiming that
every posit satisfies Quinean virtues:
What I should have said about this is what I’m saying now: that
thin posits are the items we commit ourselves to on the basis of
our theories about what the things we thickly access are like.24
This quote emphasizes the role of theories in scientific inquiry altogether,
but requires some additional clarifications. Let us first see what Azzouni
means by ‘thickly access’. Thick epistemic access is determined by causal
relations between epistemic agents and posits. Thick epistemic access makes
possible the detection of objects directly through sensory organs or techni-
cal instruments. There is a wide range of posits to which we are thickly
connected: from the birds that we observe with the naked eye, or through
binoculars, to a Geiger counter that detects the emission of nuclear radia-
tions. Roughly speaking, thick epistemic access operates under the following
conditions:
Robustness: The result of thick epistemic access to an object is indepen-
dent of epistemic agents’ expectations. According to robustness, de-
tecting properties of thick posits is a process epistemically independent
23Quine and Ullian (1978).
24Azzouni (2012b, p. 963).
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of theories. Robustness aims to limit the role of confirmation holism
or, in other words, the role of theories in scientific practice. The idea is
to provide a picture of scientific practice that takes into account what
Azzouni calls ‘gross regularities’.25 Scientists and engineers do their
job by practicing with instruments regularly without being necessar-
ily aware of what theories are behind their activities. An engineer
can use an oscilloscope correctly without being aware of what hap-
pens on the subatomic level, or what chemical mechanism allows his
movement of hands during muscles stretching. Even though gross reg-
ularities can be presumably incorporated into scientific theories, the
point is that scientists become skilled independently of the scientific
theories behind their job. Gross regularities stress how scientific prac-
tice is epistemically independent of scientific theories as a whole. As
a result, confirmation holism is partially limited by scientific practice.
Azzouni is not denying that many theories are required to build sophis-
ticated instruments in contemporary science. Of course, it would have
been impossible to build a modern microscope without optics and the
study of electromagnetic waves, or a particle accelerator without the
knowledge of electromagnetic fields and atomic properties of materi-
als as tritium. However, the process whereby scientists and engineers
become skilled is epistemically independent of scientific theories as a
whole. I can learn to use a digital ammeter to measure the electric
current without being an engineer, or even if I do not know what it is
going on at the subatomic level.
Refinement: Thick epistemic access can be refined. This process is es-
sential in scientific research as well as our common experience. Think
about when we move closer to a butterfly to observe more carefully the
color of its wings, or when Torricelli built the first mercury barometer
to measure the atmospheric pressure. Because many scientific theories
are involved when a new instrument is created, or to refine a current
25See Azzouni (2000, pp. 63-70).
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one, theories play an important role in the activity of refining. How-
ever, because the most important reason to refine our thick epistemic
access is primarily the achievement of robustness, refinement seems to
be subordinate to robustness.
Monitoring: Epistemic agents repeat an experiment several times to con-
firm an hypothesis, or to check whether or not an objects has a prop-
erty. Such activities are part of a general process that is called ‘mon-
itoring’. For example, physicians can analyze drug’s effects inside an
organism by checking it over a period of time. Monitoring is strongly
tied to observations in a limited portion of space and time.
Grounding: Thick epistemic access requires an empirical explanation of
the connection between the properties of posits and our ability to know
them. This connection depends on empirical assumptions about how
thick epistemic access operates, and it may involve a complex scientific
apparatus that accounts for how perception functions. However, an
epistemic story is required to bridge the gap between sensory organs
and properties — i.e. ‘how we know what we know’.26
The above conditions characterize thick epistemic access. However, some
conditions can be applied to ultra–thin posits. Consider refinement, for ex-
ample. Mathematicians, one could argue, do not build new tools in order
to refine their knowledge of mathematical posits. What is required to prove
theorems, conjectures and results, is merely to acquire a certain mathe-
matical skill. This picture is, however, inaccurate: computers have become
important in refining mathematical knowledge. The most popular example
is perhaps the proof of the four color theorem by Appel and Haken.27 The
proof of the four color theorem covers almost a billion cases, so every case
26Azzouni (2004, p. 136).
27The theorem states that the regions of any simple planar map can be colored with
only four colors, in such a way that any two adjacent regions have different colors. A
planar map is a set of pairwise disjoint subsets of the plane (regions). A simple map is
one whose regions are connected open sets.
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cannot be taken into account by hand. Leaving aside philosophical worries
about the status of this kind of proofs, computer’s assistance has changed
the picture of contemporary mathematics. We can now build instruments in
order to refine our mathematical knowledge. Even monitoring condition can
be applied to ultra–thin posits, because mathematicians are able to monitor
proofs by computer assistant programs. Someone could argue that com-
puters are only heuristic tools that may be dispensed with if humans could
compute every single case. But I do not think this maneuver is relevant,
because robustness and grounding are the only indispensable features of
thick epistemic access. Robustness is vital to circumnavigate the existence
of mathematical objects based exclusively on confirmation holism, whereas
grounding requires an epistemic story between mathematical objects and
sensory organs. The second point matches with Azzouni’s argument against
the existence of mathematical objects based on reliabilist epistemology.
To determine what exists, we first look at thick epistemic access, because
thick posits are mind– and language– independent. The metaphysical crite-
rion has an epistemological value when we have epistemic access to mind–
and language– independent posits. Consider a theoretical object such as
Higgs boson. In order to claim that Higgs boson exists one has to show
that we have thick epistemic access to it. Scientists discovered the existence
of Higgs boson by making use of a very powerful particle accelerator which
allows the collision between two beams of accelerated particles and detec-
tors. In this sense, the accelerator is thickly in touch with particles. But
considering that Higgs boson decays very quickly and particle collisions are
infrequent, scientists had to refine the accelerator to get an high luminos-
ity plus use sophisticated computers to reconstruct the decay process. The
entire procedure can be partially monitored but gaps are eventually filled
by using statistical analysis. Finally, it is plausible to think about an epis-
temic story that explains the connection between scientists and measuring
instruments. Perhaps a story that involves visual perception through retina
encoding and processing of light.
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I have already shown how the interplay between robustness and refine-
ment occurs. Robustness limits the role of theories in scientific practice,
whereas refinement gets them back partially. But since refinement aims to
achieve robustness, holism is still overshadowed. In Azzouni’s view, the role
played by theories is recovered by objects to which scientists do not have
thick epistemic access. This is because scientists can deduce the existence of
posits from background theories even without thick epistemic access. The
classic example is perhaps the deduction of Neptune through the irregular
orbit of Uranus based on Newton’s laws of motion and gravitation. Neptune
was seen through a telescope in 1846 but its existence had been already
argued for by the mathematician Le Verrier. Drawing a moral from this
event, it seems we can infer the existence of something even without thick
epistemic access: existence and thick posits are not co-extensive.
Before Neptune was observed through a telescope, which provided thick
epistemic access to the planet, it had been considered a thin posit. Even
though we do not have thick epistemic access to thin posits, it is counter-
intuitive to claim that such posits do not exist. After all, Neptune had
already been a mind– and language– independent object before it was ob-
served. A few years later, scientists confirmed Le Verrier’s hypothesis by
using a high-performance telescope. Neptune did not start to exist magi-
cally: it has simply changed status becoming a thick posit or, in other words,
the role of Neptune within our web of belief has changed.
Nepture’s case shows how thin posits can change status into thick posits
in order to achieve thick epistemic access. Hence thick and thin are movable
categories.28 Technological limits, calculus mistakes and wrong hypothesis,
can prevent or slow down thin/thick shift. Thin posits are derived by thick
ones by suing mathematics. Ultimately, thin posits are
items we commit ourselves to on the basis of our theories about
what the things we thickly access are like’.29
28Azzouni (2012b, p. 958).
29Azzouni (2012b, p. 963).
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The distinction between ultra–thin, thin, and thick, casts light on some
classical arguments against the existence of abstract objects. Benacerraf’s
problem about how we can get knowledge of mathematical objects raises
when one mistakes ultra–thin posits for thick ones. Quine’s solution to
Benacerraf’s problem regards ultra–thin posits as thin posits such that thick
epistemic access does not apply to them. If mathematical objects are thin
posits, there will be no need to have an epistemic story about them. But
it is possible to argue against this maneuver by claiming that whereas thin
posits can turn into thick, by contrast ultra–thin posits cannot, because we
would require robust and grounded epistemic access to them.
3.1.4 Ontological nihilism and objectivity
Penelope Maddy introduces several types of philosophers that she takes to
have played a significant role in determining what people mean by ‘philos-
ophy’: the first philosopher, the second philosopher, and the second meta-
physician.
Maddy’s primary opponent is the first philosopher, who attempts to
solve the ontological problem from a pure philosophical foundation.30 Op-
posing this figure is Maddy’s second philosopher, who begins her ontological
inquiry by accepting the large amount of work that physicists, linguists,
psychologists, and so on, have provided so far. The idea is summarized by
the slogan ‘science comes first, philosophy as second’.
There is another problematic figure: this is the second metaphysician.
The second metaphysicians requires the naturalization of epistemology in
order to defend a metaphysical claim. Azzouni’s position is considered by
Maddy an example of second metaphysics; that is to say, it is a strategy for
defending nominalism.31 According to Maddy, Azzouni’s program leads to a
form of ontological nihilism where the question about what exists cannot be
settled at all. In Azzouni’s view, Maddy argues, all the competing criteria
30Descartes is portrayed as the classic example of first philosopher. See Maddy (2007,
pp. 11-19).
31Maddy (2007, pp. 392-411).
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for what exists are on par with respect to our scientific theories. Science
cannot answer ontological questions on its own without metaphysics. Maddy
draws that conclusion from this Azzouni’s thought experiment: imagine
two communities with opposite beliefs about fictions. The members of the
first group do not believe in the existence of fictional entities, whereas the
members of the second community do. Azzouni argues that:
On what grounds can we adjudicate between these views? There
is nothing in the second community’s practices that fixes what
its fictional terms refer to in such a way that evidence can be
brought to bear for and against these alternatives to decide
among them.32
In principle, the issue whether or not fictional entities exist seems to
be indeterminate, since the opponents agree on all the relevant facts that
are necessary to settle the debate. Scientific evidence cannot help either.
Hence Maddy notes that, in Azzouni’s view, scientific practice cannot answer
ontological questions, because metaphysics cannot be naturalized within our
scientific world–view.
With respect to Azzouni’s thought experiment I should like to point
out two things: first, Azzouni seems to be skeptical about the possibility
of settling the ontological debates even by running pure philosophical argu-
ments and secondly, Azzouni cannot be considered a naturalist only if by
‘naturalist’ we mean Maddy’s second philosopher. The second philosopher
is resolute in determining what exists on the basis of the scientific practice
without any external metaphysical criteria. In fact, the second philoso-
pher no longer regards science and ontology as two separate subjects, since
science has the resources to answer the ontological question. Any distinc-
tion between ontology and scientific practice disappears according to second
philosopher.
In Maddy’s view, Azzouni is not engaged in figuring out what exists,
because there is no objective way of figuring out whether or not fictional
32Azzouni (2004, p. 94).
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objects really exist. At best we can take as existent only what our linguistic
community considers as such. But the ontological question, Maddy insists,
sounds like ‘what is there?’ and not what people are inclined to think there
is.33 In other words, the second metaphysician dodges the initial ontological
question.
Turning to Azzouni’s thought experiment, it is easy for the second philoso-
pher to decide which of the two community is wrong: because there is no
scientific evidence that supports the claim that fictional objects exist, then
they do not exist. Therefore, the scientific practice has normative force in
determining what exists (and what not):
the ordinary science, not the criterion, is what’s doing the work:
the criterion provides no independent ground for charging the
scientist with ‘double–think’ or ‘intellectual dishonesty’.34
To sum up, Azzouni is regarded by Maddy as a metaphysical nihilist
because, the ontological problem about what really exists turns out to be
unsolvable. Unlike Azzouni who begins his inquiry with the demand for
a general criterion of existence, Maddy’s second philosopher looks at what
kind of scientific evidence we have in order to settle the ontological dispute.
I believe Maddy’s proposal is attractive: the endless metaphysical dis-
putes are solved by looking at science without any criterion for what exists.
However, as far as I know, Maddy does not say how we can look to the
practice of science. And it is here that Maddy diverges from Quine’s at-
titude. Unlike Quine, Maddy does not seem to be interested in advancing
criteria for ontological commitment, nor in challenging them. For Maddy,
ontological commitment is not based on a criterion but on what scientists
regard as real — with the possibility of scientific revisions, of course. The
point, I think, is that Maddy is concerned only with this methodological
33Maddy (2007, p. 399).
34Maddy (2007, p. 402). ‘Double–think’ is a Quine’s expression, whereas ‘intellectual
dishonesty’ is Putnam’s.
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shift in ontological inquiries: from the priority of philosophical arguments
to the naturalization of ontology in sciences.
Before I consider Azzouni’s reply to Maddy, I will present an objection
to Azzouni’s approach due to Raley. According to Raley, Azzouni’s view
cannot be regarded as genuinely nominalist if by ‘nominalism’ we mean the
metaphysical position according to which abstract objects do not exist.35
Azzouni’s general strategy, Raley notes, can be summarized saying that we
cannot justify a criterion for ontological commitment if we do not justify a
criterion for what exists. However, Raley argues, Azzouni undermines his
argument in favour of nominalism by adopting this strategy.
To see what Raley has in mind go back to the aforementioned thought
experiment on communities with different beliefs about fictional entities. In
principle, Azzouni’s thought experiment could be applied not only to fic-
tional entities, but to observed entities, or to entities in space and time, and
so on. Even though Azzouni has not extended his argument so far, it is not
hard to imagine different communities with dissimilar criteria of existence.
If Azzouni’s thought experiment works even in such possible scenarios, it
shows that there is no philosophical argument powerful enough to validate
the superiority of any criterion of existence over its competitors. If we agree
on all relevant facts that would be applicable to make a decision, then the
choice of the correct criterion for what exists turns out to be philosophically
indeterminate.
Raley notices that Azzouni’s position on the indeterminacy of metaphysi-
cal criteria presupposes Azzouni’s distinction between criterion–transcendent
and criterion–immanent words.36 Consider as an example the word ‘gold’.
Criteria for detecting gold have changed over time, and some of them have
altered what fell before under the term ‘gold’, i.e. its extension. When
a new criterion is discovered, it changes the extension of the word ‘gold’.
A long time ago, people had criteria for identifying gold unlike ours such
as color, weight, sturdiness, and so on. The discovery of the atomic num-
35Raley (2009, p. 74).
36Raley (2009, pp. 77-80).
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ber of gold has changed what falls before under ‘gold’. Certain items that
were consider golden before its identification with the atomic number 79 are
no longer considered golden nowadays. Gold is ‘criterion–transcendent’ in
the sense that the criteria for identifying what is gold have been changing
over time, and have been modifying the extension of the word ‘gold’. More
generally, criterion–transcendent words are retroactive: when a new crite-
rion for detecting something is changed, previous uses of it are considered
mistaken.37
Azzouni notices that not every term in language is criterion–transcendent.
Think about the word ‘hammer’. The hammers crafted by blacksmiths in
the Iron age are unlike the hammers we use nowadays. At least shape and
materials are different. The word ‘hammer’ nowadays has a different exten-
sion than the Iron Age. Nevertheless, we do not regard the uses of ‘hammer’
in the Iron Age as mistaken. An Iron Age hammer is still considered a ham-
mer. Crafting a new hammer does not change what fell before under the
word ‘hammer’. When a term is immune to this kind of revision — i.e. the
revision is not applied retroactively — the term is ‘criterion–immanent’.
Azzouni argues that words as ‘true’, ‘refer’, and ‘exist’ are all criterion–
transcendent.38 The word ‘exist’ is criterion–transcendent, and so it is simi-
lar to ‘gold’. However, Raley notes, this implies that if our linguistic attitude
to the word ‘exist’ changed, the revision would be applied retroactively. But
then the problem of what really exists independently of any linguistic atti-
tude is simply dismissed in Azzouni’s view. In this sense, Azzouni turns out
to be a metaphysical nihilist.
I do not think that Azzouni rejects Raley’s point of view altogether.
He just restricts himself to pointing out that even if ‘exist’ is a criterion-
transcendent word, he does not commit himself to a non-factualistic view —
i.e. that there is no fact of the matter about what exists. In the same way,
to claim that ‘gold’ is criterion–transcendent does not imply that there is no
37Azzouni (2010b, p. 87).
38Azzouni (2010b, p. 89). I will not present Azzouni’s argument but just focus on
Raley’s objection.
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fact of the matter about what the term ‘gold’ refers to.39 In other words,
giving up the idea that terms have a fixed reference is not enough to endorse
non-factualism. Despite this, there might be a worry about the objective
reference of some words. The extension of ‘gold’ seems to be objective
by virtue of the atoms of gold independently of which meaning linguistic
communities attribute to ‘gold’. Unlike the case of fictional objects, we
cannot stipulate properties of mind– and language– independent objects
such as gold. There is a strong normative constraint involved in criterion–
transcendent words due to their epistemic role. As we do not stipulate the
properties of gold, so we do not stipulate what things exist.
Raley’s point resembles Maddy’s objection to Azzouni about the onto-
logical problem and its objectivity. Maddy is concerned about the source
of Azzouni’s ontological criterion: the fact that the criterion arises from
our common linguistic practices and not from science. Maddy’s concern, I
believe, is that Azzouni’s criterion functions so long as it is shared in our
linguistic practices: it works more by convention instead of being grounded
on an objective practice.
Criterion–transcendent words are bonded to their epistemic role, but
his maneuver partially answers Maddy’s worry. What is at issue is the
extent to which Azzouni endorses Maddy’s view of naturalized ontology.
Bear in mind that Maddy’s second philosopher regards ontological inquiry
as a subject that can be completely naturalized leaving no room for criteria
that come from common linguistic practices. Maddy’s objection is basically
methodological: ontology begins from science and not by looking at our
linguistic practices.
3.1.5 Defeasibility condition and fuzzy posits
I would now like to present and discuss a different objection raised by Coly-
van. According to Colyvan, Azzouni’s boundary line between what is real
and what is not can be boiled down to the distinction between causal and a–
39Azzouni (2010b, p. 98).
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causal entities.40 The reason is straightforward: both thick and thin posits
are entities with which we can have causal interaction, whereas ultra-thin
entities lack it. If Colyvan is right, he can run an argument against the
relation between causality and existence, for example by showing, first, how
causality fails to establish the existence of stars and planets outside of our
own light cone and secondly, how a–causal entities play an indispensable
role in the scientific explanations.41 According to Colyvan, causal idleness
of mathematical entities cannot be an excuse against their real role in scien-
tific theorizing, unless one is able to show the dispensability of mathematics
in empirical sciences.42
Colyvan strikes another objection noticing how thick, thin, and ultra-
thin posits can differ from each other in degrees. The point is not just that
the distinction between posits is fluid, but seems to imply the existence of
fuzzy posits: that is, posits that satisfy only partially Azzouni’s epistemic
burdens. The example described by Colyvan is Alpha Centauri, which satis-
fies the conditions of thick epistemic access, but it is less thick than Saturn,
because the refinement condition is partially satisfied— Alpha Centauri is
much farther away than Saturn. In this sense, Alpha Centauri can be con-
sidered a borderline thick posit.43 In addition, Colyvan suggests that even
mathematical entities could be considered borderline posits (very-thin): en-
tities between ultra–thin and thin which enjoy Quine’s virtues and have a
place in ontology.
Azzouni’s answer is based on two different replies: first, Azzouni shows
why thin posits are not thick and secondly, he argues against the existence
of very–thin posits. According to Azzouni, the reasons why thin posits
are not thick come from the scientific practice itself.44 Bear in mind that
thin posits are postulated on the basis of the theories that scientists have
developed about thick posits. Scientists postulate the existence of posits to
40Colyvan (2010, pp. 289).
41See for example Colyvan (2001, pp. 39-57).
42Colyvan (2010, p. 233).
43Colyvan (2010, pp. 230).
44Azzouni (2012b, p. 961).
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which we have thick epistemic access: thin posits are postulated but not ex
abrupto. Scientists are also able to distinguish thin posits from thick ones.
Geologists for example are able to distinguish whether a fossil is thick or
thin by taking account of trails, other fossils, DNA data, and so on. As
Azzouni notices:
So it’s scientific theories themselves that enable us to thinly posit
animals and kinds of animals (apart from the animals we have
actually interacted with), in particular, to thinly posit the ex-
istence of animals that were the sources of the fossils we have
discovered.45
Qualified scientists are able to distinguish thin from thick posits. But
what about very–thin posits? Do they exist? Colyvan is worried about
whether mathematical objects have an “excuse” to be considered very–thin
or not. According to Colyvan:
The posits I have in mind, are more than ultra-thin, because
they pay their Quinean rent — they are part of a well–confirmed
empirical theory exhibiting the Quinean virtues — but they are
not thin, because they do not come equipped with an excuse as
to why they are not thick posits.46
Colyvan characterizes very–thin posits as those posits that would be
thin if they satisfied what Colyvan calls ‘the defeasibility condition’. The
defeasibility condition is an excuse whereby thin posits are not thick but,
nonetheless, are listed in our ontology. Defeasibility conditions are basically
stories about why posits are thin but not thick. Very–thin and thin posits
are alike in the sense that they both play an important role in our best
scientific theories, except for the fact that very–thin posits satisfy the defea-
sibility condition. Colyvan also notes how the defeasibility condition limits
45Azzouni (2012b, p. 962).
46Colyvan (2005, p. 221).
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Azzouni’s anti-realism only to ultra–thin posits and allows mathematical
entities to be part of our ontology. The defeasibility condition for mathe-
matical entities is this: mathematical entities are not thick simply because
they are abstracta.47 Since we can provide a straightforward defeasibility
condition for mathematical posits, they deserve ontological commitment as
well as other thin posits.
As mentioned earlier, Azzouni has revised his position about ultra–thin
posits, according to which even they enjoy Quine’s virtues. As a conse-
quence, Colyvan should not have further reasons for claiming that very–
thin posits exist. But Colyvan’s argument could be reformulated as fol-
lows: mathematical objects can be considered thin posit because we have a
straightforward excuse why they are not thick — i.e. they are abstract. The
problem is whether or not Colyvan’s excuse is legitimate and, more gener-
ally, what counts as a legitimate excuse. According to Azzouni, Colyvan’s
excuse misses its target because mathematical objects play no epistemic role
in mathematical proofs. No epistemic story has a role in the explanation of
how we establish mathematical truths. We can tell several epistemic stories
for those posits taken into account by the empirical sciences: that is to say,
we have scientific reasons that are rooted in our scientific theories for certain
posits to be thin, whereas mathematical posits lack such reasons.
It is important to understand what scientific reasons are. The abstract-
ness of mathematical objects, Azzouni argues, does not count as a scientific
reason because it is not rooted in our scientific theories. This point requires
some additional clarifications. Scientific reasons seem to coincide with epis-
temic reasons in this context. According to Azzouni’s epistemic puzzle, we
do not have an epistemic story about the role that mathematical posits play
in mathematical practice. So, even if mathematical posits were concrete
objects, they would not play an epistemic role in the practice of mathemat-
ical proofs.48 Instead, thin posits play an epistemic role in the practice of
empirical science. Biologists, for example, can provide an epistemic story
47Colyvan (2005, p. 223).
48Azzouni (2012b, p. 963).
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for thin posits like dinosaurs, even though biologists have never encountered
a dinosaur. The existence of dinosaurs is postulated on the basis of fossil
records and other empirical data; the stories provided by biologists count as
scientific insofar as they are epistemic stories. Instead, in the case of mathe-
matical posits, the indispensability argument does not provide an epistemic
story: the argument aims to overcome such a story. Colyvan’s argument
does not count as an excuse because the story he provides to characterize
mathematical posits as thin does not have any epistemic values.
3.1.6 Bueno and Zalta’s objection
Bueno and Zalta challenge Azzouni’s view by running an argument that is
similar to some of Burgess and Rosen’s objections to nominalism.49 Bueno
and Zalta start with noticing how many contemporary nominalists reject the
existence of mathematical objects by using formal apparatus such as second-
order modal logic or fictional operators. These strategies notoriously fail to
keep the literal meaning of mathematical statements. The beauty of Az-
zouni’s approach, on the other hand, is to regard mathematical statements
as literally true without committing to the existence of the objects these
statements are supposed to be about. However, Bueno and Zalta argue that
Azzouni’s view faces a serious dilemma because of what it implies about the
notion of reference. Let us see how the dilemma goes:50
(S1) Either numerals, like ‘2’, refers to numbers, like 2, or they do not.
(S2) If numerals refer to numbers, nominalism is false.
(S3) According to Azzouni, nominalism is true and mathematical sentences
can be taken at face value. Thus numerals do not refer to numbers.
(C) However, if numerals do not refer to numbers, either mathematical
sentences cannot be taken as literally true, or Azzouni has to appeal
to a non-standard notion of reference.
49See sec. n. 1.4.
50Bueno and Zalta (2005, p. 297).
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With regard to the former point, if mathematical sentences are not
literally true, Azzouni’s project runs into the same objections that other
nominalistic programs do, because it does not do justice to mathematical
practice. Alternatively, Azzouni might substitute the standard notion of
reference with something else, but when a non-standard notion of reference
is involved, mathematical language cannot be taken literally either. As a
result, Bueno and Zalta argue that either Azzouni should give up his nom-
inalism by claiming that numerals refer to numbers, or he should drop the
idea that mathematical statements are literally true.
Azzouni replies to Bueno and Zalta in Talking about Nothing.51 Ac-
cording to Azzouni, Bueno and Zalta’s dilemma arises from an equivoca-
tion in the concept of reference. Bear in mind that, distinguishing between
referencer and referencee, Azzouni argues that numerals refere to numbers
but dot not referr. Since we can refer to numbers by referencee, which is
neutral from an ontological point of view, the second premise of Bueno and
Zalta’s dilemma turns out to be false.
I think that Bueno and Zalta can still press their argument against Az-
zouni. They could argue that mathematical sentences are not taken at face
value by using the notion of referencee. A very straightforward way of doing
this is to argue that referencee is a non–standard notion of reference. Even
though numerals can refer to numbers, the price we must pay in order to
sustain nominalism is to adopt a non–standard notion of reference. The cru-
cial point, I think, relies on what Bueno and Zalta mean by ‘non–standard’.
This passage should make their claim clearer:
Note that we are not saying that the notion of reference requires
the existence of an object to which we refer. But it does re-
quire that there be something to which we refer. In any case, a
non–standard notion of reference is indicative that mathematical
language is not being taken literally.52
51See Azzouni (2010a, pp. 43-45).
52Bueno and Zalta (2005, pp. 298-299).
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Using Azzouni’s terminology, they do not seem to require the identifica-
tion of reference with referencer. We can quantify over things that do not
exist, like fictions.53 What I think Bueno and Zalta object to Azzouni can
be summarised as follows: if the notion of reference is neutral, then it is
non–standard. Therefore mathematical sentences cannot be taken literally,
and Azzouni’s approach looses its face–value virtues. In short, we can see
Bueno and Zalta’s argument not as a true dilemma but, instead, as a point
against the neutral concept of reference.
It does not seem to me that Bueno and Zalta provide an argument to
show how referencee is non–standard. At this point Azzouni’s response
could be articulated by showing how referencee is standard. He could for
example show how referencee can be tracked down in our linguistic prac-
tices. The vernacular would indicate some contexts in which the reference is
taken as ontologically neutral, and referencee aims to encode such contexts.
If the neutral concept of reference can be found in natural language, this
point shows that referencee is a standard notion of reference. Moreover, Az-
zouni has another line of defense against Bueno and Zalta by showing how
referencee can be exemplified in a Tarskian theory of truth.54 Of course,
this strategy is effective insofar as one accepts that the Tarkian theory of
truth grasps what we intuitively mean by ‘reference’. If we can really frame
referencee into a Tarkian theory of truth, this maneuver will significantly
undermine Bueno and Zalta’s objection.
53Fictions, even if not objects, would be something in any case.
54See Azzouni (2010a), Ch. 5, for further clarifications.
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3.2 How logical subtraction works
Anti-Platonists are sometimes misrepresented as denying the role played
by mathematics in scientific practice. On the contrary, what is at issue is
if mathematics can continue playing that role without postulating the ex-
istence of abstract objects: ontology is challenged, not mathematics. To
argue against the existence of abstract objects, anti-Platonists can commit
themselves to the nominalistic content of scientific theories. Field is a good
example in that regard. According to Field, one can extract the pure nomi-
nalistic content from Newton’s theory of universal gravitation, that is, what
that theory says about the physical world. At a deep level Newton’s theory
describes the behavior of regions of space–time, and the extraction of its
nominalistic content can be seen as a sort of subtraction by which one takes
away mathematical objects from physics — the nominalistic content is what
is left. In the second chapter, I elaborated on how the success of Field’s
program requires that any nominalistic consequences of Newtonian gravita-
tion theory can be proved from its nominalistic content.55 In other words,
Newtonian gravitation theory has to be conservative over its nominalistic
content.
In contrast to what Colyvan argues,56 the anti–Platonist does not have
to endorse Field’s program, nor commit himself to any specific nominalistic
content. Azzouni’s criterion of existence does not tell us what the nominal-
istic content of physical theories is, and some alternatives to Field’s program
have been advanced during the last few years. In this chapter I will present
Yablo’s approach to stripping away unwanted ontological consequences from
hypotheses that presuppose the existence of mathematical objects.
According to Yablo, the nominalistic content of a theory T can be repre-
sented as what is left after subtracting the existence of mathematical objects
from T itself. Yablo’s strategy does not involve the commitment to any nom-
inalistic content, unlike Field’s case. Generally, a strategy is called ‘easy’
55See sec. n. 2.1.1.
56See Colyvan (2010).
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insofar it does not require any paraphrases of mathematical statements in
order to avoid ontological commitment. Azzouni’s and Yablo’s approaches
do not need paraphrases at all: both strategies are easy in that regard.
Easy roaders argue that mathematical statements are true and useful even
if there are no mathematical objects; hard roaders argue that mathematical
statements can be useful even in absence of mathematical objects.
Hard roaders are often committed to nominalistic content. Field, for ex-
ample, appeals to the representation theorems in order to prove the equiv-
alence between the set of quadruples of real numbers and its nominalistic
counterpart — the “structure” of space-time. In short, a representation
theorem allows to paraphrase statements that quantify over mathematical
objects where space-time is involved, and it shows how Newtonian mechanics
is committed to regions of space-time. If Field’s strategy truly exemplifies
the hard road, as Colyvan claims, it does not lead to a form of ontologi-
cal nihilism. However, as I showed earlier, other hard roads do not require
any nominalistic content, i.e Chihara’s constructibility theory and Hellman’
modal structuralism.
In contrast to Field, easy roaders deny that mathematics should be
paraphrase-bound, and some avoid the commitment to what exists. Yablo’s
logical subtraction avoids stating the nominalistic content of physical theo-
ries: it employs ‘a strategy of saying less with more’.57 On the other hand,
it requires being shown how and in what sense a commitment to mathemat-
ical objects can be eliminated from empirical theories without substantial
changes. Indeed such a subtraction may not be possible. Imagine, for ex-
ample, that a commitment to hobbits is eliminated from The Lord of Rings,
and ask yourself what kind of story is left. It does not seem that subtrac-
tion is possible in such a case, or at least without changing the story-line
in most details. In other words, what would The Lord of Rings be without
hobbits? Hence, a crucial requirement on Yablo’s approach is to explain
why subtracting mathematical objects is different from the hobbits case,
57Yablo (2014, p. 1009).
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and how subtraction can be accomplished without important alterations to
the empirical theories. Yablo’s strategy can be split into two parts: first,
we must find a way to carve out the part of a hypothesis, say m, that con-
cerns mathematical objects and secondly, we must strip away m from that
hypothesis.58
3.2.1 Aboutness and possible worlds
It is important to mention that Yablo intends to apply logical subtraction,
or simply subtraction, to propositions and not directly to mathematical
entities. Propositions are conceived as sets of possible worlds, and subject
matters are sets of proposition. I shall first present Yablo’s concept of subject
matters.
The introduction of subject matters aims to provide a general account of
aboutness. Aboutness plays a major role beyond mathematics, as it is also
involved in most linguistic practices. Imagine being in front of the paint-
ing ‘Be´lisaire’ when, all of a sudden, someone says: ‘this picture depicts
Belisarius’ poverty and misery after he was defeated’. The painting is about
Belisarius’ poverty and misery. Similarly, a sentence such as ‘Siegfried killed
the dragon’ is about both Siegfried and the dragon; the American Revolution
is about both taxes and freedom; red is about red things; and so on. About-
ness is a natural and intuitive notion we employ in many contexts, but does
not merely involve language. There is a strict correlation between aboutness
and truth-conditions in the sense that aboutness is tied up with the ways a
sentence is true. ‘All ravens are black’ is about ravens and their color, and
that sentence is true because all ravens are black. If ‘all ravens are black’
was about different things, let us say mugs and green, the truth-conditions
of that sentence would change.59
Truth-conditions and aboutness are so tied up together that most philoso-
phers have argued that aboutness can be reduced to the truth-conditions of
58Yablo (2014, p. 1012).
59Unless mugs and green are synonymous with ravens and black respectively.
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statements. ‘All ravens are black’ is true by the virtue of how things stand
in the world: the fact that all ravens are black. And the statement is conse-
quently about ravens’ color. However, that picture is partially misleading.
‘All ravens are black’ and ‘all non-black things are non-crows’ are about
different things — one is about crows, the other is not — even though the
truth-conditions of both statements are the same. For Yablo, aboutness de-
serves to be investigated independently of the traditional analysis of meaning
and semantics.
What is aboutness? I will start with presenting a couple of examples
and then will go into details. Basically, Yablo conceives aboutness in terms
of possible worlds a` la Lewis by distinguishing between, say, the nineteenth
century (which is an event of human history) and the nineteenth century
(which is a subject matter that groups possible worlds, according to what is
going on in their respective nineteenth centuries). Here is an intuitive picture
of how the nineteenth century can group worlds: it associates worlds with
the events between 1800 and 1900, in a way that every world corresponds
to the course of events between 1800 and 1900. The nineteenth century
is a subject matter, the nineteenth century is not. Here is another example.
Queen Victoria is a figure of the nineteenth century. She is a person and not
a subject matter. Queen Victoria got married with Prince Albert but she
cannot group worlds. Queen Victoria is the subject matter that groups
worlds, for example on the basis of what she did in different worlds. In
a world she got married to Prince Albert, in another she could have been
assassinated, and so on.
The nineteenth century groups worlds on the basis of how matters
stand in relation to their specific nineteenth centuries as well as Queen Vic-
toria groups worlds on the basis of how Queen Victoria stands in different
worlds. Subject matters are ‘patterns of cross-world variation’.60 When we
switch from a world to another one, for example from a fictional world to
the actual world, how matters stand may be different: a depiction of Queen
60Yablo (2014, p. 27).
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Victoria may not the Queen Victoria who ruled the British Empire. Peo-
ple, however, recognize that there is a sense in which we are talking about
the same thing. In Yablo’s view, we are talking about Queen Victoria in
both worlds (fictional and actual). Queen Victoria is a pattern through
different worlds.
The way subject matters group worlds can be defined more precisely.
Subject matters group worlds by inducing relations on them. Queen Vic-
toria, for instance, induces relations in a way that worlds are partitioned
into classes, such that every class is a way of grouping worlds. For exam-
ple, a class can group all the worlds where Queen’s Victoria got married to
Prince Albert, another class groups all the worlds in which Queen’s Victo-
ria became Empress of India, and so on. More generally, subject matters
split worlds into classes, and every class is a partition on worlds. The main
difference with the set-theoretic notion is that we are operating on worlds
instead of sets.
The identity of subject matters is given in terms of worlds. Let m1 and
m2 be subject matters; m1 and m2 are equivalent if and only if worlds
differing where m1 is concerned differ also with respect to m2, and vice
versa. Consider for instance Queen Victoria and Prince Albert’s wife.
These subject matters are equivalent to each other if they group worlds in
the same way: intuitively, if Queen Victoria is Prince Albert’s wife in all
worlds.
Appealing to possible worlds may seem an unnecessary complication.
After all we are mainly interested to a specific world: the actual one. But
keep in mind that possible worlds also contain all information about how
matters stand in relation to a specific world. From a subject matter m we
can build up a function that maps worlds to their m-conditions.61 These
m-conditions tell us how matters stand in relation to a world w, when m is
concerned. Thus, the function m(w) encodes information about a specific
world as far as m is concerned. For instance, The number of planets tells
61The domain may be empty. In this case, there would be no worlds to map.
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us how many planets exist by mapping worlds to how matters stand in w.
If w is the Solar System, then the number of planets(w) = 9.
Subjects matters are patterns through worlds. More precisely, a subject
matter is nothing but a set of propositions, and a proposition is a set of
possible worlds. The main advantage of such an approach is to give a way
of defining relations over subject matters. An outstanding relation is or-
thogonality: two subject matters are orthogonal if how matters stand with
respect to one puts no constraints on how matters stand where the other
is concerned in any world.62 That is, if one subject matter is somehow
independent from another one. For instance, the number of stars is or-
thogonal to the number of comets if any number of stars is compatible
with any number of comets. Comets are icy bodies that heat up by the effect
of Solar radiation, whereas stars are shiny sphere of plasma. The number of
the former does not influence the number of the latter (and vice versa), the
number of stars is orthogonal to the number of comets.63 Another
example, perhaps more intuitive, is the relation of orthogonality that holds
between the number of cats and the number of dogs.
Orthogonality can be defined formally if subject matters are understood
as dividing worlds into classes. Consider two subject matters m and n
which split worlds into classes. We say that m and n are orthogonal iff the
intersection between classes induced by m and classes induced by n is non-
empty. Turning back to the previous example, let us pick up the relations ‘x
has as many stars as y’ (=m) and ‘z has as many comets as y’ (=n), where x
and y are worlds. These relations induce classes which are represented as sets
of worlds. For instance, a class may be the one that contains worlds where
there are 10,000,000 stars, or where there are 2,000,000 comets, and so on.
62Yablo (2014, p. 1013).
63Orthogonality can be even used to formulate some philosophical positions. If how
matters stand physically is orthogonal to mathematical objects exist, then the
physical world neither demands nor preclude the existence of mathematical objects (in
any world). See Yablo (2012, p. 1013). In this case, physical world is thus compatible
with the (non-) existence of mathematical objects.
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Thus, the number of stars is orthogonal to the number of comets iff
the intersection between classes induced by the former and classes induced
by the latter is non-empty.
The parthood relation is also important. It is somewhat intuitive that
there is a sense in which the nineteenth century includes Queen Victo-
ria as its part, at least in the actual world. Let us call ‘cell’ a class induced
by a subject matter, and remember that such a class represents the way by
which a subject matter groups worlds. If Queen Victoria is part of the
nineteenth century, then the nineteenth century is intuitively ‘larger’
than Queen Victoria in the sense that the former induces more cells than
the latter does.
I have not presented yet how we can evaluate sentences when a specific
subject matter is involved. Suppose A is a sentence about m, and we want
to establish whether or not A is true about m relative to a possible world.
In this case, we evaluate the proposition that is true if A is true about m
relative to w. Since m is encoded in terms of possible worlds, i.e. m is a set
of sets of possible worlds, it makes sense to evaluate A’s true-value about
m as regards how matters can stand in different worlds. The idea is that
A is true about m in a world w if A is true outright without changing how
matters stand in w where m is concerned. Suppose that ‘there are nine
planets’ is about the number of planets, and evaluate whether or not
that sentence is true about the number of planets in the Solar System.
Remember that the number of planets is a set of propositions, where
each proposition expresses how many planets there are in worlds. In order
to evaluate ‘there are nine planets’, we can single out the proposition that
expresses how many planets there are in the Solar System: if the number is
8, then the sentence is true.
Yablo also distinguishes between what A says about m and the parts of
A about m. The point has important consequences in evaluating sentences
about m because, according to Yablo, the part of A about m can be true
even if the whole is mistaken. This is because a sentence can be true about
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m in some worlds while being false in others for reasons unrelated to m.
Consider again the sentence ‘there are nine planets’. The sentence can be
true about planets, in a world w, if (1) w is a world where mathematical
objects exist, or (2) w is a nominalistic world where that sentence is false
but for reasons that do not concern how matters stand regarding planets.
The point is rather subtle, so let me focus on another example. Suppose
‘the number of animals on the Earth on nth day is m’ is true about the
animals in a Platonistic world, but we do not want to commit ourselves to
numbers. A way out is to regard that statement as false in a Platonistic
world, but true about the animals in a world without numbers. The point
is that the two worlds are alike with respect to the animals although not
with respect to numbers.
The last consideration suggests how Yablo intends to employ subject
matters in order to set out an anti-Platonistic strategy: some propositions
may remain about m even after taking out what they presuppose (e.g. num-
bers). More generally, subject matters are indispensable to maintaining
what a theory is about after propositions that contain mathematical objects
are stripped away. Such a strategy requires to be formulated in terms of pos-
sible worlds insofar as worlds give a way of drawing a distinction between
Platonistic worlds and nominalistic worlds.
It is important to notice how Yablo’s considerations that I have discussed
so far do not strike a blow for nominalism. They do not aim at constituting
an argument against Platonism because, as far as physical objects is con-
cerned, propositions can indifferently be true in a world that has, or does
not have, abstract objects.64 Physical objects does not rule out the exis-
tence of mathematical objects, and nominalistic worlds are possible because
physical objects do not require the existence of mathematical ones. Accord-
ing to Yablo, physical objects do not require the existence of numbers as
well as Barack Obama does not presuppose the existence of the set {Barack
Obama}. The following passage is meaningful in that regard:
64Yablo (2014, p. 81).
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To argue from we cannot imagine–without–numbers a complex
world to we cannot imagine a complex world lacking in numbers
is like going from we cannot imagine a tree non–perceptually to
we cannot imagine unperceived tree.65
But this is not, of course, an argument against Platonism. Yablo’s con-
sideration merely aims to provide a starting point for Platonism and nomi-
nalism by establishing that both hypotheses are possible regarding physical
objects. I will show later on to what extent this point is essential to evalu-
ating whether or not Yablo’s strategy can be truly considered an easy road
to anti-Platonism.
I have not explained yet how to individuate the subject matter of a
specific sentence. At first glance, the problem is that many subject matters
can be associated with even a simple sentence. For example, any sentence
about the number of planets is also about planets, and to some extent
also about the composition of planets, and so on. In other words, the
nature of aboutness emerges as intrinsically holistic, and constitutes a serious
issue in order to find what a sentence is exactly about. Yablo’s solution is
to look to the ways a sentence is true by picking out two distinct worlds.
Consider the sentence (A) ‘my next car will be manufactured in the US’,
and suppose there are two distinct worlds where that sentence is true —
for instance, in w1 my car is a Chrysler, in w2 it is a Ford. A is true in
both worlds since Chryslers and Fords are both manufactured in the US.
But even if how matters stand in w1 is different with respect to w2, this
does not affect A’s subject matter: A is still about my new car either way.
Indeed, A is true about my new car independently of which my car is.
What changes in the two worlds is the way A is true. If a subject matter
is a set of propositions (sets of worlds), how matters stand in relation to
worlds can change the way a subject matter is internally structured. As a
result, in order to find the exact subject matter of A, one should present the
set of A’s worlds according to A’s changing ways of being true.
65Yablo (2012, p. 1014).
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3.2.2 Logical subtraction
I presented Yablo’s general view of aboutness and mentioned that subject
matters can be used to hold what a sentence is about after propositions
are subtracted. I have not explained yet how we can subtract propositions
from other propositions. This can be accomplished by using Yablo’s logical
subtraction. The idea is basically to strip a proposition from another in
order to carve out the remainder and evaluate its truth-value.
I intend to restrict subtraction to the case in which B is part of A, where
A and B are two propositions. The reason is that one of the premises of the
indispensability argument can be reformulated by saying that (1) the propo-
sition about the existence of certain mathematical objects, such as numbers,
is part of the propositions that are contained in our best scientific theories;
(2) and the former proposition cannot be subtracted from the propositions
that are contained in our best scientific theories. This is a way of saying
that scientific theories indispensably presuppose the existence of mathemat-
ical objects. Thus, the anti-Platonist who follows Yablo’s route must show
that it is possible to subtract that presupposition from propositions in our
best scientific theories.
Let us consider how the notion of part works more carefully. Given two
propositions A and B, B is part of A if and only if both conditions hold:
1. A implies B.
2. A’s subject matter includes that of B.
A’s subject matter includes that of B iff how B is true (false) cannot change
without changing how A is true (false). The way an hypothesis is true (false)
is called truthmaker (falsemaker) which is obtained by presenting the set of
worlds where an hypothesis is true (false). For example, if ‘the number of
planets in the universe is > 5’ is true about the number planets, the
truthmaker is 9 for the Solar System, perhaps 100 billion for the Milky Way,
and so on.
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Let us designate ‘B is part of A’ as B < A. What is left by subtracting
B from A is called ‘the remainder A−B’, such that A−B < A and where
A − B is disjoint from B. The remainder should in principle exist if B is
part of A. However, the remainder may not be easy to find. Consider this
Wittgenstein’s quote:
what is left over if we subtract from the fact that I raise my arm
the fact that my arm goes up?66
Wittgenstein’s question is not unique and can be extended to many other
situations. What does Tom is red add to Tom is colored? What does Alma
believes water is wet add to water exists? How can we subtract water exists
from Alma believes water is wet?67 Yablo’s reply lies on ‘extrication’.
Extrication aims to extend a hypothesis A to worlds where its presup-
position B is subtracted: in short, A−B is the result of extricating A from
worlds where B is false. In Wittgenstein’s quote, we must extend the fact
that I raise my arm to regions of logical space where my arm stays down,
where A’s logical space is configured by A’s ways of being true or false.
Let us examine how extrication works. We want to know how to extricate
A from B’s true-conditions — called ‘home regions’ — in order to project A
into worlds where B is not true — called ‘away regions’. The most interesting
case is to study the remainder’s behavior in worlds where B is false and A
is true, i.e. where presuppositions do not hold. For example, suppose that
I want to extricate ‘I raise my arm’ from ‘my arm goes up’. The problem
can be reformulated by saying that we want to understand what ‘I raise my
arm’ adds to ‘my arm goes up’. More specifically, we want to figure out
what is going on when I raise my arm in the regions of logical space where
my arm stays down.
Here is Yablo’s solution: the remainder’s (away) behavior should be
modeled starting with A’s (home) behavior. The reason is that the process
of extrication is conceived by Yablo as a sort of projection from home to
66Wittgenstein (1953, § 62).
67See Yablo (2014, p. 136).
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B’s away behavior when A is true. This consideration leads Yablo to the
following guidelines in order to evaluate the remainder’s truth-value:
Agreement: A−B is true (false) at home just when A is true (false).
Rectitude: A − B is true (false) at home for the reasons that A is true
(false) given B.
Integrity: A−B is true (false) for the reasons away as it is true (false) at
home.
Determination: A − B is true (false) away if it has reasons to be true
(false) and none to be false (true) at home.
The four guidelines indicate how extrication should be evaluated accord-
ing to what A adds to B. But it is still hard to understand how extrication
works, so let me spell the point out. What does ‘I raise my arm’ add to
‘my arm goes up’? Perhaps someone could suggest that the remainder is
the act of will, because to raise my arm I must will my arm to go up. The
hypothesis is that ‘I will my arm up’ is A−B. But the hypothesis violates
the agreement condition: it does not seem that when my arm goes up, I will
raise my arm. My arm might have gone up for other reasons than the act of
will.68 In other words, ‘I will my arm up’ fails to be the remainder because
it does not imply ‘my arm goes up’ → ‘I raise my arm’.
Yablo suggests a way of summarizing the above-mentioned guidelines.
A−B is true in w if A adds only truth to B in w, false if it adds only falsity
to B in w.69 Otherwise A − B is undefined: A − B is undefined if A adds
neither truth nor falsity to B in w, or else A adds both truth and falsity to
B in w.
I have not presented yet when A adds truth, or falsity, to B. Yablo
comes up with the following definitions:
68Yablo (2014, p. 146).
69Yablo (2014, p. 148).
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1. A adds truth to B in w iff B → A is true in w for a reason compatible
with B.
2. A adds falsity to B in w iff B → ¬A is true in w for a reason compatible
with B.
Let us see how the definitions work. First, we must consider B’s behavior
in home regions. If B is true in w, A adds truth, or falsity, to B according
to whether A is true or false in w. Home conditions are easily evaluable.
Instead, it is more difficult to evaluate A in away regions: if B is false, A adds
truth (falsity) to B if B → A (B → ¬A) is true for a reason compatible with
B. What is that reason? According to Yablo, the reason is a truthmaker
for B → A (B → ¬A) that takes as much advantage as it can from B.
Basically, a truthmaker that does not rule out B. To spell out what kind of
truthmaker we are looking for, I will cite two cases mentioned by Yablo.
Consider P ∧ Q and examine whether P ∧ Q adds truth, or falsity, to
Q. According to the definitions stated previously, either Q → P ∧ Q has
a truthmaker compatible with Q, or Q → ¬(P ∧ Q) does. In the former
case P ∧Q adds truth, in the latter falsity.70 A truthmaker compatible with
Q does not rule out Q. Now, let us consider a world where P is true. In
this case, Q→ P ∧Q has a truthmaker compatible with Q in the fact that
P . On the other hand, in a world where P is false, Q → ¬(P ∧ Q) has a
truthmaker compatible with Q in the fact that ¬P .
Let us now examine a case where the remainder is undefined. Imagine
that we want to subtract Both of Herb’s dogs have fleas from Herb has
exactly two dogs. First, we must consider an away world w where Herb does
not have two dogs — where Herb for example has three or four dogs. By
definition, Herb has exactly two dogs → Both of Herb’s dogs have fleas is
true in w if it has a reason compatible with Herb has exactly two dogs: the
fact that Herb has two dogs with fleas. On the other hand, Herb has exactly
two dogs → it is not the case that both of Herb’s dogs have fleas is false in w
70It cannot add both in the same worlds if the remainder is evaluable.
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if it has a reason compatible with Herb has exactly two dogs: the existence of
a third dog without fleas.71 The remainder is undefined in w because Both
of Herb’s dogs have fleas adds both truth and falsity to Herb has exactly
two dogs.
Undefined remainders are particularly interesting when A presupposes
B. And presuppositions are important for Platonism. An occurrence of
the indispensability argument can be formulated by saying that a propo-
sition such as there are nine planets in our Solar System presupposes the
proposition there are numbers, because it would not be true if numbers did
not exist. In other terms, some propositions in our best scientific theories
presuppose that ‘there are numbers’ is true.
Consider the sentence ‘the King of France is bald’ and its presuppo-
sition ‘France has a king’. According to Yablo, ‘the King of France is
bald’ does not seem to have a truth-value because it adds neither truth,
nor falsity, to ‘France has a king’ in a world where France is a Repub-
lic. In other words, ‘the King of France is bald’ is unevaluable because the
remainder cannot be extricated. We say that a presupposition fails catas-
trophically when the question of truth, or falsity, does not longer arise. In
this case, ‘France has a king’ is a presupposition for ‘the King of France
is bald’ that fails catastrophically. By contrast, ‘the King of France is in
my garage’ strikes us as evaluable — it sounds false — because it adds fal-
sity to ‘France has a king’. That is, ‘France has a king’ is a presupposition
that fails non–catastrophically. As a general rule, a presupposition B fails
non–catastrophically iff A − B is evaluable despite B’s falsity. To say that
a presupposition fails non-catastrophically is to say that the remainder is
evaluable.
3.2.3 Mathematics is extricable
Let us examine how Yablo’s approach works for propositions that presuppose
the existence of mathematical objects. We must find out whether mathe-
71Yablo (2014, p. 149).
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matical presuppositions fail non–catastrophically. If this is so, running an
argument against Platonism is to provide a non-catastrophic account of
presuppositions failure for propositions about mathematical objects. The
challenge is to show how presuppositions such as ‘there are no numbers’ is
non–catastrophic in the sense that its failure makes no difference to how
matters stand in relation to the physical world. Numbers should be extri-
cated from (the content of) empirical sentences in the same way ‘France has
a king’ can be extricated from ‘the King of France is in my garage’. The
indispensability argument can be formulated as the thesis that numbers can-
not be extricated from (the content of) the propositions that are contained
in our best scientific theories.
Given a couple of propositions A and B, where A presupposes B, the re-
mainder is evaluable when B fails non-catastrophically. First, we must show
that the remainder exists and secondly, we have to figure out ‘how much’ we
can extricate from B. Although extrication is a matter of degree, running an
argument against Platonism implies that propositions that involve mathe-
matical objects should be completely extricated from the propositions in our
best scientific theories. Showing that numbers can be partially extricated is
not sufficient.
There are many cases where A cannot be extricated from B. ‘Tomato
is crimson’ cannot be extricated from ‘tomato is red’. ‘Tomato is crimson’
could be extricated only if tomato is red → tomato is crimson, or alter-
natively tomato is red → tomato is not crimson, is true in w for reasons
compatible with tomato is red. The most interesting case is to consider
the worlds where tomato is not red. But ‘tomato is crimson’ does not add
truth or falsity to ‘Tomato is red’ because the property of being crimson and
redness cannot be separated. Thus, the remainder is unevaluable. More gen-
erally, we say that B is perfectly inextricable from A iff A − B is evaluable
only in B’s worlds. In such a case, A does not add truth (falsity) to B
except when B is true.72
72Yablo (2014, p. 153).
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In some cases A can be extricated when B is false. Consider Wittgen-
stein’s quote and suppose that we want to subtract ‘Lance raised his arm’
from ‘Lance’s arm went up’. In a world where Lance is dead, the remainder
is evaluable because ‘Lance raised his arm’ adds falsity to ‘Lance’s arm did
not go up’. Specifically, the fact that Lance is dead is a truthmaker for
Lance’s arm went up → Lance did not raise his arm. On the other hand,
if Lance is dead, he cannot raise his arm. In other words, there are no
truthmakers for Lance’s arm went up → Lance raised his arm. Let us now
consider a world where Lance is alive and attempts to raise his arm. Trying
to raise an arm is not enough for the arm to go up: namely, it is not a
truthmaker for Lance’s arm went up → Lance raised his arm. Same thing
for Lance’s arm went up→ Lance did not raise his arm. Thus, the remain-
der is therefore unevaluable. More generally, we say that B is partially
extricable from A iff A − B is evaluable in some B’s away regions but not
in others.
The last option is when B can be perfectly extricated from A, that is,
when A adds only truth, or only falsity, to B in any away region. The
challenge against Platonism is whether or not there are numbers (B) can
be perfectly extricated from a proposition such as there are nine planets in
our Solar System (A). For perfect extricability there are nine planets in our
Solar System has to add only truth, or only falsity, to there are numbers in
every away region, i.e. in every numberless world. A adds truth iff there
are numbers → there are nine planets in our Solar System is true in any
numberless world for a reason compatible with B. Let us see how we can
proceed. We start with a numberless world, where there are the planets
Earth, Mars, Venus, Jupiter, Saturn, Mercury, Uranus and Neptune. The
existence of those planets is a truthmaker that is compatible with B —
because it does not rule out that numbers exist. On the other hand, A
adds falsity iff there are numbers → it is not the case that there are nine
planets in our Solar System is false in any numberless world for a reason
compatible with B. Our truthmaker must preclude the latter conditional
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to make the remainder evaluable. Indeed that is so, because it precludes
the above-mentioned planets of the Solar System plus Pluto, or only Mars,
or Earth plus Venus, and so on. What we get when we subtract there are
numbers from there are nine planets in our Solar System is thus evaluable:
the remainder is the proposition that it is true in one kind of numberless
world, and false in numberless worlds not of that kind. As a consequence,
there are numbers is perfectly extricable. It is interesting how that procedure
can be applied to other propositions that involve mathematical objects.
3.2.4 Some remarks on Yablo’s approach
I intend to analyze Yablo’s approach and evaluate its contribution towards
anti-Platonism. I am going to raise some objections to the introduction of
subject matters, show how the so called ‘Yablo’s easy road’ is not a road to
nominalism, and suggest what contribution logical subtraction could bring
to the debate between Platonism and anti-Platonism.
Yablo needs that propositions that talk about the existence of mathe-
matical objects have to add only truth, or falsity, to scientific propositions
that include numbers in every numberless world for reasons that do not con-
cern physical objects. This is why subject matters are essential to carve
mathematical content out of a given hypothesis. Without subject matters,
we would not have a guarantee that propositions are still about what they
were about before subtraction. If a proposition is originally about physical
objects, the remainder should be still about the same subject matter after
that subtraction is applied.
It is questionable whether or not the ontological status of subject matters
is acceptable to the anti-Platonist. Which entities are they supposed to be?
Let us check on some definitions of subject matters provided by Yablo. A
subject matter can be conceived as follows:73
1. An equivalence relations.
73Yablo (2014, p. 28).
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2. A partition.
3. A specification for each world of what is going on there m-wise.
4. A set of propositions.
Even if the criterion of identity for subject matters is not given set-
theoretically, but in possible worlds terms, all those definitions are set-
theoretical: sets of propositions are sets; equivalence relations are defined
on sets; for each partition there is an equivalence class (set); and finally a
specification of what is going on in a world can be constructed as a function
from worlds to certain propositions.74 Anti-Platonists reject the existence of
mathematical objects in the absence of a suitable epistemological access to
abstracta, and it is not clear why subject matters should be in a better po-
sition epistemically, since subject matters are mathematical abstracta. The
treatment should not be worse than the disease that it is supposed to cure.
Perhaps we may adopt a more pragmatic attitude, and employ any ob-
ject that is indispensable to solving a philosophical problem without being
worried about the nature of such entities. The main advantage of Yablo’s
perspective is that many formal relations can be defined as regards subject
matters such as orthogonality, parts-of, and soon.75 The informal notion of
presupposition, for example, can be made precise by using the parthood rela-
tion, which can be extended to non-parts-based subject matter by adopting
the concept of partition.76
Possible worlds provide information about the actual world in a way that
they have a grip on reality. However, subject matters remain problematic
entities even including possible worlds into our ontology. Subject matters
are even more abstract than possible worlds, since they group worlds by
inducing equivalence relations. From an epistemic point of view, it is not
clear why the existence of an equivalence class would be less problematic
than numbers or other mathematical objects. In fact, they are not. Since
74Yablo (2014, p. 28).
75Yablo explicitly mentions this point on (2014, p. 29).
76Yablo (2014, p. 27).
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subject matters are sets of propositions, why should we subtract propositions
that include mathematical objects from empirical theories if what we get at
the end are sets?
To be clear, I am not arguing against the existence of subject matters.
I believe that subject matters are introduced by Yablo to handle a specific
philosophical problem: what an hypothesis is about. Subject matters serve
that purpose and perhaps have several advantages over other strategies. But
I am not sure whether or not subject matters can be employed in favor of
anti-Platonism; even possible worlds are problematic within a nominalistic
perspective. Hellman is aware that possible worlds are not acceptable from
a nominalistic point of view, and so he treats modal operations as primi-
tive notions. In point of fact, numbers are more acceptable than subject
matters, because the existence of numbers is introduced on a solid scientific
ground: numbers are indispensable to our best scientific theories. Aside
from an elegant treatment of aboutness, subject matters are clearly not as
indispensable as mathematical objects, and thus Quinean naturalism cannot
justify the existence of entities that are not indispensable.
Still, Yablo does not seem interested in figuring out what exists,77 nor
does endorse nominalism. Yablo does not consider himself a nominalist
but an anti-Platonist.78 The nominalist is an anti-Platonist, but the anti-
Platonist is not necessarily a nominalist: both argue against the existence of
abstract objects, although the nominalist is committed to what is nominal-
istically acceptable. In Azzouni’s case, the mind– and language– indepen-
dence criterion is the guideline that distinguishes what is nominalistically
acceptable from what is not. But an anti-Platonist could argue against the
existence of abstract objects without embracing any positive view about
77I refer to the skeptical conclusion in an older Yablo’s paper: “I conclude that the
existence-questions of most interest to philosophers are moot” (1998, p. 260). More
recently, (2014, p. 80).
78More specifically, Yablo calls himself a quizzicalist (2009). According to the quizzi-
calist, there is no fact of the matter about the existence of abstract objects if the presup-
position that abstract objects exist fails non-catastrophically.
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what is nominalistically acceptable. For example, Yablo’s position can be
stated in this way: there is no fact of the matter about the existence of
abstract objects if the presupposition that abstract objects exist fails non-
catastrophically.79 Despite this, the main reason to be an anti-Platonist is
tied to epistemic worries about the nature of abstract objects, but it is not
clear whether Yablo is supposed to be an anti-Platonist, since subject mat-
ters are abstract objects. As showed earlier, subject matters are problematic
entities from an epistemological point of view.
To avoid any epistemological problem, an ideal solution would charac-
terize logical subtraction independently of subject matters. However, logical
subtraction would present another issue without subject matters. Note that
logical subtraction operates on propositions: we subtract the proposition
A from the proposition B, and what we get at the end of the process is a
proposition A − B. But are propositions acceptable to the anti-Platonist?
Propositions present the same issue of subject matters: they are abstract
objects. The reason is that propositions are sets of worlds.80 Thus, it is not
clear why we should use logical subtraction against Platonism. In principle,
a way of retrieving logical subtraction as an argument against Platonism
might be avoiding both subject matters and propositions. But this goal
goes beyond the present work.
Independently of whether logical subtraction can be formulated without
subject matters and propositions, let me point out that logical subtraction
does not count as an argument against Platonism. At best, logical subtrac-
tion can show that numbers are orthogonal to how matters stand physically;
it tells us that even though there are no mathematical objects, the remainder
can be still evaluated in numberless worlds, according to how matters stand
in relation to the physical world. In other words, logical subtraction shows
that physical conditions cannot be used to prove, or disprove, the existence
79Yablo (2009, p. 522).
80“If we assume, again following Lewis, that a proposition too is a set of worlds, then
truthmakers are of the same category as at least some of what they make true, namely
other propositions”. See Yablo (2014, p. 74).
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of abstract objects. But this is not a happy result for the nominalist and for
many anti-Platonists. Indeed logical subtraction is not an argument against
the existence of abstract objects: it merely states that physical objects do
not require the existence of abstract objects, because there are truthmak-
ers for propositions about physical objects, in numberless worlds, that are
compatible with the existence of abstract objects. That is an important
result, but is still far from being an argument for the nominalist or against
Platonism — although it undercuts the indispensability argument and, as a
result, it may be considered a first step to nominalism.
With or without subject matters, logical subtraction is not an argument
for or against Platonism. If I am right, it will make sense to ask ourselves
whether Yablo’s strategy is an easy road to nominalism or not. Yablo’s
strategy does not force us in being specific about the nominalistic content
of physical theories. In contrast to Field’s program, logical subtraction
does not tell us that what exists in a Newtonian world are the regions of
space–time, or an alternative surrogate. Logical subtraction is neutral about
what exists and, more specifically, is neutral about the actual world because
nominalistic and Platonistic worlds are both possible. The proposition ‘there
are nine planets in our Solar System’ is true in a Platonistic world but false
in nominalistic worlds for reasons that do not concern planets. And when
we strip numbers away of that proposition, the remainder is still true about
planets in nominalistic worlds. Despite this, logical subtraction does not
aim to tell us which world is the actual world, but assumes that both worlds
are possible. Because Yablo’s strategy does not rule out the existence of
Platonistic worlds, it is not a road to nominalism.
Logical subtraction shows how it is possible for the existence of proposi-
tions that include mathematical objects to be extricated from propositions
that describe the physical world, but it says nothing about the outcome of
such an operation. Consider this analogy: suppose that we know that it
is possible to extricate hobbits from The Lord of the Rings in a way that
what we get at the end of subtraction remains true about the events of
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Middle Earth. But what is the remainder supposed to be? The Lord of the
Rings without hobbits seems to be metaphysically inscrutable. The analogy
with the case of mathematics should be clear: even if we could extricate
the propositions that include mathematical objects from the propositions in
our best scientific theories, what we would get at the end of that process is
not clear. Even though the remainder is still true about physical objects,
what it is remains an enigma.
I already argued that logical subtraction is not a road to nominalism, but
I have not said what kind of road it is. It seems to be that Yablo’s easy road
is a ‘no road’. Let me explain what I mean. Yablo assumes that nominalistic
and Platonistic worlds are both relatively possible. Mathematical proposi-
tions are dispensable to our best scientific theories because the remainder is
both evaluable and true in numberless worlds. In this sense mathematics is
indispensable from an explanatory point of view, but it does not entail the
existence of mathematical objects. Does it mean that mathematics is dis-
pensable from our scientific theories? In Yablo’s view, it seems that we can
dispense with mathematics in the sense that certain mathematical proposi-
tions are false in numberless worlds. But on this view the descriptive role
of mathematics remains untouched: Mathematics is explicatorily indispens-
able and extricable. Because of this, the explanatory role of mathematics
in scientific theories seems to me instrumental. To see why, notice first how
Yablo distinguishes three levels of mathematical explanation:81
• Mathematics is descriptive when it assists to provide generalization
of a certain phenomenon. For example, we observe that certain combi-
nations of tiles are never seen in rectangular floors, and we use numbers
in order to describe that phenomenon (19, 37, 71, and so forth).
• Mathematics occurs structurally when one finds certain formal rela-
tions, or structures, among objects. For example, the number of tiles
is never prime in rectangular floors.
81Such grades of mathematical involvement may not occur all together in the description
of a single physical event. See Yablo (2012, pp. 1020-1021).
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• Mathematics occurs substantially if the previous structural relation
can be used to provide further generalizations. Given prime num-
bers that divide integers exactly, i.e. prime factors, the fundamental
theorem of arithmetic states that every positive integer has a single
unique prime factorization. The theorem gives a way of individuating
an important relation between prime numbers and positive integers.
As far as the first two levels occur, mathematics provides the conceptual
backdrop to understand and unify physical regularities, but the explana-
tion of such regularities remains physical. The second level is a genuine
mathematical explanation. And according to a certain version of the in-
dispensability argument, the existence of mathematical objects can be de-
duced from the fact that mathematical explanations are indispensable to
explaining physical phenomena. But even if the explanation of a physical
event is purely mathematical, the scientist is still trying to “carve physi-
cal phenomena at the explanatory joints”.82 In Yablo’s view, it seems that
mathematical explanations are subordinate (i.e. instrumental) to physical
explanation.
If Yablo’s view is a form of instrumentalism, one could argue that logi-
cal subtraction cannot be used to draw ontological conclusions. It cannot,
because logical subtraction tells us nothing about the criteria for what ex-
ists. However, if mathematics is perfectly extricable from empirical theories,
how matters stand physically neither demands nor preclude the existence of
mathematical objects in numberless worlds. This conclusion is unsatisfac-
tory for the nominalist but seems to open the possibility of being agnostic. If
the physical world is compatible with, or without, the existence of abstract
objects, there is a stalemate between Platonism and nominalism.
82Yablo (2012, p. 1023).
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3.3 On confirmation holism
It has been argued that the indispensability argument is strongly tied to
confirmation holism. Following this path, the anti-Platonist can reject the
role of confirmation holism within scientific practice in order to run a knock-
down argument against the existence of mathematical objects. After all, the
connection between the indispensability argument and holism is grounded
on a famous passage in Quine:
The dogma of reductionism survives in the supposition that each
statement, taken in isolation from its fellows, can admit of con-
firmation or information at all. My counter-suggestion, issuing
essentially from Carnap’s doctrine of the physical world in the
Aufbau, is that our statements about the external world face
the tribunal of sense experience not individually but only as a
corporate body.83
In this passage Quine states his doctrine of holism. Science can make ac-
curate predictions to the extent that theories are confirmed empirically. To
see how confirmation holism comes in the picture, imagine a theory that de-
scribes an empirical phenomenon by employing mathematics. According to
confirmation holism, the empirical success of that theory confirms not only
the existence of the physical entities involved, but also the mathematics,
because mathematics is part of the corporate body. Basically, confirmation
holism states that theories are always confirmed as a whole and, as a conse-
quence, the distinction between ontology and epistemology cannot be drawn
when theories are empirically successful. If mathematics is true because it
is empirically confirmed, we ought to commit ourselves to abstract objects
as well as particles or quarks.
83Quine (1951c, p. 38).
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3.3.1 Maddy’s non-factualistic view
Given the connection between the indispensability argument and confirma-
tion holism, Maddy notices how the indispensability argument does not
corroborate the existence of mathematical objects that do not find any ap-
plications within physical theories.84 If Maddy is right, the indispensability
argument cannot be used in order to justify abstract objects which play an
important role within pure mathematics.
Maddy is mainly worried about set theory and its ontological status.
If confirmation holism were true, set-theoretic objects like large cardinals
would be rejected on the basis of non-mathematical standards, in contrast
with actual mathematical practice. In fact, mathematicians do not wait
for a mathematical theory to be confirmed by physics or other empirical
theories, but they proceed independently of empirical confirmation.
Since confirmation holism does not guarantee the existence of objects
that are postulated within pure mathematics, Maddy aims to provide an
alternative picture of mathematics that does not need to be grounded on
empirical sciences. Mathematics has its own ontology that starts out of
mathematical practice, and it does not require any empirical confirmation.
Eventually, some mathematical theories might become indispensable for em-
pirical sciences, and by that time experiments can provide further grounds
to strengthening our mathematical beliefs. But still, empirical confirmation
is not required to justify the existence of mathematical objects.
Although Maddy rejects confirmation holism, I do not think that her
position can be considered anti-Platonist. Maddy does not seem mainly
worried about the existence of abstract objects, but rather she is interested
in figuring out whether mathematical theories are true or simply useful to
empirical sciences.85 Of course, the question about the truth of mathe-
matics has also important consequences for the indispensability argument,
especially for undecidable problems like the continuum hypothesis. If physi-
84Maddy (1992, p. 278).
85I am referring to Maddy (1992).
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cists were able to show that space-time is continuous, the indispensability
argument would provide strong reasons for the existence of P (N). More gen-
erally, applied mathematics turns out to be true under the assumption that
the indispensability argument is valid, and from the fact that mathematics
is true we can easily get to the existence of mathematical objects.
According to Maddy, there is a strict connection between the indispens-
ability argument and the factualistic view about mathematical problems.
The factualist claims that there are facts of the matter whether mathemat-
ical statements are true or false, and such facts are grounded on our best
scientific theories. For instance, despite the independence of the contin-
uum hypothesis from Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, the factualist argues that
there is a fact of the matter whether or not the continuum hypothesis is
true. If we have physical grounds to believe the continuum hypothesis, it
makes sense to add new axioms to Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory in order to
settle that question once and for all. This attitude is firmly based on the
indispensability argument.
Maddy seems mainly interested in running an argument against the fac-
tualist rather than challenging the indispensability argument directly. To do
that, Maddy contrasts factualism with non-factualism, according to which
there is no fact of the matter whether mathematical questions are true or
false. The continuum hypothesis for example cannot be decided on the basis
of achievements in physics. Perhaps we might adopt new axioms in order to
prove (disprove) the continuum hypothesis, but such reasons should involve
only mathematics, and nothing else. As Maddy points out:
Set theorists do not regularly keep an eye on developments in fun-
damental physics. Furthermore, I doubt that the set-theoretic
investigation of independent questions would be much affected
even if quantum mechanics did end up requiring a new and dif-
ferent account of space-time.86
Maddy endorses a non-factualistic view about undecidable mathematical
86Maddy (1992, p. 289).
3.3 On confirmation holism 130
statements, but it is not obvious that her point makes a strong case against
the indispensability argument. In fact, in Maddy’s view, the indispensability
argument is aimed to address the right answer to undecidable mathemati-
cal problems and guides mathematical practice. Basically, the factualist is
warned about the fact that empirical sciences should not interfere with math-
ematics: mathematical problems are problems for mathematicians. But is
non-factualism sufficient in order to reject the indispensability argument? At
best Maddy can argue that the true-value of certain mathematical proposi-
tions should not be based on the development of empirical sciences, because
such an attitude would contrast with scientific practice. But even if the
indispensability argument is strictly connected to factualism, to reject fac-
tualism is not sufficient. Indeed, a Platonist might agree with Maddy that
the continuum hypothesis’s truth-value should not be decided on an empir-
ical basis and, nonetheless, he can argue that mathematical objects exist as
long as they are indispensable to our best scientific theories. In other words,
Platonism is not ruled out by non-factualism.
Maddy is concerned about raising a methodological objection rather than
making an ontological claim. Basically, she is interested in what kind of con-
sequences the indispensability argument may have for mathematical prac-
tice altogether, and her critique follows from that consideration. A different
question is whether or not Maddy’s worry about confirmation holism can be
used against Platonism.
3.3.2 Sober’s objection to the indispensability argument
Sober’s critique aims at undermining both Platonism and constructive em-
piricism. According to constructive empiricism, we cannot draw any onto-
logical conclusions about the existence of unobservables from the fact that
unobservable are indispensable to contemporary physics. More specifically,
constructive empiricism does not regard the question of truth about unob-
servable as essential to science but only to empirical adequacy. In short, a
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theory is empirically adequate if what it says about observables is true.87
Quantification over unobservables is allowed but their existence cannot be es-
tablished. As a consequence, constructive empiricism is a form of skepticism
about the existence of unobservables in general — without any distinction
between mathematical entities and physical ones. Since constructive empiri-
cism invites us to suspend judgment on the existence of any unobservable,
such a perspective turns out quite radical from an ontological point of view.
In this regard, Sober aims to weaken constructive empiricism by combining
it with some elements of scientific realism. The outcome is called ‘contrastive
empiricism’.
Let us see how contrastive empiricism works. Imagine two different sci-
entific hypothesis that aim to explain the same phenomenon or physical
event. How can we establish which hypothesis is more adequate? According
to Sober, adequacy is always relative to a set of observations O, and an hy-
pothesis is more adequate than another if it is favored by O. Sober provides
a model of what he means by ‘favorite’ in order to evaluate the adequacy of
an hypothesis over another: the likelihood principle.
The likelihood principle O favors H1 over H2 iff P (O/H1) > P (O/H2)
P (O/H) is the probability that the hypothesis confers on the set of
observations. The likelihood principle states that H1 is favored over H2 if
O is more probable given H1 than given H2.
What is the relationship between likelihood and indispensability? Scien-
tists may tend to consider H1 indispensable if the probability that H1 confers
on O is very high with respect to H2.
88 Because a set of observations cannot
favor an hypothesis over all possible alternatives, indispensability is a mat-
ter of degree. An hypothesis may be regarded as true, but no hypothesis
is indispensable in principle. New observations may favor other hypothesis
87The scientific Image, p. 12.
88What if both H1 and H2 confer on the same set of observations the same probability?
In this case, it seems that none of them is truly indispensable.
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and change what we currently regard as indispensable. Indispensability is
strictly connected to observation in Sober’s view.
The empirical science makes progress by facing discrimination problems
between competitive hypothesis, and such problems are solved by appealing
to the likelihood principle.89 From this perspective there is no longer a
distinction between truth and empirical adequacy, because H1 is true insofar
as it is possible to discriminate between ‘H1 is empirically adequate’ and ‘H2
is empirically adequate’. And the decision between H1 and H2 is made on
the basis of the likelihood principle. When an hypothesis that quantifies
over mathematical objects is considered empirically adequate, its success
may be regarded as an empirical reason for the existence of mathematical
objects. However, if the likelihood principle is used to favor one hypothesis
over another, for Sober empirical adequacy cannot confirm (dis-confirm)
mathematics.
Imagine two mathematical theories, M1 and M2, employed in different
physical theories. M1 is indispensable if the probability that M1 confers on
O is very high in contrast to M2. According to contrastive empiricism, we
must use the likelihood principle in order to determine whether or not M1
is indispensable with respect to M2. Therefore, M1 is empirically adequate
iff a set of observations O favors M1 over M2, that is, when P (O/M1) >
P (O/M2). Basically, if the probability that M1 confers on O is greater than
what M2 confers on O.
I would like to make a couple of remarks. First, if the argument is
formulated in this way, then the likelihood principle can be used only to
discriminate between competing mathematical theories, in order to choose
which one is indispensable. Secondly, the likelihood principle can establish
not only if a mathematical theory is empirically confirmed, but even if a
theory is rejected by a given set of observations. In short, mathematical
theories can turn out to be empirically falsifiable.
Can mathematics be confirmed, or refuted, by observation? Sober’s
89Sober (1993, p. 39).
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answer is that mathematical theories cannot confer probability on observa-
tions.90 This is because mathematical theories are not indispensable in the
same sense as empirical hypotheses: empirical hypotheses are a posteriori
indispensable, whereas mathematical theories are a priori indispensable. As
will see, that distinction is essential in Sober’s discussion of the indispens-
ability argument, but even more important is the fact that Sober discusses a
version of the indispensability argument within his contrastive empiricism.
Indeed Sober’s argument can be summarized by this way: if contrastive
empiricism is true, then a specific indispensability argument is ruled out
because it is incompatible with contrastive empiricism. So before discussing
the distinction between a priori and a posteriori indispensability, let us see
first Sober’s version of the indispensability argument:
P1: H1 or H2
P2: (H1 ∧M) entails O and (H2 ∧M) entails ¬O
P3: H1 does not entail O (or ¬O)
P4: H2 does not entail ¬O (or O)
P5: O
C: M
Let us see how the argument works. In the first premise we have two
empirical hypothesis that we want to evaluate as regards empirical adequacy.
In the second premise H1, together with a mathematical theory M , predicts
an observable phenomenon O, whereas H2 does not. The third and forth
premises state that M is indispensable because H1, or H2, cannot predict
O by their own. And finally M has to be true because we observe O.
Sober notices a deductive flaw in the argument. The observation is that
O does not prove that M is true, because O is a redundant premise in the
argument (P5). Indeed, P5 does not seem to affect the force of the argument
90Sober (1993, p. 46).
3.3 On confirmation holism 134
and, therefore, that premise can be removed without any particular issues.
As a result, the indispensability argument cannot be used in order to deduce
the truth of a mathematical theory from a set of observations: observation
does not confirm, nor dis-confirm, mathematical theories.
Compare the previous indispensability argument with the following in-
dispensability argument a posteriori :
P1: H1 or H2
P2: (H1 ∧M) entails O and (H2 ∧M) entails ¬O
P3: M ∧O
C: H1
In this case, the observation O refutes H2 and confirms H1, and H1
turns out indispensable as regards H2. Since the assumption that O is true
plays an essential role in the argumentation, observation is not a redundant
premise and it can be used to prove the indispensability of H1.
3.3.3 Confirmation holism and Platonism
The last point shows how Sober rejects empirical confirmation only for math-
ematical theories. This may seem as a decisive maneuver against the exis-
tence of mathematical objects, but I do not think that Sober is really in-
terested in challenging Platonism. Indeed Sober is not worried about the
problem of ontological commitment, and I am going to argue that the Pla-
tonist should not be worried about Sober’s objection.
First, notice how Sober does not have anything against mathematical
theories that are used with empirical hypotheses, if their truth is stated
independently of any observations. Indeed Sober recasts the indispensability
argument in the following way:91
P1: H1 or H2 or . . . or Hn
91Sober (1993, p. 47).
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P2: For each Hi, Hi entail M
C: M
The last is a valid indispensability argument (a priori), which states that
mathematical theories are true if they are entailed by empirical hypothesis,
independently of any observations. Sober does not seem to have anything
against this argument. Indeed, he argues that the indispensability argument
is a priori, because mathematics does not need empirical confirmation to
be true. Mathematics is not even affected by falsification of an empirical
theory, of course. To show this, Sober gives the following example in which
arithmetic is not dropped in the presence of non-additive quantities. Two
gallons of salt plus two gallons of water does not yield four gallons, yet
scientists are not inclined to consider 2+2 = 4 false. Empirical confirmation
may increase our confidence in mathematics, of course, but it cannot be used
to claim the truth, or falsity, of mathematical theories.
In Sober’s view mathematics is both true and a priori.92 However, the
existence of abstract objects is still unquestioned after his critique, because
the indispensability argument a priori can run even without confirmation —
although weakened. Moreover, one of Sober’s main goals is to combine some
elements of Van Fraassen’s empiricism with realism, and thus Platonism is
not really an issue for contrastive empiricism:
I will argue that contrastive empiricism captures what makes
sense in standard versions of realism and empiricism, while avoid-
ing the excesses of each.93
92Mathematics is explicitly regarded as true by Sober, although with a little trace of
criticism (1993, p. 53): “Perhaps the indispensability of mathematical statements in
empirical science is some sort of reason to regard those statements as true. Nothing I have
said here shows that this vague statement is wrong.”
93Sober (1993, p. 53). Sober means by ‘realist’ the one who is “persuaded by indis-
pensability arguments to affirm the existence of numbers, genes, and quarks” (1993, p.
53).
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Sober’s target is rather the Quinean doctrine of epistemological holism:
the idea for which our beliefs face the tribunal of experience, or are con-
firmed, as a whole. Quine’s holism is incompatible with contrastive empiri-
cism and, more specifically, it conflicts with the likelihood principle. Keep in
mind that for Sober empirical sciences aim at solving discrimination prob-
lems between competitive hypotheses through observations. But hypotheses
are not confirmed in general on the basis of the empirical adequacy of an
hypotheses: “what it is true of the whole may not be true of the parts”.94
Quinean holism is false because for contrastive empiricism, hypothesis are
compared one by one.
It is questionable that contrastive empiricism represents an accurate pic-
ture of scientific practice. Basically, Sober’s idea is that observations cannot
falsify, nor confirm, mathematical theories. According to Colyvan, Sober’s
objection fails because it does not take into account the symmetric char-
acter of confirmation holism:95 a theory is confirmed as a whole, whereas
it is usually dis-confirmed only partially.96 For Colyvan, that is the rea-
son why mathematics is usually not affected by falsification of an empirical
hypothesis. The relation between mathematics and an adequate empirical
hypothesis is analogous to the relation between a programming language
and a successful program. If the program works without compilation errors,
the programming language shares credits with the successful program. But
if the program does not work:
the job of the computer programmer (in part) is to seek out the
faulty part of the program and correct it. [. . . ] In such a case the
programmer seeks to make a small local change in the defective
part of the program. Changing the programming language, for
94Sober (1993, p. 54).
95Colyvan (2001, p. 135).
96This is essentially Quine’s point: we tend to disturb the whole system as little as
possible. Before altering the whole system, we prefer to change a statement very close to
the periphery.
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instance, is not such a change.97
It is the same for mathematics. Mathematics is empirically confirmed
when the an empirical hypothesis is empirically confirmed, but it is rarely
dis-confirmed.
I believe Colyvan’s argument is partially misleading. It is true that com-
puter programmers do not change the programming language, and it is even
true that the programming language is one of the reason why the program
works. However, it does not seem to me this point confirms the existence of
virtual objects. In the same way, mathematical objects should not be taken
to exist simply because mathematics share credits with successful empirical
hypotheses. Colyvan’s argument seems to me rather weak.
Sober’s point is that the confirmation of empirical hypotheses cannot be
used to show the truth of mathematical theories. He is not claiming that
mathematics cannot share credits for the success of empirical hypothesis, as
Colyvan seems to think. Indeed if mathematics did not share credit for this,
mathematical theories could be easily dispensed with.
I agree with Colyvan about the fact that Sober’s objection is stated pre-
supposing contrastive empiricism. Nevertheless, I do not think that Sober’s
point against the indispensability argument relies on contrastive empiri-
cism. Indeed Sober’s concern can be isolated from the specific framework
of contrastive empiricism this way: can empirical confirmation be used by
the realist to claim mathematical statements are true? This general worry
seems interesting even if contrastive empiricism is highly problematic.
Mathematics does not need empirical confirmation to be true. As Maddy
noticed, that claim would be in contrast with mathematical practice, because
mathematicians in many cases do not wait for a mathematical theory to be
empirically confirmed in order to regard it as true. We may even proceed
beyond Sober and Maddy, asking ourselves if empirical confirmation favors
the existence of abstract objects outside of space and time. I am going to
97Colyvan (2001, p. 133).
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argue in the next chapter that empirical theories do not confirm, or dis-
confirm, the existence of abstract objects.
Chapter 4
Agnosticism in the
Philosophy of Mathematics
4.1 Balaguer’s anti-metaphysical conclusion
For Balaguer, there are no good arguments for or against Platonism. As
a consequence, Platonism and anti-Platonism are both workable philoso-
phies of mathematics, and it does not matter which of them we choose.
The ontological debate cannot be settled not just because philosophers lack
good arguments, but because there is no fact of the matter as to whether
abstract objects exist or not. Balaguer’s position can be split into two differ-
ent claims:1 on the one hand, according to the epistemic conclusion, we do
not currently have any good arguments for and against the existence of ab-
stract objects; on the other hand, according to the metaphysical conclusion,
philosophers could never find such arguments because there is no fact of
the matter. The metaphysical conclusion is the only non-factualistic claim,
whereas the epistemic conclusion sounds more like ‘there is much more work
to do for philosophers’.
1Balaguer himself makes the above distinction. See Balaguer (1998, pp. 151-152).
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4.1.1 Full-blooded Platonism and fictionalism
Before I examine how Balaguer’s argument works in detail, I would like to
mention that Balaguer aims at showing that the challenge between Platon-
ism and anti-Platonism boils down to the opposition between full-blooded
Platonism and fictionalism. According to full-blooded Platonism the mathe-
matical universe is plentiful, that is, all possible mathematical objects exist.2
In this context, ‘possibility’ means logical possibility or, more precisely, the
fact that if a mathematical theory is consistent, then the objects entailed
by that theory exist. Now, I would like to point out how Balaguer is not
advocating any formal notions of consistency,3 but his argument depends
on a broader concept: the intuitive notion of consistency. Balaguer does
not say too much about this notion. Basically, we know that this notion is
primitive, in the sense that it can neither be defined in terms of abstract
objects, nor it depends on a formal notion of consistency.4 But it is not
clear to me what Balaguer means. He claims that:
anyone who has taught an introductory logic course can attest
that students can be pretty reliable judges of whether a set of
sentences is consistent, even if they have no conception whatso-
ever of syntactic or semantic consistency. Thus, the idea here
is that before we developed the notions of syntactic and seman-
tic consistency, our knowledge of intuitive consistency was good
enough to give rise to some mathematical knowledge.5
2Balaguer’s claim may be open to some ambiguities about the existence of possible
mathematical object versus actual mathematical objects. However, this distinction does
not arise for Balaguer because there is no distinction between possible and actual objects.
See Balaguer (1998, p. 6).
3There are two ways for a mathematical theory to be consistent from a formal point of
view: T is syntactically consistent if contractions cannot be derived in it; T is semantically
consistent if T has a model.
4See Balaguer (1998, pp. 70-71).
5Balaguer (1998, p. 72).
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I do not argue that we lack an intuitive notion of consistency. Perhaps,
Balaguer means by ‘intuitive consistency’ something like: “ I have made
many arithmetical operations and I have not found any contradictions so far
— unless I have not made mistakes. So I am pretty sure that arithmetical
operations do not yield contradictions. Arithmetical operations are thus
intuitively consistent”. However, I am skeptical of basing full-Platonism
on such an intuitive notion. There are many formal systems that seem
intuitively consistent whereas, in fact, they turn out to be inconsistent.
The most famous example is perhaps the failure of Frege’s comprehension
axiom.6
According to Balaguer, full-blooded Platonism is the only tenable ver-
sion of Platonism, because it can solve both Benacerraf’s problems.7 In
outline, there is no need to account for how we can get knowledge of ab-
stract entities if full-blooded Platonism is true. This is because we only need
to establish whether or not a mathematical theory is intuitively consistent, a
process that does not require any interaction with abstract objects. In addi-
tion, Benacerraf’s problem of multiple reduction disappears: given multiple
equivalent descriptions of the same mathematical object, there is no unique
sequence of abstracta that we have to pick out if mathematical universe is
plentiful.8
Balaguer argues that full-blooded Platonism can solve the epistemolog-
ical worries that arise from a reliabilist account of knowledge. Remember
that according to Field’s reliability claim, Platonists must account for the
correlation between our mathematical beliefs and the mathematical facts,
that is, they must explain why if mathematicians accept a mathematical
6It may be possible to argue that a methodology does not have to be fool-proof in order
to give us knowledge. That is right. Nevertheless, I am still skeptical that we can appeal
to such a weak notion of consistency in the case of mathematics. Mathematicians want
to prove the consistency of mathematical theories and they do not rely on an intuitive
notion.
7Benacerraf (1965) and (1973).
8Benacerraf focuses his analysis on Zermelo’s and von Neumann’s set-theoretic reduc-
tion of natural numbers.
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theory T , then T describes part of the mathematical realm. Balaguer han-
dles Field’s challenge by arguing that if mathematicians accept T , then T is
intuitively consistent. This does not imply that T is formally consistent, nor
that consistency is the only requirement for a theory to be accepted. Bal-
aguer’s point is that if full-Blooded Platonism is true, and T is intuitively
consistent, then T truly describes part of the mathematical realm. In other
words, the correlation between our mathematical beliefs and the mathemat-
ical facts holds under the assumption that all possible mathematical objects
exist.
It seems to me that Balaguer’s solution does not address a basic question:
why should we regard full-blooded Platonism as true?9 Full-blooded Pla-
tonism cannot be true just because it handles the epistemological problem.
In fact, Balaguer argues that
To assume (at some level) that full-blooded Platonism is true is
just to assume that our mathematical singular terms refer; but
it seems plausible to claim that this assumption is inherent (in
some sense and at some level) in mathematical practice.10
However, whether mathematical singular terms refer to is highly contro-
versial. To play fair, Balaguer claims that his argument does not require
that full-blooded Platonism is true: it demands only that we acquire math-
ematical beliefs through the consistency of mathematical theories.
My claim is that people can acquire knowledge of the mathemat-
ical realm — even if they do not assume (at any level) that FBP
is true — by simply having a method of mathematical belief
acquisition that (as a general rule) leads them to believe purely
9Balaguer argues that we do not need to know that full-blooded Platonism is true in
order to construct an adequate epistemology. But if it is false, then the methodology Bal-
aguer describes is not reliable. I am not saying that Balaguer’s methodology is unreliable,
but just that it would be significant to know whether or not full-blooded Platonism is
true.
10Balaguer (1998, p. 56).
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mathematical sentences and theories only if they are consistent.
[. . . ] And, of course, the reason we can acquire knowledge in these
ways is that these methods of belief acquisition are reliable.11
People can acquire mathematical knowledge because our method of math-
ematical belief acquisition is reliable. However, I do not see how Balaguer
can account for how the correlation between belief acquisition and abstract
objects would occur if full-blooded Platonism is false. In the case of physical
objects, if external-world realism is true then sense perception is reliable.
But since Balaguer does not think there is any good reason to believe that
full-blooded Platonism is true, it does not seem that there is any good
reason to believe that his method of acquiring beliefs (namely full-blooded
Platonism) is reliable.
After presenting the advantages of full-blooded Platonism over tradi-
tional Platonism, Balaguer attempts to show that the best alternative to
full-blooded Platonism is fictionalism. Balaguer’s strategy aims at ruling out
both anti-realist and realist versions of anti-Platonism. With regard to the
former point, Balaguer argues that anti-realists face all the same problems
as fictionalism does: they must account for the indispensable applications
of mathematics to physics.12 As a consequence, if anti-realist views have all
in common the same problem, Balaguer argues that we can single out one
of them as a representative of anti-realism altogether. Fictionalism is the
best candidate because, Balaguer continues, it has the advantage of taking
mathematical sentences at face value: mathematical sentences are literally
about abstract objects.
Balaguer’s point is that only Field’s fictionalism takes mathematical
statements at face value. This claim is rather controversial. On the one
hand, it is true that fictionalism regards mathematics as about abstract ob-
jects, and so the fictionalist does not need to change standard semantics.
11Balaguer (1998, p. 56).
12Balaguer takes into account if-thenism, conventionalism, and formalism. See Balaguer
(1998, pp. 100-104).
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However, since according to Field mathematical statements are false, math-
ematics is not taken at face value. To overcome this problem, one should
regard mathematical statements as true without postulating the existence
of abstract objects —- as for instance Azzouni does.
Let see how Balaguer plans on dismissing anti-Platonist realism. Ac-
cording to Balaguer, anti-Platonist realists can be divided into two differ-
ent classes: those who argue that mathematical entities are mental objects
(psychologism), and those who argue that mathematical entities are physi-
cal objects (empiricism). In point of fact, Balaguer considers only the latter
a form of realism because, for the psychologist, mathematical objects ulti-
mately depend on our psicological process, whereas one of the main features
of mathematical realism is that mathematical objects are mind-language
independent. In any case, the refutation of both psychologism and Mill’s
position dates back to Frege, and Balaguer does not add anything new to
the well-known Frege’s arguments.13
I have showed so far how Balaguer attempts to prove that full-blooded
Platonism and fictionalism are respectively our best forms of Platonism and
anti-Platonism. This reduction is essential for Balaguer’s argument, but
there are some important issues that are been left out. Balaguer does not
consider the easy-road strategies that I have presented earlier and, moreover,
he does not take seriously Chihara’s and Hellman’s nominalism. And unless
Balaguer can turn every anti-Platonist account into Field’s fictionalism, his
program will be at best incomplete.
I would like to consider another argument Balaguer gives: his defense
of nominalistic scientific realism. In a nutshell, scientific realism is the view
that we ought to believe that our best scientific theories, taken at face value,
are (approximately) true. In Balaguer’s view, nominalists should endorse
an alternative version of scientific realism about the empirical sciences. The
empirical sciences have two interpretations: on the one hand, the nominalist
13Compare Balaguer (1998, pp. 104-107) to Frege (1884). In addition, Balaguer also
criticizes Kitcher’s position, but I do not need to spell this criticism out, because it is
unnecessary to my analysis. See Balaguer (1998, pp. 107-109).
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content of an empirical theory is the true part of the theory; on the other
hand, the Platonistic content of an empirical theory is the part of the theory
that is false. Balaguer aims at separating the two interpretations from each
other without nominalization, in contrast with what Field has attempted to
do.
Balaguer comes up with a thought experiment to show that the behavior
of the physical world does not depend on mathematical objects:
If all the objects in the mathematical realm suddenly disap-
peared, nothing would change in the physical world; thus, if
empirical science is true right now, then its nominalistic con-
tent would remain true, even if the mathematical realm disap-
peared.14
The point is that mathematical objects do not have any causal role in
empirical science. Does this mean that they do not have any role at all?
Balaguer assumes that mathematical objects do not have any causal role,
and then he considers the sentence (A) : ‘The physical system S is 40◦C’.
For Balaguer, A expresses a mixed fact that involves both numbers and
temperature, even though A’s true-value does not depend upon any causal
relations between numbers and temperature. So what does A’s truth-value
depend on? According to Balaguer, A involves two facts: both a (nominalis-
tic) fact about S’s temperature and a (Platonistic) fact about numbers. But
if these two facts hold independently of one another, there is no problem
of regarding the nominalistic content as true and the Platonistic content
as false. Mixed statements contain a nominalistic content that express the
complete picture of the physical world: the physical world would be the
same even if there were no numbers.
I would like to emphasize that Balaguer does not argue that the em-
pirical sciences can be nominalized because, for him, it does not matter
to present the nominalistic content of empirical theories. Balaguer merely
14Balaguer (1998, p. 132).
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requires that the truth-values of mixed statements depend on both nomi-
nalistic and Platonistic facts, and that such facts are independent of one
another. For Balaguer, the existence of causally inert mathematical objects
is irrelevant to how the physical world is, because if mathematical objects
suddenly disappeared nothing would change in the physical world. Note
that Balaguer is not claiming that mathematical objects are irrelevant to
how we describe the physical world, but that the question of whether or
not mathematical objects exist is independent of whether mathematics is
(in)dispensable to our best scientific theories. If nominalistic and Platonis-
tic facts are independent of one another, nominalistic scientific realism turns
out to be a tenable position. This does not mean that nominalistic scientific
realism is true, but only that is it possible to endorse fictionalism without
nominalizing the empirical theories.
Since nominalistic scientific realism is the view that fictionalism can be
sustained without nominalization, I think that Balaguer’s position can be
considered an easy road to anti-Platonism. Nonetheless, there are two im-
portant premises at stake: first, Balaguer assumes that the existence of
Platonistic content is plausible and secondly, Balaguer argues that nominal-
istic and Platonistic facts hold independently of one another. With regard
to the former point, I am going to argue that it is not straightforward that
the existence of Platonistic facts is plausible; with regard to the latter point,
Balaguer’s claim implies the rejection of confirmation holism.
At first it is essential to figure out what Balaguer means by ‘Platonistic
content’. According to Balaguer, the Platonistic content of an empirical
theory is what the theory implies about an abstract mathematical realm.15
Now, I ask myself in what sense an empirical theory implies something about
mathematical objects and, as far as I gather, Balaguer does not address this
15See Balaguer (1998, p. 131). In point of fact, Balaguer individuates the Platonistic
content not just in the empirical theories but also in sentences as ‘the physical system S
is 40◦C’.
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problem openly.16 He only claims that for an empirical theory to be about a
Platonistic content does not imply that abstract objects exist.17 This seems
right, because the fact that ‘A Scandal in Bohemia’ is about Sherlock Holmes
does not imply that Sherlock Holmes exists. But here is the problem: on the
one hand, Balaguer does not commit himself to the existence of a Platonistic
content; on the other hand, he argues that it is plausible for the empirical
theories to have a Platonistic content. So what kind of argument does
Balaguer have to show that a Platonistic content is plausible? His argument
seems to be based on the claim that full-blooded Platonism is defensible,
because it can solve Benacerraf’s problems. But as I previously indicated,
Balaguer’s solution depends on a problematic notion of consistency and
does not account for the correlation between our mathematical beliefs and
mathematical facts. Thus, I doubt that the existence of a Platonistic content
is really plausible.
Now, I would like to examine Balaguer’s claim that nominalistic and
Platonistic facts are disjointed. To do this, I will pretend that the existence
of both Platonistic and nominalistic facts is plausible. So how can Balaguer
argue that such facts are independent of one another? Although Balaguer
does not refer to confirmation holism explicitly, I think it plays an essential
role in his argument. According to Balaguer,
it seems that empirical science predicts that the behavior of the
physical world is not dependent in any way upon the existence
of mathematical objects. But this suggests that what empirical
science says about the physical world — that is, its complete
picture of the physical world — could be true even if there aren’t
any mathematical objects.18
16To play fair, Balaguer points out that our empirical theories have full-blown mathe-
matical theories. And this is the best way to make sense of their references to mathematical
objects (personal communication, December 18, 2014).
17See Balaguer (1998, p. 200), footnote n. 4.
18Balaguer (1998, p. 133).
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The fact that the empirical sciences are confirmed by experience does not
depend on the existence of mathematical objects, because mathematical ob-
jects are causally inert. But if a theory can talk about the physical world,
this means that the theory in question is confirmed by experience. And
thus Balaguer’s claim implies that empirical confirmation is true indepen-
dently of the existence of mathematical objects. In other words, empirical
confirmation, what the theory truly says about the physical world, does not
imply the existence of mathematical objects. Therefore, Balaguer’s claim
implies the rejection of confirmation holism. And if confirmation holism is
rejected, the indispensability argument is disarmed in this sense: the fact
that empirically confirmed mathematical theories are indispensable to our
scientific theories cannot be used to show the existence of abstracta.
4.1.2 There is no fact of the matter
I presented Balaguer’s strategy to reduce Platonism and anti-Platonism to
their best representatives, i.e. full-blooded Platonism and fictionalism re-
spectively. Balaguer’s next move is to show how the metaphysical debate
about the existence of mathematical objects cannot be settled at all. To do
this, Balaguer first provides an argument that proves that fictionalism and
full-blooded Platonism are both defensible philosophies of mathematics and
secondly, that there is no fact of the matter as to whether abstract objects
exist.
Because there is a stalemate between full-blooded Platonism and fiction-
alism, Balaguer argues that we do not have any reasons to choose between
Platonism and anti-Platonism. According to Balaguer, there are neither
good argument for full-blooded Platonism nor for fictionalism, because both
positions can defend themselves from the best arguments that philosophers
have provided against them. On the one hand, full-blooded Platonists can
explain how we can get mathematical knowledge of abstract objects through
the intuitive consistency of mathematical theories; on the other hand, fic-
tionalists can account for the indispensable use of mathematics in the empir-
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ical sciences by endorsing nominalistic scientific realism. Bear in mind that
if nominalistic scientific realism can be sustained, the fictionalist can main-
tain that the nominalistic content of the empirical theories is true, whereas
the Platonistic content is false. In a nutshell, Balaguer argues that if the
best arguments against both full-blooded Platonists and fictionalists can be
blocked, the metaphysical debate ends up in a stalemate.
Even though philosophers have not found yet a good argument for or
against the existence of abstract objects, perhaps philosophers could settle
the metaphysical debate in the long run. Hence I would like to consider Bal-
aguer’s metaphysical claim now: philosophers could never settle the meta-
physical debate. It is important to note that Balaguer does not claim that
the dispute over the existence of mathematical objects is meaningless, be-
cause he does not commit himself to any sort of verificationism. In fact, the
metaphysical debate is factually empty.19
Balaguer’s strategy is to argue that the sentence (P ) ‘there are objects
that exist outside of space-time’ does not have truth-conditions. More pre-
cisely, even though that sentence has disquotational truth-conditions, i.e.
P is true if there are abstract objects, however it does not have possible-
worlds-style truth-conditions: there are no possible worlds where P is true.
In other words, Balaguer aims at showing how there is no fact of the matter
as to which possible worlds count as worlds in which P is true.
Let us see how Balaguer’s argument works. At first Balaguer notices
that our whole conception of what existence amounts to be is bounded up
with space and time. That is, we do not have any idea of what the existence
outside of space and time is like. If we have no idea of what existence
outside of space and time could be like then, Balaguer argues, we cannot
even imagine what a possible world where there are abstracta. Of course,
this argument does not establish that abstracta are fictional objects. And in
point of fact, Balaguer claims that despite the fact that we cannot imagine
what existence outside of space and time could be like, there could exist
19Balaguer (1998, pp. 158-159).
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abstract objects.
Balaguer’s next move aims at showing that if we cannot imagine what
existence outside of space and time is like, then there is no fact of the matter
as to which possible worlds count as worlds in which P is true. Balaguer
argues that the fact that we cannot imagine what existence outside of space
and time is like does not depend on our ignorance of the truth-value of P ,
but on the fact that our usage does not determine P ’s (possible-worlds-style)
truth-conditions. And if our usage does not determine what the (possible-
worlds-style) truth-conditions of a sentence are, we have good reasons to
imply that there is no fact of the matter.
We should be very careful in regarding Balaguer’s anti-metaphysical con-
clusion as agnostic. Nevertheless, it is true that Balaguer’s conclusion re-
sembles agnosticism in a certain sense: it may follow that we should suspend
the debate between Platonism and anti-Platonism. But even though agnos-
ticism may follow, it is because of how the world is: because there is no fact
of the matter about P ’s truth conditions.
4.1.3 Non-factualism and tertium non datur
We saw how Balaguer distinguishes different kinds of truth-conditions. Ac-
cording to Azzouni and Bueno, two notions of truth are also involved in Bal-
aguer’s analysis: one is deflationary, whereas the other is stated in possible-
worlds-style.20 Let us assume that the notion of possible-worlds truth gener-
alises the deflationary conception of truth. Thus, the actual world turns out
to be one instance of Balaguer’s metaphysical conclusion that ‘there is no
fact of the matter as to whether abstract objects exist’. If this is so, Azzouni
and Bueno notice that if the sentence (P ) ‘there are abstract objects’ has no
possible-worlds-style truth-conditions, as Balaguer claims, then P does not
also have truth conditions in deflationary sense. However, this claim is in-
20See Azzouni and Bueno (2008, p. 760). According to the deflationary theory of truth,
to say that a statement is true is just to assert the statement itself. For example, to say
that ‘snow is white’ is true is equivalent to saying that snow is white.
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consistent with Balaguer’s view that P has disquotational truth-conditions,
but it has no possible-worlds-style truth-conditions.
Azzouni and Bueno go further, and argue how Balaguer’s claim that
‘there is no fact of the matter whether abstract objects exist’ turns out
to be incompatible with classical logic. In order to sustain non-factualism,
Balaguer should be able first to assert that ‘either abstract objects exist or
they do not’ is true. But if ‘there are abstract objects’ has no disquotational
truth-conditions, then ‘either abstract objects exist or they do not’ does not
have disquotational truth-conditions either. This is because
If one is in the classical setting, one must be able to assert (A or
¬A), for any sentence A. If one nevertheless claims there is no
fact of the matter whether A or ¬A is true, then one must be able
to say this in a way that is compatible with one’s commitment
to (A or ¬A) for every sentence A in one’s language.21
As a result, Balaguer cannot run his argument unless he rejects the
principle of bivalence.22 Alternatively, Azzouni and Bueno suggest how
Balaguer could have argued that ‘either abstract objects exist or they do
not’ is true, but the choice between them is arbitrary because there is no
fact of the matter. Unfortunately, Balaguer’s anti-metaphysical claim is
way stronger than that (i.e. ‘there are abstract objects’ has no possible-
worlds truth-conditions). However, it turns out that even ‘there are abstract
objects’ has no disquotational truth-conditions, and, therefore, ‘there are
abstract objects or such objects do not exist’ has no disquotational truth-
conditions either. In Balaguer’s view, tertium non datur is rejected.
21Azzouni and Bueno (2008, p. 756).
22Balaguer points out that he rejects the principle of bivalence (personal communication,
December 18, 2014).
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4.2 Agnostic nominalism
Platonism has a great advantage over nominalistic strategies that paraphrase
mathematical statements. The Platonist can take mathematical discourse at
face value, since mathematical statements are literally true on this account
and, as a consequence, he or she can also provide a unified semantics for both
scientific and mathematical statements. On the other hand, the Platonist
requires much more work in order to explain how we can get knowledge of
abstract objects and, moreover, how we can refer to them. These last issues
are by contrast an easier task for the nominalist, because if mathematical
abstracta are fictional objects, then there is no need to explain how we can
get knowledge of a-casual entities, nor one has to explain how reference to
abstracta is possible. The application of mathematics, however, is problem-
atic for both Platonism and hard-road nominalism. If abstract objects exist,
it is unclear how they are connected with the physical world; but if mathe-
matical theories are literally false, as many nominalists claim, it is difficult
to understand how such theories can be successfully applied to the physical
world.23
Since Platonism and hard-road nominalism have both their advantages
and disadvantages, it is interesting to ask ourselves if we can get all the
benefits of Platonism without ontological commitment to abstracta. To ad-
dress this problem, Bueno advances a view where commitment to abstract
objects is avoided without denying their existence.24 The outcome is called
‘agnostic nominalism’, which stems from the following consideration: if ab-
stract objects are mind– and language– independent, it is not clear how we
can rule out their existence. At best, it is possible to argue that there are
no good reasons to believe that abstract objects exist but, still, this is not
sufficient to prove that they do not exist. As Bueno emphasizes,
23Field and Hellman, for instance, do not take mathematical discourse at face value.
Remember that for Field existential mathematical statements are literally false and, ac-
cording to Hellman, standard arithmetical statements can be reformulated into statements
about possible ω–structures.
24Bueno (2009, p. 64).
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rather than insisting that mathematical objects do not exist, we
could argue that we don’t have good reason to believe in their ex-
istence. But even if the latter claim were established, it wouldn’t
settle the issue regarding the non-existence of mathematical en-
tities.25
Bueno means by lacking ‘good reasons’ that mathematical practice does
not require the existence of abstract objects. Indeed mathematical prac-
tice starts with concrete objects such as diagrams, inscriptions, and so on.
From these concrete objects mathematicians develop certain intuitions about
mathematical facts, that is, facts about what follows from certain assump-
tions given a specific domain of objects. Furthermore, mathematicians come
up with new intuitions of such facts, and the process can be iterated indefi-
nitely. According to Bueno, mathematical intuitions are basically intuitions
of relations between objects that are introduced by comprehension princi-
ples, which provide the background assumptions for mathematical inquiry
in order to introduce mathematical objects and their properties.26
Bueno’s point is that mathematical practice presupposes comprehension
principles. This point allows Bueno to endorse a specific fictionalist view
of mathematical objects, according to which mathematical objects are arti-
facts created on the basis of comprehension principles.27 Artifacts are not
mind–independent abstracta. Mathematical artifacts require a physical basis
where they are recorded, such as paper or memory. In addition, mathemati-
cal artifacts depend on someone, or a community, who can understand them.
Mathematical objects are artifacts because if nobody can understand a spe-
cific piece of mathematical work, or every copy of it is lost, these objects
simply stop existing. But the fact that, for Bueno, abstracta have no role in
mathematical practice is not an argument to deny their existence: “perhaps
25Bueno (2008, p. 100).
26For example, Peano’s axioms provide the context to investigate natural numbers. In
general, comprehension principles do not need to be presented axiomatically.
27Bueno explicitly adopts Thomasson’s artifact theory and applies it to mathematics.
See Bueno (2009, p. 71).
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they exist, perhaps they do not”. More precisely, Bueno agrees with the
Platonist that mathematical objects would be abstracta if they happened to
exist. Indeed,
objects introduced via comprehension principles are introduced
as entities that are not located in space-time. Since, typically,
there is no specification for time or space in the comprehension
principles, the agnostic nominalist can explain why mathemati-
cal objects are, thus, introduced as abstract objects.28
Platonism is not ruled out by the agnostic nominalist. But what are the
advantages of endorsing such a view? According to Bueno, agnostic nomi-
nalism has all the advantages of nominalism without its problems. Basically,
agnostic nominalism can account for the applications of mathematics to the
physical world, and moreover mathematical statements are taken at face
value.
Let us see first how the agnostic nominalist can take mathematical state-
ments at face value. Bueno’s strategy is basically to employ Azzouni’s neu-
tral quantifiers. The idea is that if the standard interpretation of quantifiers
is neutral from an ontological point of view, as Azzouni claims, a statement
like ‘there are infinitely many natural numbers’ can be true without com-
mitting to either abstracta or concreta. But because quantifiers are neutral,
they cannot dictate what exists and what does not. In addition, the agnostic
nominalist notices how abstract objects are even compatible with Azzouni’s
mind– and language– independence criterion. This is because the Platonist
can agree with Azzouni on the criterion for what exists and claims in fact
that abstract objects are mind– and language– independent. And when Az-
zouni argues that mathematical objects are actually ontologically dependent
on us, the Platonist can still reply that Azzouni is begging the question.29
28Bueno (2008, p. 104).
29‘And if one insists that the only existing things are those that are causally accessible to
us, we would simply be begging the question against the Platonist, who has less restrictive
ontological constraints’ (2008, p. 100).
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As a result, if the anti-Platonist cannot claim that mathematical objects
are mind– and language– independent without reaching a stalemate, there
are only two alternatives: we can either show that mathematics is actually
dispensable, like Field does, or we can endorse agnosticism. By the sec-
ond option, the nominalist maintains the agreement with the Platonist on
mathematical statements semantics.
How does the agnostic nominalist explain the application of mathemat-
ics? Given that for Bueno mathematical objects are artifacts, or fictions,
one may expect that agnostic nominalism would have as many problems as
fictionalism does. However, mathematical discourse is not taken to be false
within agnostic nominalism. Since quantifiers are ontologically neutral, they
do not force us to be committed to anything, and so mathematical discourse
can be true even without the existence of objects. In this sense, agnostic
nominalism can be regarded as an easy road to nominalism: mathemati-
cal practice is naturally agnostic. Mathematical artifacts describe empirical
phenomena as well as metaphors can have a grip on reality.
At this point the Platonist can reply by noticing that mathematics does
not provide only description of the physical world, but it also provides gen-
uine explanations of empirical phenomena. Thus, the indispensability argu-
ment strikes again in a new form. Imagine that mathematical explanations
involve the existence of mathematical facts about that physical event. If
there are mathematical explanations of physical phenomena, and such ex-
planations are indispensable to our best scientific theories, then there are
mathematical facts. But these facts are about mathematical objects, and
therefore mathematical objects must exist.
To argue against this new form of the indispensability argument, Bueno
runs a counter-reply to show how mathematical explanations do not require
the existence of mathematical objects. What we call ‘mathematical ex-
planations’ are actually just descriptions of empirical phenomena. Bueno’s
point is that mathematics must be firstly interpreted in order to provide
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a suitable explanation of physical events.30 Mathematics by itself cannot
explain a physical event unless we properly attribute a physical meaning to
constants and variables. Uninterpreted mathematical statements describe
only relations among mathematical objects: not physical ones. And even
when mathematics is properly interpreted, the event under description is
still physical.
Interpretation is also the key to explain the applications of mathematics
to the physical world. Let us consider the sentence ‘there is the real number
6.02214129 × 1023’. This sentence does not have any grip on the physical
world unless we interpret that constant physically as the Avogadro constant:
that is, as the number of molecules per mole of a physical substance. Only
after we have interpreted that real number as the Avogadro constant, can we
use it to understand the interactions between molecules. But again, we are
describing physical interactions: not mathematical facts. And if no math-
ematical facts can explain physical events, the indispensability argument
based on mathematical explanations is easily blocked.
I would like to make a last remark before I turn to Azzouni’s objection
to agnostic nominalism. The underdetermination of mathematical theories
by the physical world can be used in order to show the indeterminacy of
mathematical objects. Roughly speaking, if the same empirical results are
obtained by using different mathematical theories, we cannot choose which
theory is true on the basis of empirical considerations.31 So long as underde-
termination comes into picture, it does not matter which mathematical the-
ory we pick out and, as a consequence, it does not also matter what kind of
mathematical objects we take to exist. Imagine two different mathematical
theories M1 and M2, where M1 entails the existence of objects x1, x2, ..., xn,
and M2 entails the existence of y1, y2, ..., yn. If M1 and M2 describe the
30See Bueno (2012, p. 972).
31The case of mathematics may be similar to the question of different interpretations of
quantum mechanics. If, say, the Copenhagen and many-worlds interpretations of quantum
mechanics lead to the same empirical results, it seems that the nature of the wave-function
will be underdetermined by those interpretations.
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same empirical phenomenon, we cannot choose between x1, x2, ..., xn and
y1, y2, ..., yn on the basis of empirical considerations. And, from an empiri-
cist point of view, it does not matter matter what kind of mathematical
objects we are committed to.
Establishing the indeterminacy of mathematical objects is not enough
for the agnostic. We can be agnostic, say, about the existence of sets and
categories under the assumption that category theory and set theory can be
used to describe the same empirical phenomena. But this point does not
undermine the thesis that mathematical objects exist, because we also need
a nominalistic theory that describes the same empirical phenomena as those
theories with mathematical objects do.32
4.2.1 Azzouni’s objection to agnostic nominalism
Azzouni’s critique of agnostic nominalism33 is based on Bueno’s acceptance
of the epistemic role puzzle, according to which mathematical practice does
not require the existence of mathematical objects. Azzouni argues that
agnostic nominalism is incompatible with the epistemic role puzzle and,
moreover, agnostic nominalism does not provide any further advantages over
Azzouni’s nominalism. This is because agnostic nominalism either depends
on a reformulation of current linguistic practices, or it depends on a broader
form of agnosticism. The last point is particularly interesting, because if
it is possible to show how we cannot draw a sharp line between agnostic
nominalism and global agnosticism, then agnostic nominalism will not be
restricted only to mathematics, but it will spread out to every object — i.e.
agnostic nominalism is just global agnosticism.
I am going to spell out what global and local agnosticism are. But first,
I would like to point out the difference between skepticism and agnosticism,
since there are forms of agnosticism that are not skeptical. Roughly speak-
ing, the skeptic argues that knowledge is impossible. Cartesian doubt is
32Hellman’s reconstruction of real analysis, for instance.
33Azzouni (forthcoming a).
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perhaps the most common and radical form of skepticism, since it is well
known how Descartes casts doubt on any area of knowledge: from common
sense to scientific truths. In this sense, Cartesian doubt is what we can
call a ‘global form of skepticism’. But one does not need to endorse global
skepticism to be considered a skeptic. Indeed, local forms of skepticism are
still possible, as when a specific area of knowledge, like mathematics, is in
doubt. In this way, what would be at issue is only mathematical knowledge.
However, Bueno neither endorses global skepticism nor a local one. He is
not a skeptic, at least according to the definition that I provided above. For
Bueno, mathematical knowledge is not at issue, since it can be explained
by looking at what follows from comprehension principles. More likely, the
agnostic argues that if it is unclear how to establish whether a certain thing
exists or not, then it is rational to suspend judgment on its existence. In
short, the agnostic is agnostic about objects, whereas the skeptical is skep-
tical about propositions. We can also distinguish between global and local
agnosticism: the global agnostic suspends judgment on existential assertions
independently of any context, whereas the local agnostic suspends judgment
on a targeted domain.
This distinction is useful to understand Azzouni’s argument against ag-
nostic nominalism. Although Azzouni does not make this distincion, I think
that he aims to show that, given certain assumptions, local agnosticism de-
pends on global agnosticism. To do that, Azzouni starts with noticing how
both noun phrases and quantifiers can be used non-referringly in the natural
language, where by ‘non-referringly’ Azzouni means that those expressions
do not refer to objects. The most common example is, perhaps, when we are
engaged in an activity that involves fictional characters. For example, I can
talk about Sherlock Holmes even if the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ does not re-
fer to a real detective. Ordinary speakers do not need to specify whether an
expression is used non-referringly if they can track the relevant information
down from the context.
Azzouni observes that when an expression is used non-referringly, it is
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pointless being agnostic about the existence of the objects to which that
expression is not supposed to refer to. For instance, if it is clear that we are
telling a fairy tale about hobbits and dragons, why should one be agnostic
about their existence? The point is not that hobbits and dragons are fictional
objects because nobody has ever met them, but because they are explicitly
made up by speakers. In other words, it is clear from the context that these
objects do not exist. One can still be agnostic about their existence, of
course, independently of what the speakers mean. But if this is so, why
should not agnosticism spread out to any domain?
To see how Azzouni’s argument works, let us keep in mind that, ac-
cording to Bueno, abstract objects do not play any role in mathematical
practice. Because of this, Azzouni can argue that Bueno’s thesis may be
reformulated saying that mathematical terms do not refer to abstracta. But
if it is true that mathematical terms do not refer to abstracta, why should
we be agnostic about their existence? Bueno has no reasons to be agnos-
tic about these objects because, Azzouni argues, he admits that they have
no role in mathematical practice. The situation is almost identical to the
case of fairy tales that I mentioned earlier: if hobbits are made up by the
storyteller, why should one be agnostic about their existence? After all, it
is clear that this is just a story about hobbits, and if we are still not sure
whether or not hobbits exist, something important is missing: the fact that
the story is just a fairy tale.
If Azzouni’s analogy is accurate, the only reason to be agnostic about
the existence of fictional characters relies on the fact that Bueno had already
endorsed global agnosticism; that is to say, we are going to be agnostic about
what the storyteller says independently of any content. In the same way, if
Bueno knows that abstract objects have no role in mathematical practice
— the story teller is just telling a story — he can be agnostic about their
existence only by endorsing global agnosticism. Azzouni is not running a
counter-argument to global agnosticism, but points to a serious difficulty for
those who want to be local agnostics. If Azzouni’s argument works, it seems
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that agnostic nominalism depends on general sympathy for a global form of
agnosticism that is not targeted for the specific context of mathematics.
To sum up, it seems hard to be both agnostic and nominalist unless one
adopts global agnosticism. But consider the following response to Azzouni:
because quantifiers are ontologically neutral, Bueno is simply not ruling out
that that mathematical terms can be used non-referringly. The agnostic
does not know whether or not mathematical terms are used referringly: he,
or she, suspends judgment on the use of the notion of reference. However,
this solution is ruled out because, Azzouni argues, mathematical terms are
used non-referringly: if names are introduced into a context where they
are deliberately being used non-referringly, it is pointless to be agnostic.
The fact that mathematical practice does not require the existence of math-
ematical objects indicates for Azzouni that mathematical terms are used
non-referringly.
Let us assume that the agnostic nominalist agrees with Azzouni that
mathematical practice does not refer to abstract objects. In this regard, the
agnostic nominalist may be tempted to insist that agnosticism is not about
actual mathematical expressions, but about the possibility that mathemat-
ical terms may refer to abstract objects. But if this is so, Azzouni insists,
the worry would not be about actual mathematical practice but about a
possible mathematical practice. Again, agnostic nominalism would emerge
from global agnosticism: how can we know that there are not other practices
where mathematical terms refer to abstract objects?
Azzouni’s point is that if the agnostic nominalist accepts that the non-
referringly use is the standard one, he ro she does not have any specific
reason to be agnostic, aside from general sympathy for global agnosticism.
Basically, Azzouni rightly notes a tension between nominalism and agnosti-
cism, and so the agnostics face a challenge: they should either challenge the
epistemic role puzzle, leaving behind his nominalism, or they should stretch
their agnosticism, but then failing to be locally agnostic about mathematical
abstracta.
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Can the agnostic break that impasse? I will attempt to show how the
agnostic should not be worried about the epistemic role puzzle and, in addi-
tion, that it is possible to be agnostic about mathematical objects without
endorsing global agnosticism. But first, it is important to understand how
the agnostic nominalist got in this unpleasant situation. The reason is this:
one should be careful to agree with the nominalist that abstract objects
have no role in mathematical practice and, at the same time, wink at the
Platonist by saying that perhaps abstracta exist, perhaps they do not. But
does the epistemic role puzzle imply that mathematical terms are used non-
referringly? The agnostic should be wise enough to address that question
negatively by pointing out that whether or not mathematical terms are used
referringly is indeterminate. In other words, the agnostic could argue that
mathematicians are neutral about whether or not mathematical terms are
used referringly.
The agnostic, unfortunately, cannot simply get away with the last re-
mark. Here is how Azzouni could reply: unless mathematicians intention-
ally use mathematical terms referringly, the agnostic should accept that
these terms function non-referringly. Mathematicians, Azzouni continues,
do not try to study objects that are outside of space and time. Therefore,
mathematical terms function non-referringly and, as a consequence, the only
reason to be agnostic about mathematical objects must be, only, on prior
acceptance of global agnosticism.
I will attempt to disarm Azzouni’s argument. The agnostic can point
out that many mathematicians are Platonists, and for them mathematical
terms refer to objects outside of space and time. It is clearly an empirical
question whether or not mathematical terms are used referringly, but mathe-
maticians’ answer to that problem is not unanimous. In fact, Azzouni seems
to think that the answer is agreed by everyone and that mathematical terms
are clearly used non-referringly. However, because there is a widespread dis-
agreement among mathematicians on whether or not mathematical terms
refer to, the agnostic does not sound preposterous. secondly, the agnostic
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can try to prove that Azzouni is assuming his nominalism in order to make
his argument: he assumes that mathematical objects are fictions. But in
point of fact, there is a strong dis-analogy between hobbits and mathemati-
cal objects: the former are clearly fictional characters, made up by epistemic
agents, whereas the status of the latter is controversial.
Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Four claims
In the previous chapters I examined some easy-roads to anti-Platonism. I
would now like to highlight a common idea behind such easy-roads. The
point, I think, is that we cannot find evidence to support the existence
of abstracta as regards the way the physical world behaves. According to
Azzouni and Bueno, the evidence we lack is epistemic; according to Balaguer,
it is the mechanism of the physical world that does not require abstract
objects, because nothing in the world follows from the existence, or non-
existence, of abstracta. These may be summarized as follows,
Azzouni’s epistemic role puzzle: Mathematical objects play no epistemic
role whatsoever in mathematical practice. If mathematical objects
ceased to exist, mathematical work would go on as usual.
Bueno’s agnostic nominalism: Mathematical practice does not require
the existence of abstract objects, but this claim still does not set-
tle the issue regarding whether mathematical abstract objects exist.
Moreover, even though mathematical explanations do not require the
existence of mathematical objects, the claim does not settle the issue
regarding whether mathematical abstract objects exist either.
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Balaguer’s modal anti-factualism: The sentence ‘there are objects that
exist outside of space-time’ does not have truth-conditions. Thus,
there is no fact of the matter as to which possible worlds count as
worlds where ‘there are objects that exist outside of space-time’ is
true, because our usage does not determine how worlds would be like
for ‘there are objects that exist outside of space-time’ to have (possible-
worlds-style) truth-conditions. This argument does not aim to estab-
lish that abstract objects do not exist, i.e. it is not an argument for
nominalism. In point of fact, Balaguer argues that if our usage does
not determine truth-conditions for ‘there are abstract objects’, then
there is no fact of the matter.
Each claim leads to a different conclusion: Azzouni argues for nomi-
nalism (no abstracta); Bueno’s conclusion is agnosticism (we do not know
whether or not abstracta exist); Balaguer’s final claim is non-factualism (no
facts can settle the ontological disagreement). But they all have in common
the idea that we cannot find evidence to support the existence of abstracta as
regards the way the physical world behaves, because abstracta are supposed
to be outside of space and time.
Yablo highlights a further problem. Logical subtraction is basically a
philosophical tool to show how physical conditions do not prove (or dis-
prove) propositions about the existence of abstract objects. More precisely,
logical subtraction aims to show how the proposition there are numbers is
perfectly extricable from the propositions that are involved in our best scien-
tific theories. However, logical subtraction is far from being an argument for
nominalism: at best it shows that propositions about physical objects do not
require the existence of numbers, because we can find truthmakers for such
propositions in numberless worlds that are compatible with the existence
of numbers. More likely, logical subtraction tends to breed a form of ag-
nosticism: even though there are numbers can be extricated from empirical
sciences, this does not show that numbers do not exist, because both Pla-
tonistic and numberless possible worlds are not ruled out. In other words,
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as stated in
Yablo’s modal orthogonality claim: If how matters stand physically is
orthogonal to mathematical objects exist, then the physical world nei-
ther demands nor precludes the existence of mathematical objects (in
any world). The physical world is thus compatible with the (non-
)existence of mathematical objects. This consideration is not an ar-
gument against Platonism because, as far as physical objects are
concerned, they can indifferently be in a world that has or does not
have abstract objects.
Yablo’s orthogonality claim may resemble Balaguer’s anti-factualism, be-
cause they both lead to a stand-off between Platonism and anti-Platonism,
and because Yablo and Balaguer both employ the concept of possible worlds.
But there are possible worlds where abstract objects may exist for Yablo,
whereas for Balaguer there is no fact of the matter. Yablo’s orthogonality
claim, on the other hand, might also resemble agnostic nominalism. But
whereas Bueno argues that we cannot know whether or not abstract objects
exist, knowledge of abstracta is not at issue for Yablo. Besides, it is interest-
ing to note how Balaguer, Bueno, and Yablo all have in common a stand-off
between Platonism and anti-Platonism. This does not prove that the on-
tological debate is meaningless, but that some easy-roads that I presented
earlier are either agnostic (Bueno), or imply agnosticism (Balaguer), or are
compatible with agnosticism (Yablo).
5.2 My own agnostic view
To some extent, agnosticism is a new view in philosophy of mathematics.
As far as I know, there are only two philosophers who have argued that
we cannot settle the debate between Platonism and anti-Platonism. Conse-
quently, so it is claimed, we ought to suspend judgment on whether or not
mathematical abstracta exist. According to Balaguer, the ontological debate
cannot be settled because there is no fact of the matter as to whether or
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not abstract objects exist. On the other hand, according to Bueno, even
though mathematical practice does not involve abstracta, there is no way to
establish whether or not there are such objects.1
It is important to distinguish Bueno’s agnosticism from Balaguer’s anti-
factualism. As previously shown, Balaguer’s agnostic conclusion follows
from his non-factualism, that is, from the idea that there is no fact of the
matter. Balaguer’s point is that our usage does not determine how worlds
would be made for abstract objects to exist: namely, the statement ‘there are
abstract objects’ lacks (possible-worlds-style) truth-conditions. By contrast,
Bueno argues that even though abstract objects play no role in mathematical
practice, we cannot ever know whether or not such objects exist. Since
they are supposed to be outside of space and time, there is no way of (dis-
)proving their existence. To support agnosticism, Bueno endorses Azzouni’s
neutralist quantifiers: existential quantifiers do not force any ontological
commitment to abstracta.
But here lies a question: if abstract objects have no role in mathemat-
ical proofs, or in mathematical practice, why should we suppose that they
might exist? After all, if abstracta disappeared nothing would change in
the way mathematicians prove theorems. Consider the following thought
experiment:2
Imagine that mathematical objects ceased to exist sometime in
1968. Mathematical work went on as usual.3
Some years later, Balaguer came up with a similar thought experiment,
although Balaguer commits himself to the nominalistic content of empirical
theories:
1Quine’s non-factualism about translation is an important antecedent. Quine argues
that there is no fact of the matter about how words such as ‘gavagai’ should be translated.
‘Gavagai’ means ‘rabbit’ relative to a translation scheme, but there is no fact of the matter
about what translation is the right one.
2What follows is not Azzouni’s objection to agnostic nominalism.
3Azzouni (1994, p. 56).
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If all the objects in the mathematical realm suddenly disap-
peared, nothing would change in the physical world; thus, if
empirical science is true right now, then its nominalistic content
would remain true, even if the mathematical realm disappeared.4
If abstract objects disappeared nothing would change in the way mathe-
maticians prove theorems or, more generally, in the physical world. There is
no scientific study of the epistemic access to mathematical abstracta, whereas
in the empirical sciences we attempt to improve our epistemic access to phys-
ical entities by building complex instruments and machines. In the empirical
sciences a mechanism for refining our epistemic access is involved, in contrast
to what happens in mathematics. The way mathematicians prove theorems
does not require epistemic access to mathematical objects.
Platonists could easily agree with the considerations I have cited. After
all, the indispensability argument is a way of supplying the lack of an epis-
temic role for abstract objects. In addition, Platonists could agree that no
one can dictate that an object exists only by thinking of it or symbolizing it,
and they could also agree that anything exists if it is mind– and language–
independent. In this regard, the dispute between the Platonist and anti-
Platonists is mainly about how we recognize that an object is mind– and
language– independent. For example, this is what Azzouni claims:
if an object has no epistemic role, then it’s mind- and language-
dependent, and therefore (by our criterion) it doesn’t exist. Math-
ematical abstracta have no epistemic role. Conclusion: there are
no mathematical abstracta.5
What does Azzouni mean by ‘epistemic role’? An object has an epis-
temic role if the way we discover its properties involves either physical inter-
actions with that object or with theoretically-related objects.6 According
4Balaguer (1998, p. 132).
5Azzouni (forthcoming b).
6See Azzouni (2012b, pp. 956-957).
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to Azzouni’s terminology, in the former case the epistemic access is thick
whereas in the latter, it is thin.
Azzouni’s criterion of existence needs to be distinguished from how we
determine what exists. The criterion is a necessary and sufficient condition
for existence,7 but it often requires to be combined with an empirical test
to know whether or not an object exists. Even though we do not need an
empirical test for gold to exist, because the existence of gold is independent
of our epistemic access to it, the way to determine whether or not an item is
golden is empirical. To detect existing objects we can employ the senses, but
also instruments that extend our epistemic access. In addition, we can also
deduce the existence of entities from relevant background assumptions, i.e.,
theory. For example, although we do not have thick access to items that are
outside our light cone, scientists can nonetheless commit themselves to their
existence. In other words, there are posits that may take to exist because
they have an excuse for not being thick.
Azzouni does not draw up a list of what such excuses are, but claims
that they arise from scientific practice itself. Scientists are able to decide
whether an item is thin on the basis of their internal standards, so that
thin posits can be taken to exist even without our having thick epistemic
access to them. However, mathematical objects do not benefit from any
excuse of that kind (they are neither thick nor thin) because the epistemic
role puzzle applies to them: no epistemic story can be told about the role
that mathematical objects would play in the way mathematicians prove
theorems. If such posits had any role, mathematical practice would change
when the epistemic access to abstracta was mistaken. But nothing like that
is involved in mathematical practice. A mathematical mistake
can be a matter of our failure to execute a computation correctly
[. . . ] but it can also be a matter of conceptualizing a class of
objects the wrong way. What it never involves, however, is that
the mechanism of our epistemic access to the abstracta under
7Azzouni (2012b, p. 955).
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study is misleading.8
Because of this, mathematical posits cannot be thick.9 Neither can they
be thin, since we would need a reason rooted in our scientific practices:
this much seems true about thin posits: they are what we com-
mit ourselves to that goes beyond what we have thick epistemic
access to [...] on the basis of our current best scientific theories.10
For Azzouni, the fact that mathematical posits are acausal does not
count as a reason for considering them thin posits, because it does not
come directly from mathematical practice, but it is just a philosophical
gloss on that practice. The nature of mathematical posits is not involved in
mathematical practice.
In Azzouni’s view, the epistemic role puzzle explains why mathematical
posits are not thin, and he argues that this is inconsistent with agnostic
nominalism. According to Azzouni, agnostic nominalists face the follow-
ing challenge: either they accept that mathematical terms are used non-
referringly, or they may argue that they do not know whether or not math-
ematical terms are employed referringly. The former case is a consequence
of the epistemic role puzzle: if mathematical objects have no epistemic role
in mathematical practice, why should we suppose that mathematical terms
refer to anything? And if they do not refer to anything, it is pointless to be
agnostic about the existence of mathematical objects unless one has a broad
skeptical attitude that goes beyond mathematics. On the other hand, sup-
pose that the agnostic does not know whether mathematical terms are used
referringly or used non-referringly. After all, if quantifiers are ontologically
8Azzouni (forthcoming b).
9Azzouni’s epistemic role puzzle could also be applied to mathematical objects even if
they were concreta. For instance, even if mathematical objects were perceived, we should
nonetheless account for the epistemic role that such concreta have in mathematical proofs.
Notice that even if mathematical objects are metaphysically necessary (i.e. they cannot
disappear), we should still account for their epistemic role in mathematical proofs.
10Azzouni (2012b, p. 962).
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neutral, one could be agnostic about whether they refer to a domain of ex-
isting objects. But this option is also problematic. For neutral quantifiers to
work, mathematical terms are used non-referringly unless mathematicians
intend to employ them referringly. Again, if the agnostic accepts the epis-
temic role puzzle, he or she should also agree that mathematical terms are
employed non-referringly. And even if some kind of correspondence between
mathematical terms and abtracta were to occur, it would not happen by ac-
cident but would hold because mathematicians intend to refer to abstracta.
Reference does not often happen by accident.
Notice that even if we supposed that mathematical terms refer to mind–
and language- independent abstracta, there would be no empirical way to
determine whether or not such objects exist. This is because mind– and
language- independent abstracta are immunized against any empirical test
whatsoever. Given the inertness of mind– and language- independent math-
ematical abstracta, the physical interaction between the way mathematicians
prove theorems and abstract objects cannot in principle occur. By contrast,
galaxies that are far away from our light cone are not causally inert, despite
the fact that we cannot physically interact with them. Even if mind– and
language– independent abstracta existed, they would be irrelevant to math-
ematical practice. After all, the reason why the indispensability argument
is so important for the Platonist is because it shifts the burden of proof
from epistemology to the indispensability of quantification over abstracta
in physics. Since scientists cannot avoid quantification over mathematical
abstracta, so it is claimed, these objects must exist. But quantification,
on its own, is neutral about whether or not mathematical terms are used
referringly. In that sense the agnostic should employ neutralist quantifiers.
To sum up, whether or not abstract objects existed, mathematical prac-
tice would go as usual, and quantification on its own does not tell us whether
or not mathematical terms are used referringly. But do mathematical terms
refer to anything? The agnostic should reject the claim that mathematical
terms are commonly used non-referringly. After all, many mathematicians
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think that mathematical terms do refer to something, and some of them
think that their terms refer to abstracta. Perhaps these mathematicians are
wrong about how language works, but the matter of whether mathemati-
cians should use their terms non-referringly is not at stake. What I am
arguing is that if mathematical terms intend to refer to abstract objects,
we cannot know whether or not mind– and language– independent abstracta
exist. We find out whether an object exists by looking to our (thin or thick)
epistemic access to it, but epistemic access cannot be used to determine
whether or not such abstracta exist, because of their specific nature: they
are causally inert objects.
It might seem that for the agnostic the nature of mathematical objects
(i.e. being mind– and language– independent abstracta) comes before the
problem of whether mathematical terms are used referringly. And this seems
to reverse our natural way of reasoning: first, we ask ourselves whether or
not a term refers to and secondly, we may say something about the nature of
the entity that the term refers to. This is because speculating on the nature
of non-existing entities is simply pointless; so if mathematical terms are
used non-referringly, it does not make sense to wonder about the nature of
mathematical objects. Perhaps the agnostic is just begging the question by
putting the nature of mathematical objects ahead of whether mathematical
terms are used referringly or not. However, this problem does not have a
single answer: some mathematicians employ mathematical terms referringly,
others do not. To me, the interesting point is how our world would behave if
mathematical terms referred to mind– and language– independent abstracta.
Let us suppose that someone is using mathematical terms referringly.
In this case, we will require a test in order to determine whether or not
mathematical abstracta are mind– and language– independent. The way
to figure it out usually relies on its epistemic role; however, because of
Azzouni’s epistemic role puzzle, mathematical posits must be mind– and
language– dependent. Thus, the agnostic should attempt to disarm the
epistemic role puzzle.
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Certainly, the epistemic role puzzle on its own neither proves, nor dis-
proves, the existence of abstract objects. In other words, even if there is no
epistemic role for abstracta, that claim, on its own, is compatible with the
(non-) existence of abstracta. To become an argument against Platonism,
the epistemic role puzzle requires something more: if there is no epistemic
role for X, either there is no X, or X has a “good reason” that allows X to
be a thin posit. According to Colyvan, the fact that mathematical objects
are abstracta may count as a good excuse for them to be considered (ultra-)
thin posits. But Colyvan’s claim is implausible. Physicists offer physical
explanations to commit themselves to the existence of more items than the
matter within our light cone; biologists use fossil constraints and rates of
molecular change to deduce the time in geologic history when two species
diverged; and so on. Abstractness is not a good excuse to regard math-
ematical objects as existing posits, since it is not rooted in our scientific
practices.11
In contrast to Colyvan, I do not think there are any good excuse that
allows mathematical abstracta to be existing posits. What I am arguing is
that even though there is no epistemic role for mind– and language– inde-
pendent mathematical abstracta, we still have a good reason to be agnostic
about their existence. Let us call it ‘the exclusion condition’: abstracta are
supposed to be mind– and language– independent objects that are causally
inert. If mathematical abstracta enjoy the exclusion condition, the fact that
they have no epistemic role merely implies that nothing epistemically rele-
vant to mathematical practice follows from the existence, or non existence,
of such abstracta. In other words, the existence of objects that enjoy the
exclusion condition does not influence our epistemic practices such as the
way mathematicians prove theorems. It does not matter for mathematical
practice whether or not mind– and language– independent mathematical
abstracta exist.
This is how one might reply: the exclusion condition does not come from
11See also Azzouni (2012b, p. 963) and sec. n. 3.1.5.
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mathematical practice; it is a merely philosophical gloss on that practice,
and so it does not count as a good reason.12 As mentioned earlier, I agree
that the abstractness of mathematical objects cannot be an excuse to re-
gard such objects as existing posits. Such an excuse should come from our
scientific theories. However, even though the exclusion condition is a pure
philosophical condition, I do not see that there is problem with respect to
agnosticism is concerned. Agnostics continue looking to science to discover
what exists and what does not; they are not trying to engage with science
by advocating some philosophical excuse, but just pointing out that certain
philosophical questions are indeterminate. Agnosticism is clearly consistent
with scientific practice.
The fact that our epistemic practices are restricted within space and time
does not imply that the objects that are beyond such practices are mind– and
language– dependent. Our concept of existence is tightly bounded by space
and time. Nevertheless, even though we cannot imagine what the existence
outside of space and time would be like, the point is not relevant when
addressing the problem of whether or not abstracta exist. This is because
the problem cannot be addressed within our epistemic practices. Moreover,
since nothing that is epistemically relevant follows from the existence of
mind– and language– independent abstract objects, the matter of whether
or not such objects exist is irrelevant to mathematical practice. In point
of fact, my claim is even stronger: for any practice in space and time, the
matter of whether mind– and language– independent abstracta exist or not
is irrelevant.
I have so far applied the exclusion condition to abstract objects that
are supposed to be mind– and language– independent, and I have claimed
that nothing that is epistemically relevant follows from their existence. In
addition, the exclusion condition separates local agnosticism from global
agnosticism, because it implies that we should be agnostic only about mind–
and language– independent abstracta. I now wish to clarify how agnosticism
12This is how Azzouni replies to Colyvan. See Azzouni (2012b, p. 964).
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does not spill over fictional or physical objects. The point is important for
those who endorse local agnosticism, that is, for those who do not want to
be agnostic about any object whatsoever. What the agnostic needs to be is
not to be agnostic about everything.13
Consider first the case of objects that have causal power. The exclusion
condition does not apply to such objects, and so we can tell whether or not
they exist: for a posit to exist, we either have thick access to it, or we are
thinly connected with it. In other words, the way we discover the properties
of objects that have causal power involves either physical interactions with
such objects or with theoretically-related objects.
Consider the case of fictional characters that are supposed to be ab-
stracta. There are two possible options: they are either mind– and language–
dependent or independent. On the one hand, if fictional characters are con-
sidered mind– and language– dependent, the exclusion condition does not
apply to them. This is because even if fictional objects were causally in-
ert, they would need to be considered mind– and language– independent for
the exclusion condition to apply to them. For example, I am not agnostic
about the existence of Sherlock Holmes exists insofar as I consider Sher-
lock Holmes a mind– and language– dependent object. On the other hand,
suppose that fictional objects were mind– and language– independent. In
this case, the exclusion condition would hold, and thus we should be ag-
nostic about the existence of such objects. I nevertheless do not think that
there are any good reasons to conceive of fictional characters as mind– and
language– independent objects. If someone recognizes that Sherlock Holmes
is a fictional character, Sherlock Holmes should be considered a mind– and
language– dependent object.
Now, consider the indispensabilist objection: even if the agnostic is right,
one may claim that certain abstracta, i.e. mathematical abstracta, must ex-
13A caveat: consider the case of mind– and language– independent objects that are
causally inert. Because of the exclusion condition, we can never know whether or not
they exist or not. The exclusion condition is indeed applied to any mind– and language–
independent abstracta whatsoever.
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ist insofar as they are indispensable to our best scientific theories. I would
answer in these terms: even if we ought to assume that certain existence
of mathematical entities to formulate our best scientific theories, the in-
dispensability argument does not tell us whether such entities are mind–
and language– independent. But consider the following counter-replies: one
could argue that (1) Platonism is our best view of mathematical objects, be-
cause we cannot break Turing machines, nor we can causally interact with
numbers, and so on; (2) we also have good reasons to claim that mathe-
matical objects are not concreta, because there are not as many concrete
objects as we need in the universe to represent all mathematical objects; (3)
if mathematical objects are mind– and language dependent, they simply do
not exist. Regarding this, I wish to point out I do not need to show that
Platonism is false, since I argue that there is no way to prove, or disprove the
existence of mind– and language– independent abstracta. I just suggested
that agnosticism may be compatible with the indispensability argument.
I would now like to suggest how the agnostic does not need to reject con-
firmation holism altogether. It seems there are at least two ways of rejecting
confirmation holism: on the one hand, according to Sober and Maddy, the
confirmation of empirical hypotheses cannot be used to show the truth of
mathematical theories; on the other hand, according to Balaguer, the con-
firmation of empirical hypotheses does not show the existence of abstract
objects, because the behavior of the physical world is not dependent on
the existence of abstract objects. Agnostics can partially endorse confirma-
tion holism: they can commit themselves to posits to which we have epis-
temic access, but they remain agnostic about the existence of mind– and
language– independent abstracta. In other words, empirical confirmation
cannot be used to prove, or disprove, the existence of mind– and language–
independent abstract objects. In addition, agnosticism seems compatible
with Field’s argument against Platonism. If we are not able to account for
the correlation between belief states and mind– and language– independent
abstract objects, Field argues that Platonists cannot explain why expert
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mathematicians are reliable. But if such abstracta does not play any role
in mathematical practice, there is no need to disarm Field’s argument: the
agnostic overcomes Field’s argument.
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